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1
Introduction
The perfectly competitive, frictionless, complete information general
equilibrium model has served as the cornerstone to modern economic
theory for over 50 years. However, the Walrasian assumption that
markets clear necessarily assumes away the possibility of unemploy
ment. This is a particularly disturbing problem for anyone who wishes
to consult basic economic theory for guidance. After all, much public
debate concerning economic policy revolves around the expected ef
fects of proposed policies on the unemployment rate and the welfare
of the unemployed. In light of this and in light of the fact that unemploy
ment exists and persists, it is vitally important for economists to ex
pand their basic paradigm in a manner that would allow for the investiga
tion of issues related to unemployment.
Prior to the 1960s, the amount of work devoted to unemployment
was limited. Most studies that focused on unemployment tended to
assume that it was due either to a minimum wage, rigid wages, or unions.
It is by now well accepted that unions alone cannot cause unemploy
ment as long as a sector of the economy remains nonunionized (see any
standard macroeconomic text, such as Parkin 1984). Unions can cause
wage differentials across sectors but cannot keep the labor market in
nonunionized sectors from clearing. Minimum wages also seem to be
an unlikely cause of a significant amount of unemployment, since only
a small percentage of the economy's jobs are affected by the minimum
wage laws. Moreover, recent empirical evidence provided by Brown,
Gilroy, and Kohen (1982) suggests that minimum wages do not con
tribute significantly to adult unemployment (although they can be viewed
as a significant contributor to teenage unemployment). Finally, models
with rigid wages are of little value unless they also provide an explana
tion of the cause of the rigidity; otherwise, it is impossible to predict
how various policies will affect unemployment and real wages.
Therefore, little, if any, success at understanding the phenomenon of
unemployment was achieved prior to 1960.
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In contrast, over the past 25 years the causes and consequences of
unemployment have been a major focus of much research. Most of the
studies have remained in the traditional paradigm, but have extended
the basic model by dropping one or more of the assumptions that lead
to market clearing. For example, in models with unemployment
generated by search, the assumption that unemployed workers and firms
with vacancies are instantaneously matched is replaced with the assump
tion that it takes time and effort for the trading parties to find each other.
Other lines of research have introduced unemployment by allowing for
incomplete information in the marketplace (the implicit contracts and
efficiency wage literatures) or by assuming that quantities adjust faster
than prices to clear markets (the fixed price or disequilibrium literature).
In each case, however, most of the studies have tended to focus on the
technical details and the theoretical aspects of the models and little has
been done to make these new theories accessible to the majority of the
profession and policymakers. Moreover, only recently have these
theories been developed to the point that serious empirical investiga
tions could be undertaken.
The purpose of this monograph is to provide a nontechnical summary
of the most prominent theories of unemployment that have emerged
since 1960: search, disequilibrium (i.e., fixed price models), implicit
contracts, efficiency wage, and insider/outsider models. This is ac
complished by reviewing selected articles in each of the areas and distill
ing their arguments to the bare essentials. In this manner, I am able
to focus on the overall purpose of each line of research, its strengths,
and its major weaknesses. I have attempted to keep as much of the discus
sion at as nontechnical a level as is possible by relying heavily on graphs
and intuitive arguments, with some occasional elementary calculus. The
level of technical difficulty varies with topic. For example, many of
the arguments in the implicit contracts chapter are presented graphically.
On the other hand, some basic calculus is required in part of the chapter
on search theory. By presenting the material in this manner, I hope to
make the new theories more accessible to the profession and shorten
the time lag that usually exists between the development of a new theory
and the empirical work that is necessary to test its implications.
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The monograph consists of five chapters in addition to the introduc
tion. Chapter 2 is devoted to the search literature; beginning with Stigler's
classic article on the economics of information and proceeding gradually
to the general equilibrium search models of Diamond (1981, 1982a.,
1982b, 1984a, 1984b). In chapter 3, I turn my attention to the fixed
price or disequilibrium literature. Coverage of this topic includes discus
sion of the work by Barro and Grossman (1971), Malinvaud (1977),
and Benassy (1982). Since one of the major insights provided by this
literature is that the most effective policy for combating unemployment
depends upon which markets are out of equilibrium (in addition to the
labor market), I emphasize the relationship between the appropriate
policy prescription and the structure of market disequilibrium. Recent
work on imperfect competition in a general equilibrium setting and the
"coordination failures" that may result are also reviewed in this chapter,
with careful attention given to how this work relates to the earlier fixed
price models. Chapter 4 is devoted to the literature on implicit con
tracts. Here, particular emphasis is placed on the difficulties this line
of research encountered in attempting to explain the coexistence of wage
rigidity and unemployment in a contracting framework. Chapter 5 covers
the newest theories of unemployment the efficiency wage and in
sider/outsider theories of unemployment. Finally, in chapter 6, a sum
mary of the important insights provided by each theory is complemented
by a discussion of the important questions that remain to be addressed.
Before beginning, a brief word about the theories I have and have
not chosen to review in the monograph is in order. Most notably ab
sent is the "rational expectations" approach to macroeconomics
developed by Lucas, Sargent and Wallace, among others. This line of
research differs from those reviewed here in one fundamentally impor
tant aspect: it rejects the Keynesian approach to macroeconomics and
unemployment while the theories that I have chosen to survey can be
viewed as attempts to provide a solid microeconomic foundation for
the Keynesian model. This important distinction is explained in the
following passage from Diamond (1984b).
To contrast with equilibrium models, I will start with a
strawman Keynesian model. Prices and wages are given.
Resources are allocated on the basis of these prices and a
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rationing mechanism. Prices and wages then adjust in
response to the presence of rationing and past inflation rates.
We can see that this model is not micro based: transactions
are occurring at prices that neither clear the market nor come
from an explicit micro source that might generate trade at
nonclearing prices; furthermore, price adjustment is not
related to any explicit consideration of self-interested price
setting or price negotiations. Nevertheless, a model based
on this approach can be developed to give a reasonably good
fit to aggregate time series data. In addition this is a simple
framework that can be readily used for macro problems and
policies.
There are at least two possible reasons for constructing
micro-based models as an alternative to this approach. One
is a belief that the Keynesian model is basically wrong. The
second is a belief mat the model can be improved by
reconstruction from a micro foundation. The former is
represented by the rational-expectations equilibrium approach
to business cycles; the latter by my search-equilibrium ap
proach [and the other literatures surveyed here]. There is a
problem of vocabulary here. The [search] model I presented
in the first lecture has rational expectations, is an equilibrium
model, and can be viewed as an alternative to the Keynesian
model; yet it is not the type usually referred to as a rationalexpectations equilibrium model. Such a description is usually
applied to the models pioneered by Lucas, which I refer to
as the classical market approach.
The classical market approach says that the economy may
have the appearance of slow, nonclearing price and wage
movements, but that actually markets clear. The combina
tion of small price and wage movements is due to large intertemporal substitutabilities and misperceptions of relevant
relative prices. Such misperceptions are necessarily present
when markets are incomplete; that is, observed nominal prices
are not adequate guides to intertemporal relative prices. Note
that market clearance and market nonclearance are mutual
ly exclusive views of the world.
Diamond then goes on to argue (convincingly) that his search
framework provides models that are better able to explain micro data
(such as price dispersion) and fit macro data than the rational-expectations
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counterparts. In addition, he argues that the insights generated by his
model are much more robust with respect to changes in the underlying
assumptions. Although I believe that similar arguments hold for the other
models of unemployment surveyed here, I will not press this issue. In
stead, I will simply note that with its market-clearing framework, the
rational-expectations approach only provides an explanation for fluc
tuations in employment and output or, at best, voluntary unemployment.
In this monograph, I restrict attention to theories of involuntary
unemployment, that is, theories that are consistent with or provide a
rationale for Keynesian macroeconomics.

2
Search Theory
In the standard Walrasian general equilibrium model, trade is coor
dinated by a fictitious auctioneer who instantaneously matches buyers
and sellers. In addition, since prices adjust to equate supply and de
mand, all desired transactions take place at a single price or wage, the
one that clears the market. Therefore, price or wage offers are never
rejected by potential trading parties. In the search literature, unemploy
ment is generated by dropping one (or sometimes both) of these assump
tions. Search models assume that it takes time and effort for trading
parties to find each other. In addition, firms are allowed to offer dif
ferent equilibrium wages so that workers sometimes find it optimal to
reject a wage offer they consider too low. Workers who cannot find
a firm with a vacancy or workers who cannot find a firm offering a
sufficiently high wage remain unemployed. In such a setting, deter
minants of the unemployment rate include the search technology (the
process that matches workers and firms), the cost of search, and the
wage-offer distribution.
Although search models have provided insights into a wide variety
of labor-oriented issues, in this chapter I focus solely on their potential
value for understanding unemployment. In addition, rather than attempt
to provide a complete survey, my goal is to offer a critical overview
of the literature's historical development with an emphasis on the
usefulness of the models for policy analysis. In section B, I review papers
that adopt a "partial-partial" equilibrium approach. This phrase, coin
ed by Rothschild (1973), indicates that these models focus on only one
side of one market, i.e., the supply side of the labor market. 1 Most
of the studies in this category begin by assuming that firms offer dif
ferent wages and that unemployed workers search by contacting firms
until they find a wage offer they consider acceptable. The major result
supplied by this literature is a fairly complete characterization of the
optimal search strategy for an unemployed worker in a variety of
environments.
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To adequately investigate both the effects of policies aimed at reduc
ing unemployment and the hardship associated with joblessness, a full
equilibrium model is essential. The partial-partial equilibrium approach
tells us how policies affect the behavior of unemployed workers by alter
ing their incentives to accept or reject wage offers. However, the fact
that the firm's problem is never explicitly modeled (and therefore no
explanation of the origin of the wage-offer distribution is provided)
severely limits the number and type of questions that can be addressed
in this framework. Two different approaches have emerged to close
the model in a manner that would permit one to address policy issues:
the "reservation wage" and "trade friction" approaches. 2
Section C is devoted to an analysis of the reservation wage approach.
The studies that fit into this category generally build on models introduc
ed in the partial-partial equilibrium literature by endogenizing the wageoffer distribution. This allows for an investigation of the influence of
worker search behavior on firm behavior. Moreover, it allows for a
study of the types of incentives created by various policies and their
impact on labor demand. Unfortunately, most of the results from this
literature must be characterized as negative (or, at best, ambiguous)
and, at the end of the section, it is argued that further work along these
lines is not likely to be fruitful.
The newest and, in my opinion, most promising line of research is
reviewed in section D. This literature focuses on the difficulty that firms
with vacancies and unemployed workers face in trying to find each other.
Both sides of the market are modeled as active searchers attempting
to locate a trading party in a friction-filled world. Such models are com
monly referred to as "trade friction models." One of the most impor
tant insights provided by this line of research is that the individual's
search decision is riddled with externalities. This result implies that all
equilibria are (generally) suboptimal and gives rise to arguments for
corrective policies. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that when search
is required to find employment, there is a natural tendency towards multi
ple equilibria. This result further suggests that an active government
might improve the performance of the economy by guiding it to the
"best" equilibrium.
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An additional insight provided by the trade friction literature con
cerns the inherent social value of a job. Most economists would agree
that, if we ignore equity considerations, the social value of a job is ful
ly captured by the value of the stream of output it produces. This is
certainly true of employment in frictionless Walrasian general
equilibrium models. However, when frictional unemployment is pre
sent and workers are finitely lived, it has been shown that each job car
ries with it a surplus value above and beyond the value of the output
it produces. The intuition for this result runs along the following lines.
When search is required to find employment, a worker currently holding
a job is more likely to be employed in the future than his or her jobless
counterparts. Moreover, new generations entering the labor force must
incur at least a brief spell of unemployment as they search for their
first jobs. Therefore, since the current cohort of workers includes both
employed and unemployed workers, while future generations begin their
careers unemployed, the share of tomorrow's economic pie enjoyed by
members of today's generation increases with current employment. In
addition to implying that jobs are more valuable than the output they
produce, this result also implies that generations will differ in their
assessments of labor market policies. This has important implications
for the optimal labor market policies in the presence of search-generated
unemployment.
Before beginning, a few words about the approach taken in this survey
are in order. First, as a prelude to the review, I begin in section A by
providing a simple dynamic model of the labor market designed to show
how flows into and out of employment influence the equilibrium level
of unemployment. This allows me to refer to the model in future sec
tions in order to emphasize which aspects of unemployment can and
cannot be explained by the different models. Second, many of the studies
reviewed, especially those in sections B and C, focused on the implica
tions of search in product markets. However, since I am concerned solely
with the implications in terms of unemployment, I will take the liberty
of presenting the results as they apply to the labor market.
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A. Labor Market Dynamics
The unemployment rate changes over time for a variety of reasons.
Unemployed workers find jobs, employed workers quit to seek a bet
ter job, firms lay off part of their labor force, and so on. To examine
the effects of policies aimed at reducing unemployment, we need to
understand how these flows into and out of employment are determin
ed and how they interact to produce an equilibrium level of unemploy
ment. In this section I provide a simple dynamic model of the labor
market that allows me to address the second issue. 3 In the subsequent
sections, models of worker and firm search aimed at explaining the dif
ferent components of job turnover are reviewed.
To describe the evolution of the labor market over time, the follow
ing notation is introduced (t denotes the time period):
Nt =the number of labor force participants
Ut =the number of unemployed workers
/it =the unemployment rate
NEt =the number of new entrants into the labor force
Rt=the total number of retirements
UR^the number of unemployed workers who choose to retire
Qt =the number of workers who quit to seek a new job
Jt =the number of unemployed workers who find a job
St =the number of unemployed workers unwillingly
separated from their job (i.e., laid off or discharged).

My goal is to explain how the equilibrium unemployment rate, (i= —,
N
is linked to movements into and out of employment. To begin with,
it can be shown that, if the time between periods is small, the rate of
growth of n is (approximately) equal to the rate of growth of unemploy
ment less the rate of growth of the labor force. That is,

A#= AU_ AN
\L
U N
Equilibrium occurs when the unemployment rate remains constant over
time (i.e., A/A = 0); or, from (1), when the level of unemployment
(1)
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grows at the same rate as the labor force. This fact is used below to
solve for /**, the equilibrium rate of unemployment.
First, I describe how the size of the labor force and the level of
unemployment are determined. The number of labor force participants
changes over time as new workers enter and others retire. Assuming
that the decision to enter the labor force is made at the beginning of
each period while the decision to retire is made as the period ends, it
follows that
(2)

Nt = Nt_ { + NEt - Rt_! .

Now consider unemployment. Workers leave unemployment if they
find a job or retire; they enter the unemployment pool if they are fired
or quit (layoffs are included in the first category). New entrants also
contribute to unemployment as they join the labor force jobless and im
mediately begin searching for employment. The dynamics of Ut are
described in equation (3) under the assumption that job terminations
occur at the end of the period.
(3)

Ut = Ut_, + NEt + CM + SM - URt_ { - 7M .

It is important to note that workers who quit or lose their jobs are not
immediately rehired by some other firm (therefore, Q excludes those
workers who quit in order to accept another job immediately). This is
due to the assumption that it takes time and effort to find a suitable job.
Without this assumption, equilibrium would always be characterized
by full employment.
The number of quits, separations, retirements, new entrants, and new
jobs depends on the current composition of the labor force. At each
point in time, I assume that a constant fraction of all labor force par
ticipants chooses to retire. This fraction, which is assumed to be in
dependent of the worker's employment status, is denoted by r. Therefore,
/?M = rNt_! and UR{_i = rt/M . In addition, the current labor force
gives birth to new workers so that the number of new entrants may be
represented as a fraction of the current labor force. The birth rate is
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represented by b. Consequently, NEt = WVM . From (2), it follows that
the labor force grows at a rate of b - r:
(4)

Nt-i

= % change in N = b - r.

A similar analysis can be used to describe the rate of growth of
unemployment. Quits and involuntary separations are written as frac
tions of employment with q and s denoting the proportion of workers
quitting or losing their jobs, respectively. In other words, Qt-l = <7[A/,_j
- £/M] and SM = s[Nt_ { - t/M]. Finally, e denotes the proportion of
unemployed workers who find employment in any given period so that
Jt~i = e Ut-\- Substituting these values into (3) and solving yields the
rate of growth of unemployment:
(5)

At/, = b + q + s -(r + e + s + q).
Ut-l
Mr-l

We are now in a position to solve for the equilibrium rate of unemploy
ment. This is accomplished by substituting (4) and (5) into (1), setting
Ajt equal to zero, and solving for /*. We obtain
(6)

n* =

b + q + s
b + q + s + e

/i* is inversely related to the job finding rate (e) and positively related
to the quit, job separation, and birth rates (q, s, and b). Intuitively,
an increase in any of the flow rates into unemployment results in a higher
equilibrium unemployment rate, while an increase in the flow rate out
of unemployment lowers the natural rate. Therefore, insights into the
impact of policies on unemployment can be gained by examining how
the policies influence these flows into and out of employment.
From the worker's point of view, the flow rates represent hazard rates,
i.e., the per period probability of changing employment status. Cen
tral to the search theoretic framework is the assumption that these values
lie strictly between zero and one. This implies that there is randomness
involved in movements from one employment state to another. Workers
may attempt to reduce the randomness by altering search behavior, but
cannot eliminate it entirely. Most of search theory can be viewed as
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an attempt to explain how search behavior and the market interact to
determine these hazard rates.
Finally, to close this subsection, I would like to offer a few words
about the empirical relevance of the different hazard rates. Several facts
about job turnover are well known. First, over 60 percent of the workers
who quit move immediately into another job; that is, few quits are follow
ed by nontrivial spells of unemployment. 4 Historically, only 10-15 per
cent of the newly unemployed choose to leave their job. 5 Second, most
workers who are unemployed have held jobs previously. 6 These workers
either lost their jobs through layoffs or job terminations or are reentering the labor market after a spell of nonparticipation. This class of
workers accounts for well over 60 percent of unemployment. 7 These
two facts imply that s, the separation rate, is the most important factor
in explaining transitions into unemployment. Third, unemployment spells
occur frequently, but most are of short duration. Although the average
duration varies across the business cycle, it is usually the case that about
half of the unemployed have been without a job for fewer than six weeks.
Very few searchers remain unemployed more than 27 weeks. 8 This sug
gests that for the typical searcher s and e are not insignificant. Finally,
quits are countercyclical while separations vary procyclically. This fact
implies that layoffs and job terminations are the most important deter
minant of the cyclical component of unemployment. 9 Moreover, com
bining these facts leads to the conclusion that the quit and birth rates
are far less important than s and e in explaining the unemployment
process.

B. The Partial-Partial Approach
(i) Optimal Search When Unemployed
The earliest search models focused on the manner in which
unemployed workers find employment; or, in terms of the model above,
the determinants of e, the job finding rate. This literature originated
as a response to the following observations. The Walrasian model
predicts that, in equilibrium, there should be a unique wage associated
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with each type of employment opportunity. Casual observation suggests
that in reality this is not the case. In fact, we often observe workers
with similar jobs, skills, and work histories earning different wages.
Moreover, these wage differences persist over time, suggesting that wage
dispersion is an equilibrium phenomenon.
The first two papers that attempted to explain and deal with these
facts were George Stigler's classic 1961 piece "The Economics of In
formation" and its 1962 companion paper "Information in the Labor
Market." Although other issues were addressed, the primary contribution
of these papers was to raise the question of how an unemployed worker
ought to go about finding a job in such an uncertain environment. To
be more precise, suppose the worker knows the distribution of wage
offers but does not know which firm is offering the highest wage. 10
Information may be gathered by contacting individual firms and ob
taining wage offers, and then the worker may accept the best offer receiv
ed. The question is: what is the best strategy to use when searching
across firms? Or, what is the best way to search for the highest wage?
Stigler postulated that the optimal search strategy would be to visit
a predetermined number of firms, N, and then accept the best offer.
N would be determined by comparing the expected gain from an addi
tional search with the cost. If the expected gain dominated the cost,
N would be increased. If, on the other hand, the marginal cost outweigh
ed the expected gain, N would be deemed too large. The optimal number
of firms to sample would therefore be the number that equates the ex
pected gain from searching once more with the marginal cost of search.
Assuming that the marginal cost of search is nondecreasing, this value
is unique, since additional search yields diminishing returns (the prob
ability of finding a wage above your current best offer falls as more
firms are contacted).
Stigler's two papers garnered a great deal of attention. In fact, most
(if not all) of the work surveyed in this chapter can be viewed as an
extension of his work. However, his conjecture about the optimal search
strategy was, for the most part, incorrect. The basic problem is its nonse
quential nature: the worker decides upon N before actually searching,
contacts all N firms, and then accepts the best offer. This strategy might
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make sense if it takes a significant amount of time for the firm to decide
how much compensation to offer the worker. In such a setting, N can
be interpreted as the number of applications filed by the worker. If,
on the other hand, the firm can respond quickly, Stigler's rule can lead
to behavior that is clearly suboptimal. For example, suppose the first
firm contacted is offering the highest wage in the distribution. Since
the worker cannot gain anything from searching further, he or she should
stop searching and accept the job. However, even in this situation, the
nonsequential search rule dictates that the worker must continue search
ing until all N firms have been contacted. Clearly, this is not optimal
behavior, as a cost is incurred with each unnecessary search.
The problem with nonsequential search was pointed out by J.J. McCall
in his 1965 paper "The Economics of Information and Optimal Stop
ping Rules." In that paper, McCall demonstrated that the optimal search
rule involves a sequential process in which the worker decides whether
or not to continue searching after obtaining each wage offer. The rule
used is very appealing and can be explained in the following manner.
Suppose the worker has contacted a firm and has the opportunity to
accept a job paying a wage w. If the worker continues to search, there
is a potential benefit in that he or she might find a firm offering a higher
wage. In deciding whether to stop searching, this expected gain must
be compared to the cost of contacting an additional firm.
Let G(w) denote the expected gain and c(w), the cost of search. These
values are depicted in figure 2.1. G(w) is downward sloping since a
worker holding a relatively high current offer knows that the probability
additional search will yield a better offer is small and, even if such an
offer is obtained, the increase in lifetime income is likely to be small..
Turn next to the cost of search. If we let x denote unemployment com
pensation and v represent the value of leisure, then the cost of search
is equal to w - (x + v) since, by rejecting the offer, the worker chooses
to remain idle and collect x + v rather than earn w during the period.
It follows that, since the cost of search is increasing in w, there is a
unique wage, w*, that equates the gain from additional search and its
cost. This wage, called the worker's reservation wage, allows for a sim
ple characterization of the optimal search rule: search until finding a
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firm offering compensation at or above the reservation wage. 11 This
rule is optimal in the sense that it maximizes the expected value of future
income. 12
Figure 2.1

c(w) = w - (x+v)

G(w)

w

With the optimal search rule in hand, we are now in a position to
describe how the job finding rate is determined in the simple wage search
models. The job finding rate (e) is equal to the probability that the worker
accepts a job in any given period; that is, the probability that the worker
receives an offer above the reservation wage. Formally, let X denote
the per period probability of receiving an offer and let F(w) represent
the cumulative distribution function of the wage offers. Then it follows
that e = X[l - F(w*)]. Since the reservation wage depends on the form
of the wage-offer distribution, the value of leisure, and unemployment
insurance, these factors also determine e.
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Finally, it is also worth noting that changes in the expected duration
of unemployment are linked to changes in the reservation wage. This
follows from the fact that an increase in w* implies that the worker
is more likely to reject any randomly chosen wage offer. This increases
the expected length of time it takes for the worker to find (what is con
sidered) suitable employment.
Returning now to figure 2.1, it is possible to investigate the effects
of various labor market policies on the search behavior of the
unemployed. For example, an increase in unemployment compensa
tion (*) lowers the cost of search by reducing the cost of rejecting am
offer. This, in turn, increases the worker's reservation wage and leads
to a longer expected duration of unemployment. Intuitively, reducing
the cost of search allows the worker to hold out for a better job. However,
since the wage offers are unchanged (an issue to be discussed below),
it obviously takes the worker more time to find acceptable employment.
In terms of the model presented in section A, an increase in unemploy
ment compensation lowers e and, if no other rates change, increases fi*.
Another recently suggested policy provides a bonus payment to
workers who find employment within a specified length of time (as in
Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987). This policy makes any offer appear
more attractive, since acceptance allows the worker to collect the bonus
immediately. Therefore, the bonus increases the level of foregone in
come associated with a rejection, which causes the cost of additional
search to rise. This, in turn, lowers the reservation wage and shortens
the length of time needed to find employment. The full implications
of these and additional policies are discussed at length in section E below.
Before moving on, it should be pointed out that implicit in the model
presented above is an assumption that the worker cannot influence the
rate at which offers are received. In reality, of course, the worker can
increase this rate by searching more intensely. 13 There are a number
of ways to extend the analysis to allow search effort to be chosen op
timally. The method used by Benhabib and Bull (1983) is especially
appealing for our purposes since it combines the approaches developed
by Stigler and McCall discussed above. u Define the length of a period
to be equal to the amount of time it takes for a firm to respond to the
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worker's inquiry concerning possible employment. Benhabib and Bull
allow the worker to choose the number of firms to contact in a given
period and then, at the end of the period, when all offers have been
made, the worker decides whether to accept the best offer or keep search
ing. Marginal analysis is used to find the optimal number of contacts
and the reservation wage is derived using a method analogous to
McCall's. One of their findings is that the worker will typically choose
to apply for employment at more than one firm, but that the number
of contacts made will be less than the number dictated by Stigler's non
sequential search rule. In addition, in a similar setting, Morgan (1983)
shows that an increase in unemployment compensation decreases the
number of firms contacted, thereby reinforcing the policy's negative
effect on the worker's reservation wage.
(ii) Optimal Search When Employed
Quits can be analyzed in a search theoretic framework by extending
the analysis above to allow for on-the-job search. This has been done
by Burdett (1978) and Benhabib and Bull (1983). Both papers follow
a similar approach in that they allow for different search intensities on
and off the job, and both papers obtain similar results. While
unemployed, the worker searches with an intensity that equates the ex
pected gain from additional effort with its marginal cost. The worker
accepts the first job offering a wage above the return earned while idle,
i.e., the value of leisure plus unemployment compensation. Once
employed, additional search may be warranted if the current job does
not pay enough. However, since the return to additional search is
decreasing in the current wage, the worker's optimal search effort
declines as better jobs are found. Finally, if the worker secures employ
ment at a high enough wage, search ends altogether. Therefore, with
on-the-job search there are two reservation wages, vv* and vP*. If
unemployed, the worker accepts the first wage offer above w*, but con
tinues to search if the wage is below vv*. While searching, each job
offer paying more than the worker's current job is accepted. Should
a job offering compensation above >v* be found, the job is accepted
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and no further search occurs. Quits occur whenever an employed worker
receives a better offer.
An alternative model of quits has been provided by Jovanovic (1979,
1984). 15 In these papers, Jovanovic assumes that the worker's produc
tivity is unknown at the time of employment. Over time, both the firm
and worker gain information about this unknown value and, hence, the
value of the job. If the information is favorable, the wage adjusts ac
cordingly and the worker remains employed. If, on the other hand, the
information implies that the worker is not very productive on the cur
rent job, the worker's wage falls and quitting may be optimal. Search
on the job is allowed so that the worker may be able to move immediately
to another job. However, if no current offer is sufficiently high, the
worker may find it optimal to quit and begin searching full time for
a better job (depending on the market opportunities perceived). Note
that the Burdett and the Benhabib and Bull models can only explain
movements from job to job, while the Jovanovic assumption that the
value of a job is revealed over time provides an explanation of quits
followed by a spell of unemployment. This is a nontrivial distinction
since, as discussed in section A, quits resulting in a movement from
job to job do not contribute to unemployment.

(iii) Other Insights
The partial-partial model of labor supply has been used by a number
of authors to address a host of issues. For example, it can be shown
that the standard sequential search model predicts that the reservation
wage should fall over time for workers who are liquidity-constrained
or nearing retirement (see note 11). If such is the case, then as these
workers remain unemployed their probability of leaving unemployment
rises (since they become more willing to accept a job). This feature
is known as "positive duration dependence." For workers with a con
stant reservation wage, the theory predicts no duration dependence; theit
is, the probability of leaving unemployment should be independent of
the length of time the worker has been without a job. Therefore, the
theory provides predictions concerning the time path of hazard rates.
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Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on this issue is mixed (see Salant
1977, Heckman and Borjas 1980, and Heckman and Singer 1982 for
details).
The simple search model also provides explanations for positively
sloped wage/tenure profiles. In the Burdett model of on-the-job search,
workers who have been in the labor force for a longer period of time
are more likely to be earning a higher wage simply because they have
had a longer time to search. The higher wage need not reflect greater
productivity. This prediction also falls out of the Jovanovic model, since
workers remaining on the job for a long period of time do so because
they have proven to be highly productive and have therefore been ade
quately rewarded. In this case, the higher wage does reflect greater pro
ductivity to some degree.
A number of other predictions can be derived from the simple ver
sion of the partial-partial search model, or some variant of it, and a
great deal of effort has been expended to test these predictions. Many
of these predictions concern changes in search behavior either over the
life cycle or over the spell of unemployment. For this reason, these
results allow us to infer the distributive effects of various policies.
Although such effects are clearly important, they are beyond the scope
of this review. Moreover, these results have been reviewed elsewhere.
Interested readers are referred to the excellent survey by Mortensen
(1986).

(iv) Criticisms
The papers reviewed above are said to adopt a partial-partial
equilibrium approach because they focus solely on the supply side of
the labor market. No attempt is made to analyze the firm's problem,
and therefore they cannot provide an explanation of job turnover in
duced by employer behavior (layoffs and other forms of job termina
tion). Even more seriously, since the behavior of firms is not modeled,
it is impossible to investigate how workers' search behavior and govern
ment policies influence the employment practices of profit-maximizing
firms. For example, if an increase in unemployment compensation in-
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creases the reservation wage of all workers, how will this affect the
wages firms are willing to offer? It is conceivable that firms, finding
it difficult to hire workers at their old wage, will increase their wage
offers enough that the expected duration of unemployment will actual
ly be lower once a new equilibrium is established. It is therefore
dangerous to attempt to draw policy conclusions from such a limited
modeling framework. In fact, results from models in which firm behavior
is explicitly analyzed suggest that conclusions drawn from partial-partial
equilibrium models may be extremely misleading.

C. The Reservation Wage Approach
(i) The Basic Problem
The value of the papers reviewed in section B lies in their characteriza
tion of the optimal search strategy for workers in an uncertain environ
ment. This provides us with a model of the supply side of the labor
market and allows us to investigate how policies influence the search
behavior of workers. To complete the model, a demand side must be
added. This can be accomplished in a number of ways, but two par
ticular methods have dominated the literature. These two approaches
share some similarities, but focus on different aspects of the unemploy
ment problem. To be more precise, to become employed a worker must
find a firm offering a job at a sufficiently high wage. Therefore, a worker
may remain unemployed for two reasons: either no offers are obtained
or no acceptable offers are obtained. The trade friction approach (discuss
ed in section D) focuses on the former problem and assumes that all
equally productive workers earn the same wage rate. In such a setting,
the driving force behind unemployment is the rate at which firms with
vacancies and unemployed workers establish contact. On the other hand,
the reservation wage approach focuses on the problem of finding a firm
willing to offer (what the worker considers) adequate compensation.
In this case, only wage offers above the worker's reservation wage are
accepted and therefore, for rejections to occur, it must be the case that
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firms offer different equilibrium wages. Unemployment is then deter
mined by the distribution of reservation wages and its relationship to
the distribution of wage offers.
The reservation wage approach grew out of early criticisms of the
partial-partial equilibrium models. As noted above, there are reasons
to be skeptical of policy conclusions drawn from models that do not
account for the behavior of agents on both sides of the market. This
skepticism led to attempts to close the original search models in a logical
ly consistent manner. Intuitively, one might have thought that this would
be a simple task. After all, it seems obvious that if search costs vary
across workers, an equilibrium could be established in which some firms
offer low wages and attract only a few workers while other firms pay
higher wages and attract a greater supply of labor. The high-wage firms
would sell more output but would also be burdened by a larger wage
bill so that, in equilibrium, their profits would exactly match those of
low-wage firms. Unfortunately, the first attempt to prove the existence
of such an equilibrium produced a devastating result: in a model with
wage-setting, profit-maximizing firms and workers who search optimally
while facing non-zero search costs, the unique equilibrium is characteriz
ed by all firms offering the same wage. In addition, the equilibrium
wage is identical to what would be offered by a monopsonist (see, e.g.,
Diamond 1971).
This result, that optimal search by labor eliminates the need to search,
created a dilemma. How could one use search theory to model the supply
side of the labor market when optimal behavior on the demand side
implies no need to search? In other words, although the original search
models of Stigler and McCall seemed to provide an intuitively appeal
ing framework in which to analyze unemployment and its consequences,
this result implied that when the full labor market equilibrium is deriv
ed, all wage dispersion and search disappears. 16 By the same token,
although search models were initially developed in an attempt to ex
plain equilibrium price and wage dispersion, optimal search actually
eliminates all incentives to offer different wages. Therefore, imperfect
information and unequal search costs across workers cannot be the sole
sources of the wage dispersion that leads to search.

Search Theory

23

An enormous literature developed during the 1970s and early 1980s
in an attempt to find a way out of the problem created by this negative
result. Most studies attempted to provide a model of search in which
equilibrium price and/or wage dispersion could be supported. Below
I outline the proof that wage dispersion cannot persist in the environ
ment described above in an attempt to shed some light on the types of
forces that can result in a nondegenerate equilibrium wage distribution.
Consider a market consisting of a large number of profit-maximizing,
wage-setting firms. Suppose that workers search for employment se
quentially and that all workers face non-zero (but not necessarily equal)
search costs. Let k denote the lowest of these search costs. Finally, sup
pose that the market is currently characterized by wage dispersion. Can
this situation persist? In other words, can this be an equilibrium? To
see that the answer is no, consider the plight of the firm offering the
highest wage (iv) and, therefore, the best job. What would happen if
this firm changed its wage offer? There would be two effects. First,
this might change the number of workers who accept the firm's offer.
Second, such a change might cause those workers who choose to ac
cept the job to work a different number of hours, i.e., there might be
an individual labor supply response. By definition, this second response
will increase profits only if the firm moves its wage closer to the monop
sony wage. The first effect will be non-negative if the firm increases
its wage and non-positive if the firm lowers its wage. Therefore, we
can immediately conclude that if the firm's wage is below the monop
sony wage, it can increase its profits by increasing its wage offer.
What about the more interesting case in which the high-wage firm
is currently offering a wage above the monopsony wage? A lower wage
would imply greater profit (/"the firm could guarantee that it would not
lose any workers due to the wage cut. Suppose that the firm lowers
its wage offer by kr/2, with r denoting the discount, i.e., interest, rate.
Would any worker who would have accepted an offer at the higher wage
(w) now find it optimal to reject the lower wage and continue search
ing? The answer is no. Searching once more costs the worker at least
k and yields a benefit of at most kr/2 per period for the rest of the
worker's life (this benefit is only realized if the worker is lucky enough
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to find another firm offering vv in the very next period). An infinite
stream of kr/2 beginning next period has a present discounted value
of k/2. Therefore, the expected benefit to continued search must be
smaller than its cost, which implies that any worker who would have
accepted the higher offer would be also willing to accept the lower of
fer. It follows that, in this case, the firm gains by cutting its wage offer.
We have now shown that the firm offering the highest wage can always
increase its profits by changing its wage offer unless the firm is offer
ing the monopsony wage (W"). However, if the firm is paying w™, then
other firms offering lower wages could increase their profits by increas
ing their offers towards w"1. Therefore, either the high-wage firm faces
an incentive to alter its offer or low-wage firms benefit from raising
their offers. Since this implies that at least one firm can increase its
profits, our original wage distribution cannot represent a labor market
equilibrium. Moreover, it should be clear that the only labor market
equilibrium is characterized by all firms offering the monopsony wage.
These arguments can be summarized as follows. Search costs, no mat
ter how small, provide the firm with a small amount of monopsonistic
power. This power lies in the fact that small wage cuts will not cause
the firm to lose workers or job applicants. The firm will not want to
reduce its wage offer only when it is paying the monopsony wage. It
follows that firms will only offer different wages if they disagree as
to the value of the monopsony wage. This would occur, for example,
if they possessed different technologies but would never occur if the
firms were identical.

(ii) Solutions
There are two ways to alter the analysis above in a manner that allows
for a nondegenerate equilibrium wage-offer distribution. The simplest
way is to assume that labor productivity (and thus, the monopsony wage)
varies across firms. This approach was originally suggested by Reinganum (1979) and has been used by Albrecht and Axell (1984) to develop
a general equilibrium model with search-generated unemployment. A
brief description of the Axell and Albrecht model and their results shows
both the importance of using a fully consistent equilibrium model for
policy analysis and the problems associated with closing the model in
this manner.
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To keep the model as simple as possible, Albrecht and Axell con
sider an economy with only one factor (labor) and one produced good.
Perfect competition (with complete information) is assumed to prevail
in the product market while in the labor market workers must search
for jobs knowing only the distribution of wage offers. To generate an
equilibrium with wage dispersion, they introduce heterogeneity on both
sides of the labor market. On the supply side, they assume that there
are two types of workers, distinguished by the value they place on leisure.
On the demand side, productivity is assumed to vary across firms. A
job is created each time a worker accepts an offer and the job dissolves
when the worker retires (or, in Albrecht and Axell's terminology, when
the worker dies). Equilibrium is achieved when workers search optimal
ly, given the wage distribution and firms offer profit-maximizing wages,
given the distribution of reservation wages. Once equilibrium is
characterized, the effects of an increase in unemployment compensa
tion are examined.
With only two types of workers, there can be at most two equilibrium
wages. To see this, let Wj denote the reservation wage of the workers
who place a relatively low value on leisure and let wh represent the
reservation wage of the remaining workers. While searching, the
unemployed consume leisure and therefore, those who value leisure
greatly are less anxious to find a job. Consequently, WA >WI . Now,
consider the problem of a typical profit-maximizing firm. Does it ever
make sense to offer any wage other than wh or Wj? Certainly not. The
firm can guarantee that each job offer it makes will be accepted by of
fering a wage at or above wh . Therefore, there is no reason to offer
a wage above wh. What about wages below wh but greater than or equal
to w,? Such an offer would be accepted by all job applicants who place
a low value on leisure and rejected by all other workers. Since this is
true for all wages between wh and w{ , a profit-maximizing firm would
never offer a wage between the two values. Finally, if the firm offers
a wage below wlt no worker would accept and the firm would earn
no profit. Therefore, in equilibrium, only two wages are offered. The
low wage is equal to the reservation wage of the impatient searchers
and the high wage is equal to the reservation wage of those workers
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who place a relatively high value on leisure. Impatient workers accept
the first job offer they receive and the remaining workers search until
finding a firm paying the high wage. The total number of unemployed
workers is therefore equal to the number of individuals who place a
relatively large value on leisure and cannot find a high-wage firm.
To complete the description of equilibrium, we need to explain how
active firms decide which wage to offer. Let <?, denote the constant
marginal product of a worker at firm i and let P denote the price of
the produced good. Some firms, those with qi less than ^-, will choose
not to produce. This follows from the fact that for these firms the
marginal revenue product of labor falls short of the cost of hiring cheap
labor. All other firms will produce and earn non-negative profit. Firms
with a relatively high value for qt can afford to pay high wages since
their workers are very productive. Firms with a relatively low value
of qi (but a value above 1^1) prefer to offer the low wage and hire only
impatient searchers. There is a unique productivity value, q*, such that
a firm with qi = q* is indifferent between offering the high and low
wages. Therefore, all firms with values of qi between^! and q* offer
Wi and all firms with qt greater than q* pay wh . Finally, let 7 denote
the proportion of active firms paying the high wage. As 7 rises, it
becomes easier for patient workers to find a high-wage firm and, thus,
unemployment falls.
We can now describe how changes in unemployment compensation
affect the equilibrium unemployment rate. We noted in section B that
an increase in unemployment compensation causes the reservation wages
of all workers to rise. Since patient workers spend more time searching,
the impact on their reservation wage (v^) is greater. As vvt and wh in
crease, some firms leave the market (since they can no longer afford
to pay even the low wage) and some firms originally offering the high
wage switch and offer the low wage (since the gap between the high
and low wages has widened). In other words, the number of active firms
and the number of high-wage firms both decrease. Unemployment is
linked to 7, the proportion of firms offering the high wage, and since
this value is equal to the ratio of high-wage firms to active firms,
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unemployment may rise or fall. In general, the effect on unemploy
ment depends on the distribution of the productivity parameter (qj) across
firms. 17
This result illustrates two points. First, conclusions drawn from a
partial-partial equilibrium analysis may be misleading. Even though an
increase in unemployment compensation does result in higher reserva
tion wages, when firms are allowed to react to this change they may
do so in a manner that actually reduces the unemployment rate. Sec
ond, in order to generate an equilibrium characterized by wage disper
sion, it is necessary to introduce heterogeneity on both sides of the labor
market. While this may seem appealing in that it probably mimics reality,
it results in at least two problems. To begin with, the underlying
heterogeneity may be difficult to characterize. After all, for any given
level of unemployment compensation there will almost assuredly be more
than one distribution of qt consistent with the observed wage distribu
tion. Subsequent changes in unemployment insurance will nonetheless
have very different effects on the unemployment rate (depending on
the true ql distribution). Thus, although it is clearly important, the
distribution of qt cannot be inferred from observable data such as
wages. The key data, the values of qit seem impossible to specify. Sec
ond, even if we ignore this problem, introducing heterogeneity on both
sides of the market produces a complex model that yields few (if any)
unambiguous predictions. This follows from the fact that the equilibrium
wage distribution, unemployment rate, and comparative static proper
ties will depend on the ad hoc specification of the underlying distribu
tions describing the degree of heterogeneity in the market. In other
words, in order to explain one stylized fact (wage dispersion), a fact
that is probably not a major contributor to unemployment, the reserva
tion wage approach must sacrifice tractability and analytic simplicity.
In the next section I argue that the trade friction approach, a framework
that ignores wage dispersion and focuses instead on the difficulty search
ers face in finding any employment opportunity, is much more likely
to be able to provide insights into the problems associated with searchgenerated unemployment.
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An alternative model of equilibrium wage dispersion can be found
in Burdett and Judd (1983). On the surface, their model appears to be
a significant improvement over the Reinganum and Albrecht/Axell ap
proach, since it produces wage dispersion without introducing
heterogeneity. The fact that they are indeed able to explain wage disper
sion in a model with identical rational agents on both sides of the market
provides us with some comfort in that it confirms our earlier intuition
that incomplete information can be an important source for sustained
price disparity. Unfortunately, as I will argue below, their approach
can only yield limited insights concerning policy effectiveness for ex
actly the same reason that the Albrecht and Axell paper fails.
Burdett and Judd generate wage dispersion by changing the descrip
tion of the search process. They analyze two models. In the first, workers
file applications with firms at the beginning of the period and then receive
offers as the period ends (as in Benhabib and Bull 1983). When facing
such lags in the hiring process it is optimal for workers to search nonsequentially. Assuming that they do so, searchers are likely to observe
more than one wage offer before making their decision. Let TT, denote
the probability that a worker receives i offers at the end of the period.
Then Burdett and Judd show that there are two types of equilibria that
may occur, depending on the distribution of irt. If TTI = 1, then all firms
pay the monopsony wage. In this case, even though workers may app
ly for more than one job, they always receive exactly one offer per
period. Since this yields a model virtually equivalent to the sequential
search model, it is not surprising that wage dispersion cannot exist. The
second case is more interesting. When irv lies strictly between zero and
one, so that with some positive probability the firm has complete monop
sony power over a worker, there may be a dispersed distribution of
wage offers in equilibrium. Not surprisingly, the form of the wage
distribution is tied to the number of applications filed (through the
distribution of TT,), which in turn depends on the common search cost.
If search costs are relatively low, then Burdett and Judd show that the
monopsony wage equilibrium and two dispersed wage equilibria exist.
On the other hand, if search costs are relatively high, only the monop
sony wage equilibrium will appear. Wage dispersion becomes possible
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(when search costs are low) because with positive probability some
workers receive more than one offer, so that, unlike the case in which
workers search sequentially, a small decrease in the wage offered may
cause a firm to lose some potential new hires.
A second form of the search process, labeled "noisy search," is also
considered. With noisy search each worker pays a fixed fee (c) at the
beginning of the period and then receives a random number of job of
fers. The purchase of a newspaper that includes advertisements for a
variety of products would be an example of noisy search in the product
market. Making use of a private employment agency might qualify as
an example in the labor market. In this case the TT, described above
would still be interpreted as the probability of receiving / offers but
these values would no longer be tied to c (they are exogenous). This
opens up the possibility of a third type of equilibrium one in which
IT, = 0 and all firms pay the perfectly competitive wage. Intuitively,
since 7r t = 0, no firm possesses monopsony power over any worker,
in that the firm is assured that any worker it tries to hire has at least,
one other offer in hand. This leads to competition across firms that drives
the wage down to the competitive level. Combining this case with the
two described above completely characterizes equilibrium with noisy
search for any fixed distribution of TT, and for any c.
The Burdett and Judd analysis demonstrates that price and/or wage
dispersion can arise in a very simple setting one with identical, ra
tional, payoff-maximizing, uninformed agents. Unfortunately, their
framework does not lend itself to policy analysis any more than does
the Albrecht/Axell approach. Consider first the case of nonsequential
search. If the cost of search is large, then the unique equilibrium displays
no wage dispersion and our original problem of optimal search destroying
incentives to search arises again. If the cost of search is low, there are
multiple dispersed wage equilibria. In this case, even if one could decide
which equilibrium to work with, it would, in general, be difficult to
tease out unambiguous comparative static predictions. It is highly like
ly that the results will depend on the form of the wage distribution,
just as in the Albrecht/Axell paper. Policy analysis would be even more
difficult in the presence of noisy search since the distribution of TT, is
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determined outside the model. Different assumptions concerning this
distribution will lead to different equilibrium wage distributions and,
of course, different comparative static results. In both cases, of course,
there is still the problem of finding a way to infer the key parameters
(the distribution of TT,) from the available data.
At this point, it is useful to step back and summarize the advantages
and disadvantages of this approach. On the positive side, the reserva
tion wage approach has clarified the types of forces that can explain
persistent wage dispersion. Although it took nearly a decade, it has con
firmed our intuition that wage dispersion may be the result of incomplete
information about the availability and quality of job offers. It has also
shown us that the amount of information collected in the search pro
cess is an important determinant of the amount of wage dispersion that
can be supported in equilibrium. The fact that firms need not offer iden
tical wages in equilibrium is also appealing in that it is consistent with
observation and allows for the possibility that workers may choose to
reject some job offers.
On the negative side, to generate an equilibrium in which equally
productive workers earn different wages, we are required to work with
models that are hard to characterize, in that the key parameters are often
unobservable, and models that seldom yield clear-cut, intuitive predic
tions. In other words, we must sacrifice simplicity and tractability. If
one truly believes that wage disparity and job rejections play important
roles in the unemployment process, then the sacrifice is probably worth
making. If not, then the unemployment problem stems more from the
difficulty of finding a vacant job opportunity rather than finding one
offering adequate compensation. If the latter is true, then it is suffi
cient to work with models with a single wage rate and focus on the
determinants of the rate at which firms with vacancies and unemployed
workers are matched. This is the approach adopted in the trade friction
literature.
How important are job rejections for explaining unemployment? For
some subgroups this is clearly an important factor. Feldstein and Poterba
(1984) have shown that the reservation wages of displaced workers are
generally at or above the wage they earned on their last job. For this
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reason, displaced workers often have difficulty finding new jobs. In
fact, in one survey, the median reemployed displaced worker was
unemployed for 40 weeks (Hamermesh 1987)! These workers general
ly find employment only when their reservation wages fall significant
ly. On average, the real wage earned on their new job is approximately
10 percent below the level earned on their previous job (Hamermesh
1987). A similar problem exists for unemployed black youth (Holzer
1986). One possible explanation for this group is that they misperceive
the distribution of wage offers available to them. When they first enter
the labor market, their reservation wages are unjustifiably high and they
reject too many reasonable job offers. After awhile, they learn about
the true distribution, adjust their expectations downward, and accept
employment. For other workers, the role of job rejections is less clear
cut. For example, Holzer (1987, 1988) reports that unemployed teen
agers accept approximately 80 percent of the job offers they receive.
What does this imply about adult rejection rates? On the one hand, the
ratio of the expected wage to the value of leisure is probably lower for
teenagers than for prime-age wage earners and, thus, the rejection rate
of adults may be even lower. On the other hand, prime-age adults face
smaller separation rates, implying a longer expected duration of employ
ment. This suggests that adults may be more reluctant to accept what
they consider a low-paying job. In a 1976 survey of 3,200 unemployed
workers, Rosenfeld (1977) found evidence supporting the view that,
in fact, adults reject fewer offers than teenagers. Only 10 percent of
the workers searching for employment rejected an offer.

D. The Trade Friction Approach
(i) Externalities
The foundations of the trade friction framework can be found in a
series of papers by Peter Diamond (1981, 1982a, 1982b, 1984a, 1984b) ;,
Dale Mortensen (1982a, 1982b), and Christopher Pissarides (1984a:,
1984b). In each of these papers, jobs are viewed as the outcome of a
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process in which idle factors of production must actively search each
other out before production can take place. An underlying "matching
technology" (also referred to as the "search technology") describes
how search effort on both sides of the market translates into employ
ment. This technology may be viewed as a production function with
jobless workers, their search effort, vacancies, and the search effort
of firms as the inputs and jobs as the output. Government policies in
fluence the unemployment rate either by altering the flow of inputs in
to this production process or by changing the form of the matching
technology.
Although they differ in specifics, the basic structure of all trade fric
tion models is as follows. In each period, idle factors of production
search for employment opportunities. Once a job is located, the firm
and worker bargain over the wage rate and then, assuming they can
reach agreement, production begins. The duration of a job is assumed
stochastic, dissolving with an exogenously given probability in each
period. Each time a worker and firm are separated, they each reenter
the labor market and begin searching again. Equilibrium occurs when
workers choose a level of search effort that maximizes expected lifetime
utility, firms choose a level of search effort that maximizes expected
profit, and the flows into and out of employment are equal. While flows
into employment are governed by the matching technology, search ef
fort, and the level of unemployment, the rate of job separation is usually
assumed to be exogenous. 18
Unemployment occurs whenever a jobless worker fails to find an
employment opportunity or fails to reach an agreement with the firm
he or she is bargaining with. Unlike the reservation wage approach,
the trade friction approach assumes that all equally productive workers
earn the same wage, i.e., the bargaining process leads to the same wage
for all equally productive workers. The single wage assumption does
not necessarily imply that all job offers will be accepted. If the value
of the match is stochastic, it is possible that even when potential trading
parties meet, it may be optimal to continue searching for a better match.
However, in contrast to reservation wage models, job rejection is not
the primary reason for unemployment. Instead, in trade friction models,
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the primary focus is on the determination of the rate at which workers
and firms meet. Even when some job offers are rejected, it is the search
technology that drives the model. By ignoring wage dispersion and focus
ing on the search technology, it is possible to build simple, intuitively
appealing models that make policy analysis fairly straightforward.
Before digging into the specifics of the various models, I would like
to begin by providing an overview of an important insight supplied by
the trade friction literature. The result that I wish to focus on is that,
in the presence of trading friction, equilibrium will almost certainly be
suboptimal. This result is somewhat surprising since, in general, when
agents possess no market power, competitive economies operate effi
ciently. However, this is not the case in the presence of search-generated
unemployment. This result follows from the fact that individual search
decisions are riddled with externalities. Two types of externalities are
most prevalent. 19 The first, labeled "congestion externalities," arise
because increased search activity on one side of the market affects the
probabilities of employment on both sides. For example, increased search
effort by an unemployed worker lowers the probability that other workers
will find employment (a negative externality), while making it easier
for firms to fill vacancies (a positive externality). Even if a change in
one agent's search activity has a small effect on the employment prob
abilities of other agents, the number of agents so affected will be large,
so that the aggregate effect may be nontrivial. These congestion exter
nalities lead to an inefficient level of search activity; but, since both
positive and negative externalities are involved, there may be too much
or too little search.
I refer to the second type of externality as an "income externality"
for lack of a better term. In deciding how hard to search, each worker
takes into account the fact that expected lifetime income increases each
time a job offer is accepted (relative to what it would be if the offer
were rejected). However, the worker ignores the fact that acceptance
of the offer also increases the firm's profits by allowing the firm to
fill a vacancy. Likewise, when a firm settles on its recruiting intensity,
it ignores the positive effect it will bestow on its workers when hiring
them. Since these positive external effects are ignored when search deci
sions are made, income externalities lead to too little search.
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If congestion externalities result in too little search, then the two ex
ternal effects reinforce each other. This leads to a level of search ac
tivity below the social optimum. What does this imply about the effi
ciency of unemployment? The answer to this question depends on the
nature of the search process. If, for example, workers and firms search
at a constant intensity with a reservation wage in mind, then workers
will be too willing to accept a job (their reservation wages will be too
low) and firms will be too willing to employ workers (their reservation
wages will be too high). Or, in terms of the model presented in section
A, the job finding rate (e) will be too high. It follows that, in this case,
unemployment will be too low and welfare would be enhanced if all
workers raised their reservation wages and all firms lowered theirs by
a small amount. This result is reversed, however, if search intensity
is a choice variable. When workers or firms can vary their search in
tensities, too little search activity implies that more effort should be
invested in the search process. Since increased effort increases the prob
ability of successful search, too little search translates into an unemploy
ment rate that is too high.
When congestion externalities imply too much search, the two ex
ternal forces work in opposite directions and the implications for
unemployment are ambiguous. In a recent paper, Davidson, Martin,
and Matusz (1987a) developed a general equilibrium model with searchgenerated unemployment and isolated the congestion and income ex
ternalities in an effort to understand the conditions under which this
would occur. To provide some insight into exactly how these models
work and to provide a basis for the policy discussion to follow, I now
turn to a brief description of our model and results. 20
The Davidson, Martin, and Matusz model consists of two sectors and
two factors of production. For expositional purposes, the factors will
be referred to as capital and labor and the sectors will be referred to
as manufacturing and agriculture. Factor markets in the agricultural sec
tor are frictionless and competitive, so that employment is always readily
available and capital is never idle. Agricultural output is produced ac
cording to a neoclassical constant returns to scale production function.
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In the manufacturing sector, one unit of output can be produced by one
worker and one unit of capital. However, it takes time and effort for
idle factors to find each other. In other words, search is required to
find employment and/or fill a vacancy. Once capital and labor are match
ed, a partnership is created that lasts until either the worker retires or
capital becomes obsolete (each of these events occurs with an exogenously given probability, r, in each period). If the partnership dissolves,
the remaining factor resumes searching. While the partnership lasts,
the output produced is sold and the proceeds are distributed to labor
and capital according to a sharing rule that is negotiated at the time
the partnership forms.
The probability of successful search in the manufacturing sector
depends on the mix of the searching population. Let s denote the frac
tion of searchers who are workers, e(s) the per period probability that
an unemployed worker finds a job, and k(s) the per period probability
that a vacancy is filled. Then if s increases, i.e., the unemployment
pool becomes more labor intensive, it becomes harder to find employ
ment but easier to fill a vacancy, i.e., e'(s)<Q and k'(s)>Q. Since
unemployment occurs only in the manufacturing sector, the equilibrium
unemployment rate is tied to the size of the manufacturing sector and
the value of s. The search technology is represented by e(s) and k(s).
Equilibrium occurs when the agricultural factor rewards adjust to clear
the agricultural input markets, product prices adjust to clear product
markets, and, since factors of production are mobile across sectors,
labor and capital are distributed such that the expected lifetime return
(in terms of income) from searching for employment in the manufac
turing sector is equal to the lifetime income earned by working in the
agricultural sector. This last condition is necessary since, for example,
if the lifetime return to labor is higher in one sector than the other, all
labor will flow to the high-income sector and no output will be produc
ed in the remaining sector (implying an excess demand for output in
at least one product market).
By examining the decision process of a typical worker seeking employ
ment, we can see how income and congestion externalities distort in
centives. We can also contrast this model with the reservation wage
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models discussed above. Consider first the position of a jobless worker
seeking employment in the agricultural sector. Let w denote the
agricultural wage. Then, since the agricultural labor market is frictionless, this worker will immediately find employment and earn w in
each period until retiring. Since r represents the probability of retiring
in any given period, i is the expected length of time the worker re
mains employed. It follows that expected lifetime income is ™Turn next to workers currently searching for employment in the
manufacturing sector. Let P denote the revenue generated by the sale
of a unit of manufacturing output and 0 represent labor's share of
revenue. In addition, let Ve denote expected lifetime income for a
worker currently employed in manufacturing and Vu represent expected
lifetime income for a searcher. Then Ve and Vu satisfy
Ve = OP + [l- r]{(l - r)Ve + rVu]

The first equation states that an employed worker's expected lifetime
income is equal to current compensation (OP) plus expected future com
pensation provided that the worker does not retire (an event occurring
with probability 1 - r). Expected future consumption is equal to the
probability that the capital used by the worker does not become ob
solete ([1 - r]) multiplied by expected lifetime income while employed
(Ve) plus the probability the job dissolves (r) multiplied by the expected
lifetime income of an unemployed worker (KM). The second equation
states that expected lifetime income for an unemployed worker is equal
to the probability of not retiring multiplied by a weighted average of
income if employed and income if unemployed where the weights are
equal to the probabilities of being in that state in the next period (I assume
unemployment compensation is zero). These two equations can be solved
for Ve and Vu to obtain the benefit due to employment

V
- V
=
re
vu

OP
1 - (1 - r) (1 - r -
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Note that regardless of the value of 6, Ve - Vu >0 so that, in contrast
to the reservation wage model, searchers never turn down job offers.
This immediately implies that the duration of unemployment simply
depends on the amount of time it takes to find an idle piece of capital.
The search technology, e(s), drives the model.
A similar analysis can be carried out to determine the expected lifetime
return to capital if in use (Vk) and when idle (F,). For any value of 6,
it can be shown that Vk > Vi so that firms with vacancies never turn
away workers seeking employment.
We are now in a position to describe the income and congestion ex
ternalities. Consider the problem faced by an unemployed worker try
ing to decide where to seek employment. If the worker applies for work
in the agricultural sector, employment will be gained immediately and
the worker can expect to earn ™ before retiring. If employment in the
manufacturing sector is sought, the worker enters the sector as a searcher
and can expect to earn Vu before retiring. If™> KM, then all workers
will seek employment in the agricultural sector, no output will be pro
duced in the manufacturing sector, and there will be excess demand
for the manufactured goods. A similar argument rules out the possibility
that ™ < Vu . Therefore, in equilibrium, workers distribute themselves
such that ^ — Vu . Does this equilibrium condition imply an efficient
allocation of labor resources across sectors? The answer is no. A worker
who contemplates entering the search sector takes into account the fact
that each job offer accepted raises expected lifetime income from Vu
to Ve . However, the worker ignores the fact that accepting the job also
increases the expected return on the capital used from Vi to Vk .
Therefore, workers ignore a positive externality associated with enter
ing the search sector and too few of them seek employment in the
manufacturing sector. Of course, capital also ignores the positive ex
ternal effect its entry into the search sector has on worker income so
that there is too little capital involved in manufacturing as well. In sum
mary, these income externalities result in a search sector that is too small
and, since unemployment is positively related to the size of the manufac
turing sector, there is too much unemployment in equilibrium.
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Congestion externalities arise due to the fact that the entry and/or
exit of factors from manufacturing alters the value of s and therefore
the employment probabilities. An extra worker seeking employment
raises s, lowers the probability that other workers will find employ
ment, and makes it easier to fill a vacancy. Davidson, Martin, and
Matusz demonstrate that because of these congestion externalities, the
search sector is too asymmetric in equilibrium. In other words, if s > l/2
so that the searching population is labor-intensive, then efficiency would
be enhanced by making the sector more capital-intensive. If s < l/z, then
the performance of the economy would be improved by making the sector
more labor-intensive. Loosely, if s> l/2, then, when a worker enters
the search sector, the negative externalities imposed on fellow workers
outweigh the positive externalities enjoyed by capital, since labor is in
the majority. Thus, the overall effect is that the sector is too laborintensive. What are the implications for unemployment? The matching
technology works best when the sector is perfectly symmetric. With
an equal number of factors on both sides of the market, there are no
excess vacancies or searchers; the only problem in creating jobs is get
ting the idle factors together. Therefore, when the sector is too asym
metric the matching technology is not being used efficiently and jobs
are lost. The implication is that congestion externalities lead to too much
unemployment.
In summary, the Davidson, Martin, and Matusz analysis suggests that,
in general, income and congestion externalities work in opposite direc
tions. 21 Unemployment may be too high or too low. Public policy
specifically aimed at eliminating the external effects will enhance effi
ciency but may, in some instances, do so by increasing unemployment.
I return to this issue in the policy section below.
Finally, before moving on to discuss some other insights provided
by this literature, I wish to point out some features of the Davidson,
Martin, and Matusz model that reflect the difference between the trade
friction and reservation wage approaches. First, as stressed above, all
job offers are accepted and unemployment simply depends on the rate
at which firms and workers meet. The number of new jobs created
depends on how well the market uses the search technology, a factor
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influenced by the equilibrium composition of the unemployment pool
(as reflected in the value of s). Second, the trade friction model yields
clear-cut, clean results and is easy to work with. There is no need to
introduce heterogeneity across firms or workers in order to generate
an equilibrium level of unemployment. As we will see below, this makes
policy analysis much less complicated than it would be in a model follow
ing the reservation wage approach.

(ii) Multiple Equilibria, Feedback Mechanisms,
and Business Cycles
When externalities distort incentives, government policies can be used
to alter incentives at the margin and guide the economy back towards
optimality. If equilibrium is unique, this is all the government interven
tion that is required or desired. If, however, more than one equilibrium
exists, additional policies may be needed to insure that the economy
ends up in the "best" equilibrium. Peter Diamond has demonstrated
that this is a problem that is likely to emerge when trading frictions
are present (see, for example, Diamond 1984b). To be more precise,
Diamond has shown that models with search-generated unemployment
are likely to be characterized by multiple equilibria. This result asserts
that there may be more than one equilibrium rate of unemployment,
i.e., more than one "natural rate of unemployment" and is consistent
with the Keynesian notion that the economy can get "stuck" in an
equilibrium in which output remains below its full employment level.
The reason for this is simple. In equilibrium, each firm is maximizing
profits and has no desire to increase its labor force. Now, consider what
would occur if all firms simultaneously increased their recruiting ef
forts, increased their labor forces, and increased production. The in
crease in employment would generate a larger level of worker income,
thereby increasing the demand for output. If the increased demand in
the product market is large enough, it could justify the increased
recruiting efforts. Therefore, a new equilibrium with lower unemploy
ment might be established. Note that in the original equilibrium, by
definition, no individual firm has an incentive to alter employment.
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However, if recruiting efforts could be coordinated across all firms so
that all firms simultaneously increase employment, the increased hir
ing is profitable. The force at work here is called a "feedback
mechanism." Simply put, the increase in labor market activity stimulates
demand in the product market which, in turn, feeds back to the labor
market by increasing labor demand. When the original increase in hir
ing exactly matches the generated increase in labor demand, a new
equilibrium is established.
Diamond also demonstrates that economies characterized by multi
ple equilibria may exhibit interesting dynamic behavior. This follows
from the fact that current search behavior depends on the type of
equilibrium agents expect to occur in the future. For example, if agents
expect the economy to be booming in the future, then the return to search
will be large and it makes sense to search relatively intensely. If, on
the other hand, agents expect a recession, the return to current search
is likely to be low (it will be very hard to find employment) and search
activity will fall off. In each case, expectations are self-fulfilling in that
increased (decreased) search activity increases (decreases) the number
of new jobs created. Greater (less) employment translates into greater
(less) income and implies a more (less) prosperous economy. Since ex
pectations play such an important role in the evolution of the economy,
waves of pessimism and optimism sweeping across the country can
generate dynamics that look very much like a business cycle.
A brief review of a simple version of the Diamond model helps to
crystalize these results and also lays a foundation for a discussion of
policy-related issues in the next section. The model is extremely sim
ple, yet it captures the fundamental elements of production and exchange
in a friction-filled environment. There are no firms; instead, workers
search for a suitable "production opportunity." When such an oppor
tunity arises, the worker produces output and then attempts to trade
it for goods that he or she can consume.
Production opportunities arrive at a constant rate but vary in their
cost. Workers undertake low-cost projects but shun high-cost ones. The
break-even cost, i.e., the cost at which the worker is indifferent be
tween continuing to search for a lower-cost project and producing, is
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the worker's "reservation cost." The reservation cost plays the same
role that the reservation wage plays in standard labor market search
analysis: a higher reservation cost implies that the worker is more willing
to accept a job.
Once production occurs, the worker must search for a trading part
ner. The reason for this is that workers are not allowed to consume
goods that they themselves have produced. This assumption captures
the notion that, in reality, people tend to specialize in production and
generalize in consumption. Trading becomes easier as production in
creases, since there are more agents to trade with. Once trade takes
place, the workers consume the output and then begin searching for
new production opportunities. Workers are characterized as
"unemployed" when engaged in search for a low-cost project and
"employed" when searching for a trading partner.
As we will see below, the key assumption is that trade becomes easier
as production increases. This amounts to an assumption that the search
technology is characterized by increasing returns to scale and it is the
driving force behind the result that equilibrium is not unique.
The entire model can be characterized by two equations. The first
is an equilibrium condition stating that, in a steady state equilibrium,
the flows into and out of employment must be equal so that unemploy
ment remains constant. The second equation defines optimal search ef
fort in the labor market given the current economic environment. When
both equations are satisfied, the economy is in a steady state equilibrium.
Begin with the equilibrium condition. Let E denote current employ
ment, N the size of the labor force, B(E) the probability of finding a
trading partner at any point in time, c* the reservation cost, G(c) the
cumulative probability distribution for the cost of production; and z the
probability of finding a production project. By assumption, as employ
ment (E) increases, it becomes easier to find a trading partner (this is
the increasing returns to scale assumption). Thus, B'(E)>Q. Consider
first the flow from employment into unemployment. Employed workers
are those who are looking for someone to trade output with. They become
unemployed by locating a trading partner and carrying out an exchange
of goods. Since E represents employment and B(E) is the probability
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of locating a trading partner, EB(E) equals the number of workers enter
ing the unemployment pool at each instant. Turn next to the transition
from unemployment to employment. At each point in time, N - E
workers are unemployed (looking for a low-cost production opportunity).
With probability z a jobless worker is offered a project, and with prob
ability G(c*) the project is acceptable (its cost is below the worker's
reservation cost). Thus, (N - E)zG(c*) unemployed workers become
employed at each instant. 22 Finally, let E denote the change in employ
ment at each instant. If £>0 employment is increasing, and if E<0,
unemployment is increasing. It follows that
(7)

E = (N - £)zG(c*) - EB(E).

We are in a steady state when E = 0.
Equation (7) is depicted in figure 2.2. As c* rises, workers are more
willing to undertake production projects (i.e. , accept jobs) and the flow
from unemployment to employment increases. To restore equilibrium
(E = 0), the flow out of employment must also increase. For this to
occur, it must become easier to find a trading partner; that is, E must
rise (so that B(E) increases). Therefore, the combinations of E and c*
that are consistent with steady state equilibrium in the labor market are
represented by an upward sloping curve (the E = 0 curve in figure 2.2).
Above this curve c* is too large for equilibrium (for a given value of
E), implying that workers are too willing to accept jobs. Therefore,
the flow into employment exceeds the flow out and employment is in
creasing. Below the curve, E<0.
Turn next to the determination of c*. Workers will be more willing
to undertake high-cost projects when they expect it to be relatively easy
to trade their output, since this would allow them to consume the out
put and reenter the labor market quickly. Due to the assumption of in
creasing returns to scale in the search technology, trade becomes easier
as E rises. Thus, c* is an increasing function of £, as depicted by the
c*(E) curve in figure 2.2. This curve would be horizontal under cons
tant returns to scale.
Since workers choose c* (to maximize expected lifetime income),
the economy always operates along this curve regardless of whether
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or not it is in a steady state equilibrium. If the current level of employ
ment is such that the c*(£) curve lies above the E = 0 curve, thee
employment increases and the economy moves up to the right along
c*(E). If employment is such that c*(£) lies below the E = 0 curve,
then employment falls and the economy slides down c*(£) towards the
origin. The economy is in a steady state equilibrium when E = 0 along
the c*(£) curve. Since both curves are upward sloping, they may in
tersect any number of times. As drawn in figure 2.2 there are several
equilibria, one for each intersection of the two curves. 23 The existence
of more than one equilibrium is a direct result of the feedback mechanism
described above and the assumption of increasing returns to scale in
the search technology. If workers expect it to be easier to trade output,
they are more willing to undertake costly projects. The greater will
ingness to accept jobs results in greater output which, in turn, does in
deed make it easier to trade (//"there are increasing returns to scale in
the search technology). Hence, the worker's original optimism is war
ranted. However, pessimism can also be warranted. If all workers ex
pect it to be difficult to trade output, they will be reluctant to accept
high-cost projects. This unwillingness to produce implies a low level
of output and makes it hard to find a trading partner. Diamond
demonstrates that changes in expectations about the future environment
can cause the economy to bounce back and forth between high- and
low-employment equilibria in a manner that closely resembles the
business cycle. 24 Note that with constant returns to scale such business
cycle behavior could not arise, since equilibrium would be unique (c*(E)
and E = 0 intersect only once when c*(£) is horizontal).
As is clear from figure 2.2, unemployment varies across the equilibria.
The "best" equilibrium, in terms of welfare, is the one with the lowest
level of unemployment. It is not clear, however, that the economy will
naturally gravitate towards this equilibrium without government interven
tion. Moreover, even if the economy did manage to reach the best
equilibrium, the existence of congestion externalities implies that even
the high-employment equilibrium is suboptimal welfare could be
enhanced even further by implementing policies aimed at increasing
workers' willingness to accept production opportunities.
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Figure 2.2

E=0

c*(E)

Although the Diamond model is extremely simple, it captures what
appear to be the most important features of economies troubled by searchgenerated unemployment. These features include the fact that it takes
time and effort to find trading opportunities (in both input and product
markets), the importance of expectations concerning the future economic
environment in making present search-related decisions (e.g., how hard
should workers search and/or how many resources should firms devote
to recruitment?), and the fact that search decisions made by an individual
affect the welfare of others. Diamond's analysis is important because
it demonstrates that even in a simple barter economy with no firms these
features can produce several striking results, e.g., multiple equilibria
that can be Pareto-ranked and business cycles. The intuition offered
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at the beginning of this subsection suggests that these results will con
tinue to emerge in more elaborate models that more closely resemble
our economy.

(iii) The Value of a Job
Total national income is one measure of welfare that is often used
to evaluate the desirability of certain policies. In a standard neoclassical
general equilibrium model, total national income is equal to the value
of output. Consequently, the value of a job is captured fully by the value
of the output it produces and the level and composition of employment
do not enter the welfare function. Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1987b,
1989) have shown that this is not the case when workers are finitely
lived and trading frictions are present. In such an environment, jobs
carry with them a surplus value above and beyond the value of the out
put they produce. Furthermore, the size of the surplus is tied to the
expected duration of unemployment required to find the job. This im
plies that the number and types of jobs held in equilibrium must be con
sidered when evaluating policies aimed at increasing welfare.
To illustrate this point, return to the Davidson, Martin, and Matusz
model outlined above and make one small change; assume that workers
leave the workforce due to death rather than retirement and that newly
born workers enter the labor force at a rate that keeps the number of
labor force participants constant over time. In this model, the value of
a manufacturing job can be shown to be equal to the value of the output
it produces plus Z = Ve - Vu + Vk - Vi . Z is a measure of the surplus
value of each job and is equal to the increase in expected income at
tained by labor and capital when the job is created.
If we let J denote the steady state number of jobs held in the search
sector, then total welfare is equal to the value of output plus JZ. Two
points are worth making. First, the number of search sector jobs held
in equilibrium matters. Since search sector jobs carry with them a surplus
value while agricultural jobs do not, manufacturing jobs are more
valuable to society. Second, the harder a manufacturing job is to ob
tain, the larger is its surplus value. This follows from the fact that jobs
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that are more difficult to obtain generate a larger difference between
Ve and FM . 25 This is precisely why agricultural jobs carry no surplus
value. In any given sector, Ve and Vu will differ only if a spell of
unemployment is required to find a job. But, this is not the case in the
agricultural sector, since its factor markets are frictionless. The im
plication is that the composition of jobs also matters. In an economy
with several search sectors, jobs that are more difficult to obtain carry
with them a larger surplus value.
Why are some jobs more valuable than others? To answer this ques
tion, consider the labor market experience of a cohort of newly born
workers. When they are born, a number of workers choose to seek
employment in the manufacturing sector. Since they begin their search
unemployed, they can each expect to earn Vu over their lifetime. The
remainder take jobs in the agricultural sector and can expect to earn
- before death. Therefore, at birth, expected lifetime income for this
w
cohort is equal to MVU + A—, where M refers to the number seeking
search sector jobs and A represents those taking agricultural jobs. A
similar expression can be derived for the return to new capital. It can
be shown that these terms sum to a number that is equal to the value
of steady-state output. Therefore, each newly born generation of workers
can expect to earn income exactly equal to the value of steady-state
output no more or less. This implies that the interests of future genera
tions of workers are best served by implementing policies aimed at max
imizing the value of output.
Now, as this generation of workers matures, they begin to find employ
ment in the manufacturing sector. With each job accepted, welfare in
creases by the surplus value of the job. At maturity, J manufacturing
jobs are held and welfare is equal to the value of output plus JZ. This
implies that the interests of current mature generations are best served
by implementing policies aimed at maximizing the value of output plus
the surplus value of jobs. The interests of current and future genera
tions diverge. We discuss this point in greater detail in the policy sec
tion below.
Intuitively, workers currently employed realize that they may lose
their jobs and be forced to search for new employment in the future.
•\AJ
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If this occurs, their new job may entail using capital that has not yet
entered the input market. Since they share the proceeds of production
with the capital they use, this implies that part of expected lifetime in
come is generated by using factors of production not currently in use.
In other words, the surplus arises because current generations borrow
from the future each time a search-sector job is created. The greater
the number of steady-state jobs, the more current generations can bor
row from the future. It is important to note that this borrowing is not
at the expense of future generations. After all, as mentioned above, future
generations can expect to earn income exactly equal to the value of the
output they produce regardless of the number of search-sector jobs.
Moreover, as this future generation matures, it also borrows from the
unborn. Of course, the surplus value of jobs would not appear if workers
were infinitely lived since, in that case, borrowing from the future is
equivalent to borrowing from yourself.
(iv) Limitations
Even though the trade friction approach was developed less than 10
years ago, it has already yielded an impressive number of insights. In
terms of the model introduced in section A, it has allowed us to ad
dress the question of whether or not the natural rate of unemployment
is efficient (taking as given the process by which firms and workers
meet) in a fairly simple setting. This has been accomplished by focus
ing on how the market manages to determine e, the job-finding rate,
by creating incentives for firms and workers to enter the search pro
cess and expend effort to find employment. We have seen that market
externalities lead to an inefficient job-finding rate and that feedback
mechanisms may create more than one equilibrium. Unfortunately, very
little effort has been made to use this approach to explain how jobs
dissolve. 26 The separation rate, s, is almost always taken as exogenous
in these models. This is disturbing in light of the fact that there is strong
empirical evidence that most unemployed workers become unemployed
involuntarily (through layoffs). 27 A good theory of unemployment needs
to explain why layoffs occur.
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It should be fairly easy to extend the trade friction models in a man
ner that allows for endogenous job separations. One can easily imagine
a model with several search sectors in which exogenous shocks cause
prices to fluctuate across sectors. As price falls in a particular sector,
the value of each match in that sector drops and may fall below the
expected return from search in another sector. This would cause the
firm to lay off the worker. Unfortunately, the worker would also wish
to sever the relationship, and thus such a model would not be able to
explain involuntary job separations. In addition, such a model would
be unable to explain the source of the exogenous shocks. A theory about
cyclical fluctuations in unemployment should be able to explain the origin
of business cycles as well as their implications for the labor market.
Therefore, for search theory to continue to evolve as a major theory
of unemployment, we need to find ways to extend the model to allow
for layoff unemployment and business cycles. For a more detailed discus
sion of these issues, interested readers are referred to Pissarides (1988)
on the issue of layoffs and Howitt and McAfee (1988) on endogenous
business cycles.

E. Employment Policies, Unemployment and Efficiency
My goal in this section is to examine a number of policies commonly
used to deal with the unemployment problem using the framework pro
vided by the search literature. The treatment offered here is in no way
meant to represent a complete analysis of the impact of these policies;
instead, it reflects the insights that the search literature provides with
respect to each program.
The discussion focuses on two related issues: the impact of the pro
gram on unemployment and efficiency. We consider these issues
separately since, as discussed above, there are cases in which a reduc
tion in unemployment does not signal an increase in efficiency.
Nonetheless, policymakers often have noneconomic objectives in mind
and may be more interested in reducing unemployment than in achiev-
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ing allocative efficiency. Moreover, it is not difficult to imagine that
some politicians might find the concept that an increase in unemploy
ment is necessary to improve efficiency politically unpalatable. Final
ly, when assessing the potential value of a policy on efficiency grounds,
it will be useful to divide social welfare into two components: the value
of output and the surplus value from employment.

(i) Transfer Payment, Unemployment and Duration
In terms of job search, government programs that make payments
directly to individuals can be separated into two categories: those that
provide income to the unemployed and those that supplement the in
come of the employed (or newly employed). Payments to unemployed
searchers, such as unemployment insurance, reduce the cost of
joblessness and therefore make search relatively more attractive. In a
model with a distribution of wages, this results in higher reservation
wages. If the wage offer distribution remains unchanged, unemploy
ment and duration both rise. However, as shown by Albrecht and
Axell (1984), it is possible for the wage-offer distribution to shift in
a manner that actually reduces unemployment (see the discussion in sec
tion C.ii above).
The trade friction approach also suggests that such policies will in
crease unemployment. If, for example, workers choose search effort
to maximize expected lifetime utility, then any increase in search costs
will lead to a decrease in aggregate search effort. This triggers increases
in both the level and duration of unemployment. In fact, even with search
effort fixed, the link still exists. To see this, consider a multisector model
in which the structure and level of unemployment varies across sec
tors. In equilibrium, all active sectors will have to offer workers the
same expected lifetime income (otherwise, searchers will simply flow
to the sector offering the highest expected return and the remaining sec
tors will produce no output). Sectors with the highest unemployment
rate will therefore have to offer higher wages in order to compensate
workers for the relatively longer spells of unemployment they would
face in such sectors. Since payments to searchers make unemployment
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less costly, they result in more searchers seeking jobs in these highpaying sectors. This, in turn, increases the economy wide unemploy
ment rate (see Davidson, Martin, and Matusz 1987b for details). Of
course, policies that reduce the wages of the employed, such as wage
taxes, generate exactly the same type of effects.
Considering the results from the trade friction literature, the insights
offered by the early partial-partial equilibrium models, and the evidence
that wage offers are rarely rejected (so that the importance of the
Albrecht/Axell finding is diminished), it seems reasonable to conclude
that policies subsidizing unemployment or taxing employment should
theoretically result in a drop in the number of jobs and increase the
average spell of unemployment. With respect to unemployment in
surance, these hypotheses have been confirmed empirically by a number
of authors (see, for example, Topel 1983, 1984).
By similar arguments, programs offering additional compensation to
the employed encourage search and reduce the unemployment rate. Brief
ly, increasing the reward associated with employment increases the return
to search while making unemployment relatively less attractive than it
would be in the absence of such a scheme. The result is a reduction
in reservation wages, increased search effort, and an increased will
ingness to accept low-paying jobs. All three of these effects reduce both
the average spell of unemployment and the unemployment rate. Policies
that affect unemployment in this manner include job subsidies (subsidies
to firms and employees paid at the time a new job is created), wages
subsidies and programs that pay workers a bonus for finding employ
ment in a relatively short, prespecified length of time. An example of
the latter policy would be the bonus program in Illinois that paid newly
unemployed workers $500 if they accepted a job during the first 11
weeks of unemployment. This experimental program produced results
consistent with search theory: the duration of unemployment fell by
a full week (see Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987 for details)!
The manner in which transfer programs are financed can also have
an important impact on unemployment. For example, a number of
authors have criticized the manner in which unemployment insurance
(UI) is financed. UI is funded by a payroll tax levied on wages that
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fall below a given ceiling. This has important implications for unemploy
ment. Because wages above a certain level are exempt from the tax,
financing UI in this manner increases the incentives firms face to employ
high-wage workers. Hamermesh (1977) has suggested raising the ceil
ing on distributional grounds and in order to reduce unemployment
among low-wage workers. The argument runs as follows. Since firms
pay relatively more in taxes when they hire low-wage workers, they
offer them fewer "good jobs." By increasing the ceiling, the distor
tion is removed and low-wage workers should benefit. In an intriguing
paper, Wright and Loberg (1987) demonstrate that, to some degree,
Hamermesh's argument is correct but incomplete. In particular, they
show that an increase in the ceiling lowers the reservation wages of
low-wage workers, thereby reducing their unemployment rate. However,
there are two caveats. First, the reservation wages and unemployment
of high-wage workers both rise. Second, and perhaps most important,
they show that the average wage earned by the low-wage workers (both
before and after taxes) fall so that expected income falls when the ceil
ing is raised. Wright and Loberg therefore advocate, as an alternative
policy, an increase in the tax ceiling accompanied by an equiproportionate reduction in the tax rate. They go on to demonstrate that
such a policy change does not affect high-wage workers at all, while
achieving the goal of increasing the employment and after-tax wages
of low-wage workers. 28
Finally, transfer payments and taxes may also have an important im
pact on the relative earnings of workers and firms. As discussed above,
trade frictions create an environment in which wages are shielded from
competitive labor market forces. Search costs, therefore, provide both
firms and workers with a degree of monopoly power, resulting in a
wage that depends on the relative bargaining power of the two contract
ing parties. For example, in a simple one-sector model Pissarides (1985)
demonstrates that unemployment insurance increases the bargaining
power of the potential employee, since it reduces search costs. This
leads to an increase in wages and a reduction in profits. Proportional
wage taxes paid by firms lower the worker's value to the firm. Conse
quently, the bargaining power of the firm is enhanced and its share of
revenue rises.
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(ii) Minimum Wages, Employment Agencies,
and Aggregate Demand Management
Among the additional policies that affect unemployment, three in par
ticular are worth discussing: minimum wage laws, state-run employ
ment agencies and aggregate demand management. While traditional
arguments in favor of minimum wage laws usually entail distributional
issues, these latter two policies are specifically targeted at increasing
employment.
Virtually any model of the labor market predicts that effective
minimum wage laws will increase unemployment. Debate therefore
usually centers on the question of whether the increase in income for
low-wage workers is sufficient to justify the policy. However, multisector
trade friction models reveal that these wage floors may also have im
portant allocative effects (see Davidson, Martin, and Matusz 1988).
Since, if labor is mobile, each sector must offer searchers the same ex
pected return from search, low-wage sectors are characterized by less
unemployment than high-wage sectors. Minimum wage laws increase
the wages that firms in the low-unemployment sectors must pay, and
this reduces the demand for labor by those firms. This further increases
unemployment by reallocating labor towards the high-unemployment
sectors. As in traditional models, the increased flow of searchers to
the high-unemployment sectors causes the wages in this sector to fall
and increases the average spell of unemployment.
Turn next to state-run employment agencies, where the goal is to
reduce unemployment by improving the efficiency of the matching pro
cess. These agencies offer an alternative to the search process by register
ing and matching unemployed workers with firms carrying vacancies.
Pissarides (1979) constructs a simple search model of the labor market
in order to determine the optimal policies that state-run employment
agencies should adopt if their goal is to increase employment. In his
model, all unemployed workers must register with the agency in order
to qualify for unemployment insurance. These workers may also engage
in costly private search activity in order to further increase their
likelihood of employment. Firms have a choice, they can either register
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their vacancy with the agency or advertise privately, but not both. This
assumption is justified on empirical grounds (see Evans 1977). Firms
receive no compensation from registering with the agency and do so
only because it might be a quicker way to fill the position. Vacant jobs
that are publicly advertised are available to all workers engaged in private
search activity.
Pissarides derives several interesting results. Most important, he
demonstrates that while a reduction in the cost of private search always
reduces unemployment, policies that reduce the cost associated with
using the employment agency have an ambiguous effect on employ
ment. This follows from the fact that increased activity at the agency
reduces the incentive to search privately. The fall in private search ef
fort reduces employment and this effect might be sufficient to outweigh
the increase in jobs brought about by the increased efficiency at the
employment agency. As far as policy is concerned, this result indicates
that the agency should employ methods that encourage private search
activity. For example, rather than trying to entice more firms to register
their vacancies (doing so would lower the return to private search), it
is better to subsidize private job advertisements by firms. Alternative
ly, the government could charge workers a fee for using the agency
or tie unemployment benefits to the number of contacts made with firms
during the search period, i.e., the government could provide a bonus
for each contact made. These policies would reduce the number of jobs
generated by agency activity, but would increase employment overall. 29
Finally, consider the role of aggregate demand management. As shown
in section D.ii, the externalities inherent in the search process create
a feedback mechanism that may lead to multiple equilibria. Which
equilibrium the economy actually settles down to depends on the cur
rent level of economic activity and agents' expectations about future
trading opportunities. Actions taken by the government to stimulate ag
gregate demand can lead the economy towards a more desired
equilibrium (one with lower unemployment). This provides a rationale
for the Keynesian policy of "pump priming." Furthermore, govern
ment programs designed to convince agents that the economic future
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is bright can also be an effective way to guide the economy towards
the desired equilibrium. Propaganda can be beneficial!

(iii) Efficiency
The externalities inherent in the search process make it almost cer
tain that the equilibrium level of unemployment will not be efficient.
Unfortunately, search theory does not provide any clear-cut prescrip
tions for dealing with this problem. There are a number of reasons for
this. First, as we have seen above, search activity simultaneously
generates positive and negative external effects, so that it is impossible
to know whether unemployment is too high or too low. Second, although
it is by now accepted that such externalities exist, no one has yet been
able to demonstrate that their effects are nontrivial. Are the distortions
so small in size that they may be ignored, or are they large enough to
warrant costly government corrective programs? Empirical work aim
ed at addressing this issue might also be helpful in pinpointing the
dominate external effect, thereby addressing the first issue as well. Final
ly, as shown in the recent papers by Davidson, Martin, and Matusz
(1987b, 1989) the combination of search and finite life creates an en
vironment in which the interests of current and future generations
diverge. Briefly, while the unborn prefer policies aimed at maximizing
the value of steady-state output, current generations wish to maximize
the sum of this value and the surplus value of the jobs held in equilibrium.
Since the policies that maximize the value of output differ, in general,
from those that maximize the surplus value from employment, these
cohorts will generally prefer different policies. In fact, Davidson, Martin,
and Matusz (1987b) demonstrate that there are cases in which the un
born desire unemployment insurance without job subsidies (to shift
resources to the high-unemployment sector) while the current genera
tion prefers the exact opposite!
In spite of these problems, the existence of a surplus value from
employment does have policy implications that should not be ignored.
In particular, jobs that are more durable and more difficult to obtain
generate a larger social surplus than other jobs. All else equal, this
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implies that policies should be aimed at expanding low-turnover sec
tors in which it is difficult to secure employment. In the cases in which
these jobs are also characterized by relatively high wages, as is likely
to be the case (see Davidson, Martin, and Matusz 1990), this theory
lends some support to recent calls for protection of high-wage industries.

Conclusions

Given these difficulties involved in tailoring policies to raise economic
welfare and given that there seems to be a clear presumption (at least
publically) that reducing unemployment is an important goal, it seems
reasonable to conclude that policymakers will be most interested in what
the search literature dictates along these lines. With this in mind, the
most potent policies are those that promote search activity and remove
trade frictions. Bonuses to workers finding employment, bonuses to
searchers contacting firms, subsidies to firms advertising their vacan
cies, job and wage subsidies and, provided that they are run properly,
state-run employment agencies are favored over programs such as
minimum wage laws and unemployment insurance. There is a clear role
for the government to act as an economic cheerleader, encouraging
private economic activity by insisting that the future looks favorable
and pumping up the economy by increasing aggregate demand if it ap
pears headed in the wrong direction.

NOTES
1. Therefore, since both sides of the market are not modeled, it would be inappropriate to call
it a partial equilibrium approach.
2. This nomenclature is borrowed from Pissarides (1988).
3. This model is adapted from Mortensen (1970).
4. See Mattila (1974).
5. See table B-41 of the 1987 Economic Report of the President.
6. See Topel (1983).
7. See table B-41 of the 1987 Economic Report of the President.
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8. See Feldstem (1973) and Mortensen (1986).
9. See Lilien and Hall (1986) or Pissarides (1988).
10. The importance of the assumption that the wage-offer distribution is known is discussed in
note 12 below.
11. It is interesting to note that for workers nearing retirement (or those facing liquidity con
straints), the reservation wage falls over time. This follows from the fact that as retirement nears
(or, as savings are depleted) additional search is less likely to be fruitful. Therefore, G(w) falls
over time, and the worker becomes more willing to accept a low-paying job. For young workers
with adequate savings, the reservation wage remains constant over time.
12. An obvious weakness of this analysis is the assumption that workers know the wage-offer
distribution with certainty before beginning to search. This is simply not the case. Workers learn
of their potential value in the market by contacting firms and seeking employment. In other words,
workers learn about the wage-offer distribution by sampling from it. It is therefore important
to know whether optimal search from an unknown distribution is similar to that from a known
distribution. A formal analysis of this issue was provided by Rothschild (1974) and the results
are comforting. Assuming that the worker begins with an estimate of the distribution and updates
this estimate as search occurs, Rothschild provided examples in which the optimal search strategy
would be characterized by a reservation price rule. To obtain this result, it was necessary to place
restrictions on the form of the original estimate and on the type of updating rule used as new
information is obtained. Although the conditions appear restrictive, he argues (convincingly) in
the conclusion that the basic result (the optimality of the reservation price rule) is probably far
more general. Therefore, it seems the assumption that the wage-offer distribution is known is
a useful abstraction that does not seriously limit the applicability of the model.
13. The empirical importance of relaxing this assumption is discussed in Barren (1975).
14. See also Gal, Landsberger and Levykson (1981), Morgan (1983), and Morgan and Manning
(1985) for similar approaches.
15. See also Johnson (1978), Viscusi (1979), and Wilde (1979) for similar approaches. In these
studies it is generally assumed that the worker does not know the quality of the job when hired.
Over time, as he or she works, the quality of the job is revealed (i.e., jobs are experience goods)
and if the match is poor, the worker quits. This yields a model very similar to Jovanovic's.
16. It is worth noting that, since equilibrium is characterized by all firms offering the same level
of compensation, all job offers will be accepted. Unemployment is then simply tied to the rate
at which the workers receive job offers, a factor that, as we will see below, the reservation wage
approach makes little or no attempt to explain.
17. Albrecht and Axell do not present their result in this manner. Instead, they place restrictions
on the productivity distribution to insure that unemployment rises with unemployment compensa
tion. They also point out that a selective increase in unemployment compensation restricted to
low-wage workers unambiguously reduces unemployment. Such a selective program does so by
increasing the low wage and driving the least productive firms from the market. This increases
the fraction of firms offering high wages and causes unemployment to fall. Note that this policy
is costless, since low- wage workers are never unemployed and therefore never collect unemploy
ment insurance.
18. See Diamond and Maskin (1979) for a notable exception.
19. For a review of the externalities involved in the search process, see Mortensen (1986) par
ticularly section 4 and Hosios (1990).
20. Descriptions of congestion and income externalities can be found in many other papers in
cluding Diamond (1982b), Pissarides (1984a, 1984b), Mortensen (1986), and Hosios (1990). I
have chosen to use the Davidson, Martin, and Matusz set-up due to my own obvious familiarity
with the model.
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21. It is important to remember that in this model, search intensity is not allowed to vary. When
search intensity is endogenous, the externalities lead to further distortions. Income externalities
lead to a search intensity that is too low (implying too much unemployment), while congestion
externalities have ambiguous effects.
22. Note that in this model, unlike the one developed by Davidson, Martin, and Matusz, workers
still reject some job offers (since some projects cost more than c*). However, none of Diamond's
results depend on the form of G(c), and therefore his results are not driven by the rate of job
rejection. As with most trade friction models, it is the search technology (£(£)) that drives the model.
23. There is an additional equilibrium at the origin where no production takes place, because
workers are unwilling to undertake even the lowest-cost projects (c* = 0). This is an equilibrium
since, if no one else is producing, there will be no one for a worker to trade with if he or she
chooses to produce. Thus, there is an equilibrium in which everyone is unemployed.
24. Changes in expectations actually cause the c*(£) curve to shift, altering the equilibria and,
as Diamond shows, may change the type of equilibrium the economy heads towards.
25. To see this, note that in section (i) we derived Ve - K and it was decreasing in e, the jobfinding rate.
26. See Jovanovic (1983) for a notable exception.
27. See Topel (1983) and Lilien and Hall (1986).
28. The fact that UI is ' 'experience rated'' has also drawn a great deal of criticism, mostly because
this feature contributes to layoff unemployment. The forces at work in this instance have little
to do with search and will be discussed in detail in the chapter on contracts. The interested reader
is also referred to Brechling (1981) or Topel (1983).
29. This does not imply that it would be optimal to do away with the agency altogether. In fact,
Pissarides shows that such policies work only if all workers remain registered with the agency.
In addition, if all workers engage in private search activity, then it is optimal to encourage firms
to register their vacancies.

Non-Walrasian Equilibria

Prior to the late 1960s, virtually all microeconomic models included
the assumption that prices were perfectly flexible and able to adjust in
stantaneously to equate supply and demand. No rigorous explanation
was offered for how prices would adjust when out of equilibrium; it
was simply assumed that some dynamic process would lead us instant
ly to the market-clearing values. The continued reliance on this assump
tion led to (what I consider) the three most embarrassing facts about
the state of economic theory. First, with perfectly flexible prices and
frictionless markets, involuntary unemployment (by definition) cannot
occur at a positive wage rate. Therefore, even though unemployment
is considered a major barometer of economic performance in Western
cultures, most economists have worked with models in which unemploy
ment was a logical impossibility. Second, our models could not explain
how the economy would adjust when out of equilibrium. There are a
number of good reasons to be bothered by this. For example.,
microeconomics tells us that the selfish pursuit of private gain will result,
under certain conditions, in an equilibrium that is Pareto Optimal.
However, it does not tell us if this same selfish pursuit will lead us
towards equilibrium if, for some reason, the equilibrium is disturbed.
Nor does it tell us how selfishness leads us to equilibrium in the first
place. Another problem arises from the fact that by ignoring out-ofequilibrium behavior, we necessarily ignore some important interac
tions in the marketplace. If prices adjust instantaneously, consumers
and firms know that they will be able to complete all desired transac
tions. There is no need to take into account possible market constraints
such as unemployment (which constrains worker income) or insuffi
cient market demand (which constrains the firm's sales). These con
straints link markets in important ways that equilibrium models effec
tively rule out (e.g., greater unemployment lowers workers income and
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reduces product market demand; smaller than expected sales cause firms
to reduce their demand for inputs in factor markets).
The final embarrassment concerns the difference between macro- and
microeconomics. Macroeconomics is the study of the economy at an
aggregate level, with a particular emphasis on the determinants of
economic activity (including unemployment) and the price level.
Microeconomics is the study of individual behavior. One would expect
these two fields to be linked, with micro models serving as the basis
for macro theories. Unfortunately, since traditional microtheory relies
on the assumption of perfectly flexible prices, there is no role for
unemployment in such models. This has forced us to develop one set
of theories to explain individual behavior and a different set of theories
to explain behavior in the aggregate. One would have hoped for more
consistency than this in a field that is over two hundred years old!
If we think carefully about the development of macroeconomics, it
is easy to see the source of our difficulty in dealing with these issues.
Modern macroeconomics was born with the publication of Keynes's
"General Theory" in 1936. At that time, the theory of individual
behavior was fairly well established. Although its mathematical for
mulation by Samuelson (1947) and Arrow and Debreu (1954) had not
yet taken place, its reliance on market-clearing prices was firmly en
trenched. Keynes's theories were difficult to integrate into this
framework. He wrote of involuntary unemployment, a concept at odds
with market clearing, and consumption as a function of income, a variable
that should be endogenous (not a parameter) according to classical
microeconomics. Due to the power of Keynes's theory and the seem
ing inconsistency between his theories and microeconomics,
macroeconomics made little attempt to ground itself in true
microeconomic principles. 1
The "fixed-price" or "disequilibrium!" models of the late sixties
and early seventies, e.g., Glower (1965), Leijonhufvud (1968), and
Barro and Grossman (1971, 1976), attempted to deal with these issues
by providing a microeconomic framework in which Keynesian notions
such as the consumption function and involuntary unemployment made
sense. 2 This was done by assuming that prices were fixed (or slow to
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adjust) and by focusing on how the economy would behave when out
of equilibrium. The fixed-price assumption was made for two related
reasons. First, it is obvious that in reality prices do not always clear
markets. Queues form every day in response to excess demand and firms
are often forced to carry unplanned inventories. Such quantity ad
justments determine which transactions will take place in the short run
and it is only later, in the long run, that prices adjust. It therefore makes
sense to ask how economies adjust when rigid, nonmarket-clearing prices
prevail.
The second reason for focusing on fixed-price models is that it can
be shown that links across markets are created by non-Walrasian prices
that can provide a basis for certain Keynesian phenomena. These links
can be described as follows. When prices are incorrect, one side of the
market will not be able to carry out all desired transactions. Constraints
faced by agents on the short side in one market obviously affect their
behavior in other markets. For example, workers who fail to find a job
reveal a different demand for goods than they would have if they had
been able to secure employment. Changes in behavior caused by market
constraints are known as "quantity adjustments." These quantity ad
justments interact and produce an equilibrium state even when prices
are at nonmarket-clearing levels. The type of equilibrium created,
however, behaves very differently from a standard Walrasian
equilibrium. In fact, non-Walrasian equilibria may be characterized by
involuntary unemployment. Moreover, Keynesian features such as
multipliers and a consumption function with income as a parameter arise
naturally in such an environment. Therefore, micro models with ra
tional, utility-maximizing agents facing incorrect prices can provide a
solid microeconomic foundation for Keynesian macroeconomic theory.
The goal of this chapter is to review the major insights provided by
the fixed-price literature. This will be accomplished in three steps. In
section A, I begin by explaining the difference between quantity and
price adjustment in a partial equilibrium setting. When focusing on on
ly one market, this is equivalent to the distinction between Walrasian
and Marshallian stability. The analysis is extended to a general
equilibrium framework in section B. The focus in this section is on
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the manner in which quantity adjustments link markets and produce nonWalrasian equilibria. I also stress that the effectiveness of various policies
aimed at reducing unemployment depends on the types of quantity con
straints faced by workers and firms.
In section B, prices are assumed to be fixed while quantities are allow
ed to adjust to clear markets. In section C, I discuss recent contribu
tions aimed at providing a more complete theory in which prices are
chosen by profit-maximizing firms with market induced constraints in
mind. In some of the early studies, prices change from period to period
with quantities adjusting within each period to achieve equilibrium. This
effectively amounts to an assumption that while both prices and quan
tities react to market signals, quantity adjustments occur faster than price
adjustments. More recent contributions have abandoned this assump
tion by allowing for simultaneous price and quantity determination. The
main goal of this literature is to address the question of whether or not
the selfish pursuit of private gain will necessarily lead towards the Walrasian equilibrium. One of the major results is that such models are often
characterized by multiple equilibria that can be Pareto-ranked. The
Walrasian equilibrium may be included in the set of equilibria but there
is no guarantee that an unaided economy will end up at the Walrasian
prices. This result is therefore qualitatively similar to those obtained
by Peter Diamond in the search literature (see the previous chapter).
The reason for the similarity is also discussed in section C.

A. Quantity vs. Price Adjustment
Suppose that, for some reason, a market is temporarily out of
equilibrium. Will the economy adjust and move us towards equilibrium
or are there market forces present that may actually push us away from
equilibrium? To answer this question, two different adjustment processes
have been proposed. The first, due to Leon Walras, assumes that prices
adjust to equate supply and demand. The argument runs along the follow
ing lines. Suppose that price exceeds its market-clearing level so that
the quantity supplied exceeds the quantity demanded (see figure 3.1).
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Could this situation persist over time? The obvious answer to this ques
tion is no, since firms would build up ever increasing inventories as
some of their goods remained unsold. In an effort to reduce inventories,
firms would eventually be forced to lower their prices toward
equilibrium. If, on the other hand, the price level is such that demand
exceeds supply, either unsatisfied customers would bid up the price or
firms would take advantage of the excess demand by raising price. In
each case, price moves towards equilibrium. Eventually, the marketclearing price is reached and equilibrium is achieved.

Figure 3.1

D

Q
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The alternative adjustment process, due to Alfred Marshall, actually
predates Walras's theory and relies on quantity adjustments to clear
markets. To explain how equilibrium is achieved, refer to figure 3.2.
Suppose first that too little output has been produced. Then, according
to the supply curve, the lowest price that suppliers are willing to accept
for an additional unit of output (the "supply price") is Ps. This price
is lower than Pd, the maximum price consumers are willing to pay for
an additional unit of the product (the "demand price"). Since consumers
are willing to pay more for extra output than firms are asking, firms
respond by increasing output. This moves us closer to the equilibrium
(or market-clearing) quantity. A similar argument can be used to show
that if too much output is produced (so that the supply price exceeds
the demand price) market forces lead firms to reduce output. Once again,
although for different reasons, the market works when out of
equilibrium the market adjusts and moves us back towards equilibrium.
Figure 3.2
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In a partial equilibrium setting, the distinction between price and quan
tity adjustment processes may seem like a distinction without a dif
ference. After all, in each case the outcome is the same: the market
ends up in equilibrium with supply equaling demand. This would not
be the case, however, if, for some reason, demand or supply were
perversely sloped. For example, in figure 3.3a it can be shown that
the equilibrium is stable under the Walrasian price adjustment process
but unstable when Marshallian quantity adjustment is assumed. The op
posite is true for figure 3.3b. Therefore, at least in some cases, the
assumed adjustment process matters.
While this analysis has provided insight into the difference between
quantity and price adjustment, and although these arguments have been
used countless times in the literature to address the question of stabili
ty, the reasoning behind each argument is flawed. To begin with, both
stories of out-of-equilibrium adjustments are just that stories. No one
has developed a model of profit-maximizing price-setting firms and
demonstrated that it is in their interest to raise price in the presence
of excess demand and lower price when facing excess supply. Although
this seems intuitively plausible and although a great deal of effort has
been expended to demonstrate its truthfulness, to date no one has been
successful. 3 Likewise, no one has demonstrated that the most profitable
course of action is to increase output when the demand price exceeds
the supply price. Therefore, neither theory of adjustment has been shown
to be consistent with profit or utility-maximizing behavior.
A more serious flaw with the analyses rests in the fact that, although
both theories purport to tell us how agents act in disequilibrium, they
rely on supply and demand curves that are generated under the assump
tion that all desired transactions can be completed. For example, the
labor demand schedule is derived by maximizing profits under the
assumption that all output produced can be sold. If, as may be the case
if prices are incorrect, there is insufficient demand in the product market,
the firm will reveal a different demand for labor. Supply and demand
curves derived under the assumption that agents will not be constrain
ed in carrying out transactions are known as "notional." Demand and
supply curves derived taking into account the quantity constraints
generated by nonmarket-clearing prices are known as "effective." The
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Figure 3.3a

Figure 3.3b
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analyses above focus on notional demand and supply. However, if the
economy is not in equilibrium, it is the effective demand and supply
curves that govern matters.
To derive the effective demands, we need to know which agents are
constrained in the remaining markets. For example, refer back to the
depiction of the product market in figures 3.1-3.3 and consider the
possibilities for the labor market. One possibility is that the real wage
is above its equilibrium value resulting in an excess supply of labor.
In this case, some workers are unemployed and therefore earn a lower
level of income than originally planned. This leads the unemployed to
restrict their purchases in the product market and implies that the ef
fective demand for output is less than the notional demand. The de
mand for output is therefore overstated in figures 3.1-3.3. Now, sup
pose instead that the real wage is too low so that there is excess de
mand in the labor market. In this case, firms are unable to hire all the
workers they desire and therefore cannot produce their planned level
of output. Thus, the effective supply of output is less than its notional
value and the supply of output is overstated in figures 3.1-3.3. In either
case, at least one of the curves is mis-specified, rendering the subse
quent analysis incorrect. This example clearly illustrates that the type
of disequilibrium encountered in other markets has a direct bearing on
the behavior of agents within a market. To understand how an economy
behaves when nonmarket-clearing prices prevail, we must consider the
situation in all markets at once. We need to make clear which agents
are constrained in which markets and we must take these constraints
into account when calculating supply and demand schedules. We now
turn to a general equilibrium approach to show how to handle these
matters in a rigorous fashion.

B. Fixed Prices in General Equilibrium
(i) Walrasian Equilibria
In this section, a simple three-good model is developed in order to
illustrate the differences between a Walrasian equilibrium brought about
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by price adjustment and a non-Walrasian equilibrium generated by quan
tity adjustment with fixed prices. The three goods are a nonstorable
consumption good, leisure, and money, with money held as a store of
value. There are two types of economic agents: consumers and firms.
Labor is the only productive input. 4
I begin by describing the problems faced by consumers and firms
when they believe that they will be able to purchase and sell all they
desire in each market. With no fear of unemployment or shortages in
the goods market, consumers choose consumption, leisure, and money
holdings to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint. The only
other constraint they face comes from the fact that they cannot work
more than 24 hours in a day. Formally, let£/(c,l,^) denote the con
sumer's utility function, with c representing consumption; 1, leisure; m,
money holdings; and p, the price of the consumption good (so that «represents real money balances). Utility is assumed to be increasing
in each argument (money represents wealth and enters the utility func
tion since it is used to finance future consumption). Then, letting w denote
the wage and ra denote initial money holdings, the consumer's daily prob
lem is to choose c, 1, and -^ to maximize:
(1)

£/(c,l,-^)

subject to: cp + m = (24 - l)w -I- m.

The budget constraint states that expenditures on consumption (cp) plus
money holdings (m) must equal income [(24-l)w] plus initial money
holdings. The solution to this problem yields a demand for consump
tion, a supply of labor, and a demand for money, all of which are func
tions of the price, wage, and initial money holdings - c"^(p,w,m),
L^tp.w.m) and /^(p.H^/n), respectively (L represents labor services
and is therefore equal to 24-1). In each case, the superscript n is used
to remind the reader that these are the consumer's notional functions
since they are derived under the assumption that the consumer is not
rationed in any market. Note that consumption is a function of prices,
not income, in this setting since leisure (and hence income) is a choice
variable for the consumer.
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To derive the effective demand curves, we would have to take into
account any constraints the consumer might face in the marketplace.
For example, if labor was in excess supply, the consumer might not
be able to work more than, say, L hours per day. The constraint (24
- 1) < L would then have to be added to (1). If the consumer faced
a constraint in the product market due to an insufficient supply of out
put, then a constraint such as c < c would have to be added to (1).
These cases will be considered in detail below when I discuss the no
tion of a non-Walrasian equilibrium. It is important to note, however,
that in each case, the effective demand and supply functions that result
from (1) will be functions of these constraints as well as the price and
wage levels.
Turn next to the firm's problem. Each firm's goal is to maximize
profit. If there are no labor shortages or problems selling output, then
the firm's objective is to choose labor (L) to maximize profit, or:

(2)

f(L)p - wL.

In (2), J(L) represents the production function. It is well known that
profit is maximized by hiring labor until the marginal product of the
last worker hired (/"'(L)) equals the real wage. This condition yields
a demand for labor and a supply of output that are functions of the real
wage - L^) and <7"*("), respectively (of course, cf" = fiL*"*)). Once
again, the superscript n signifies that these are notional functions, since
the firms face no market-imposed constraints. As with the consumer,
effective demand and supply functions for the firm are derived by add
ing any product or labor market constraints to (2).
We are now in position to describe the traditional microeconomic no
tion of equilibrium.
Definition: For any given level of initial money holdings, a Walrasian
equilibrium is a price and wage pair (p*,w*) such that ^(p^w^m) =
^) and
*
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This definition states that a Walrasian equilibrium occurs when prices
and wages equate notional supply and demand in each market. When
such is the case, agents are justified in assuming that they will be able
to carry out all their plans.
It is easy to think of examples in which, in reality, markets do not
clear. Unemployment signifies excess supply in the labor market, waiting
lists for foreign cars signify excess demand in some auto markets, and
so on. Thus, it is clear that the economy is not always in a Walrasian
equilibrium. We have tended to focus on this concept of equilibrium
not because it describes reality but because we have believed that market
forces always cause the economy to move towards a Walrasian
equilibrium. If this is true, then this concept allows us to predict where
the economy is headed. We have argued above, however, that it is not
clear that the economy will indeed tend towards such a state. In addi
tion, casual observation suggests that price and wage rigidities exist
that often keep markets from clearing. It is therefore necessary to ex
amine the behavior of the economy when non-Walrasian prices prevail.

(ii) Non-Walrasian Equilibria
Suppose that prices and wages are fixed in the short run at nonWalrasian levels due to unexplained rigidities. When the economy fails
to achieve a Walrasian equilibrium, some agents will not be able to carry
out all their planned transactions. Once this has been discovered, these
agents will have to adjust accordingly. Such adjustments will, of course,
alter the economywide supply and demand schedules in many markets.
As long as supply and demand remain unequal, these adjustments will
continue to be made. At some point, hopefully, supply and demand will
balance. If they do, then the economy is said to have achieved a nonWalrasian equilibrium.
To gain some insight into the nature of a non-Walrasian equilibrium,
an example is provided to show how such a state might be achieved.
Suppose that the real wage and the price level are both above their
market-clearing levels so that there is excess supply in both the labor
and product markets. Excess supply in the labor market implies
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unemployment and a constraint on the number of hours each consumer
can work. When (1) is resolved with this added constraint, an effective
demand for output is obtained that depends on the tightness of this labor
market constraint. For the firm, excess supply in the product market
implies that they cannot sell all the output they had planned on produc
ing. When (2) is resolved, taking into account this product market con
straint, it yields an effective demand for labor that depends on the
tightness of the sales constraint. Different constraints in the labor and
product markets yield different levels of effective demand. If there ex
ists a set of constraints such that the effective demand for labor by firms
equals the supply of labor at the same time that the effective demand
for output equals the supply, then the plans of consumers and producers
formed by taking into account the market imposed constraints will be
mutually consistent. If this state is ever achieved, the economy will be
in a type of equilibrium, since (effective) supply and demand are equal
and therefore all planned (albeit constrained) transactions can be car
ried out.
We are now in a position to formally define a non-Walrasiaa
equilibrium. Let Lw and Z^ denote the labor market constraints faced
by workers and firms, respectively, and let c and q represent the pro
duct market constraints on purchases and sales, respectively. 5 Then a
non-Walrasian equilibrium can be defined as follows.
Definition: For any given price/wage pair (p,w) and any initial level
of money holdings, a non-Walrasian equilibrium is a set of constraints
(L*, Lf, c*, q*) such that, when these constraints are taken into ac
count by consumers and firms, effective demand and supply are equated
in all markets.
We now turn to an explicit derivation of the non-Walrasian equilibria
in order to compare them with the Walrasian equilibrium.
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(iii) Properties of Non-Walrasian Equilibria
Whether workers or firms are constrained in a given market depends
on the structure of prices and wages. For the model introduced above,
there are four possibilities (see table 3.1). In the first case, workers
are constrained in the labor market and the firm is constrained in the
product market. This case occurs when the notional demand for labor
falls short of the notional supply (so that there is unemployment) and
the notional supply of output exceeds the notional demand (so that the
firm cannot sell all its output). For reasons to be discussed below, this
case is referred to as "Keynesian unemployment." The second possibili
ty occurs when labor is constrained in both markets. Thus, not only
are workers unemployed, but they also find it impossible to purchase
the amount of the consumption good that they desire. This case is referred
to as "classical unemployment." "Repressed inflation" occurs when
there is excess demand in both markets. The final case, simply labeled
X, occurs when the firm is constrained in both markets. The label "X"
is used to signify that this type of non-Walrasian equilibrium cannot
arise in our simple model. 6
Table 3.1

Which side of the market
is constrained?

Labor
market

Product
market

Labor

Firms

Labor

Consumers

Firms
Firms

Consumers
Firms

Label
Keynesian
unemployment
Classical
unemployment
Repressed
inflation
X

Since different market constraints are imposed on the economy in
each of the situations in table 3.1, the economy will adjust differently
in each instance. To see how an equilibrium is achieved via quantity
adjustments and to investigate the effectiveness of various government
policies, I now turn to a detailed analysis of each case.
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Keynesian Unemployment
Consider first the problem faced by workers. With the notional de
mand for labor falling short of supply, workers will not be able to work
as many hours or earn as much income as they had planned. Instead,
they will work as many hours as the market allows and then choose
consumption and money holdings to maximize utility. Therefore, the
effective supply of labor is exactly equal to the market constraint, Lw,
and the worker's problem is to choose c and m to maximize: 7
(3)

t/(c,24-Lw,-p-)

subject to: pc + m = (24 - LJw + m.

Problem (3) is nothing more than (1) with the labor market constraint
added. The solution to (3) yields an effective demand for consumption
that depends only on the labor market constraint (remember that prices.,
wages and initial money holdings are assumed to be fixed).
The functional relationship between the effective demand for con
sumption and Lw has some interesting and familiar properties. To begin
with, since income is equal to hours worked multiplied by the wage.,
and since the wage is fixed, once L^ is set by the market so is the
worker's income. Changes in this labor market constraint result in
movements in income, thereby triggering a change in consumption,,
Thus, consumption is simply a function of income which, in this case,
is a parameter set by the market (as far as the worker is concerned).
Turn next to the nature of the demand function. If we assume that pres
ent and future consumption are both normal goods and that the worker
uses savings to finance consumption when it is impossible to find work,
i.e., when Lw = 0, then this consumption function takes on the form
depicted in figure 3.4 (the superscript e is used to denote an effective
demand or supply curve so that ced represents the effective demand for
consumption). All macroeconomists will immediately recognize this as
nothing more than the Keynesian consumption function. It states that
as the labor market constraint is relaxed (allowing the worker to work
more hours), income and consumption both increase. However, since
future consumption is a normal good, each extra dollar of income
translates into less than one dollar's worth of extra consumption (the
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remainder goes into savings). Thus, the marginal propensity to con
sume, i.e., the slope of the consumption function, is less than unity.

Figure 3.4

*-L*>m

The solution to the firm's problem in the presence of Keynesian
unemployment is easy to characterize. Since the firm cannot sell all
it wants to, it will simply produce the level of output demanded. Thus,
the effective supply of output is equal to the sales constraint, q. The
effective demand for labor is then equal to the number of workers needed
to produce exactly q units of output. This value is given by the inverse of
the production function evaluated at q. As the sales constraint is relaxed
(allowing the firm to sell more output), the effective demand for labor
increases. This positively sloped function is also depicted in figure 3.4.
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To derive the non-Walrasian equilibrium, consider an arbitrary labor
market constraint such as Lw in figure 3.4. For this constraint to be
part of a non-Walrasian equilibrium, there would have to be a corres
ponding product market constraint that leads to equality between ef
fective demand and supply in all markets. From figure 3.4, the labor
market constraint (Lw) translates into an effective demand for consump
tion of c'. However, when firms face this constraint in the product
market, they reveal an effective demand for labor of L'W . Since, the
effective demand for labor (L^) is greater than the effective supply (Lw),
we conclude that Lw cannot be part of a non-Walrasian equilibrium.
In fact, this sort of argument rules out all constraints except L* and
c*. It is easy to see these constraints do constitute a non-Walrasian
equilibrium, since when the workers face L* they reveal an effective
demand for consumption of c*, and when the firms face a constraint
of c* in the product market, they will want to hire L* workers.
This equilibrium is characterized by involuntary unemployment even
though the actions of consumers and producers are mutually consis
tent. This follows from the fact that at the fixed wage and price levels
the notional supply of labor exceeds demand. 8 Equilibrium is reached
when the agents realize that they cannot carry out their notional plans
and instead take into account the market-imposed constraints. Their final
constrained desires are mutually consistent but, if it were possible,
workers would prefer to work more hours and firms would prefer to
sell more output. Finally, note that once this equilibrium is reached there
are no longer any market signals present to put upward or downward
pressure on wages and/or prices. Since firms are selling exactly what
they produce and there are no unsatisfied customers demanding more
output, there is no reason for the firm to raise or lower its price.
Likewise, in the labor market workers are providing exactly the level
of labor services demanded by employers, and thus there is no downward
pressure on the real wage. Quantity adjustments can remove the market
signals that we usually assume will lead to price changes.
Why is this case referred to as "Keynesian unemployment?" One
rationale has already been offered: the effective demand for consump
tion closely mimics the traditional Keynesian consumption function. This,
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however, is not the primary reason for the nomenclature. Instead, this
label refers to the types of policies that will be effective in lowering
unemployment. The traditional Keynesian prescription for lowering
unemployment is an increase in aggregate demand brought about by
either an increase in government spending or a reduction in taxes. It
is argued that unemployment stems from insufficient aggregate demand
which keeps firms from expanding and increasing employment. On the
other hand, the classical theory argues that unemployment stems from
real wages that are too high. It is argued that by simply allowing the
market to function unimpeded, real wages would fall and unemploy
ment would disappear. An examination of these two policies in this set
ting reveals that only the former policy will work.
Consider first the Keynesian solution. An increase in aggregate de
mand (due to, say, an increase in government spending) stimulates the
economy by relaxing the product market constraint faced by firms. As
firms realize that they can sell more output, they respond by hiring more
labor. This, in turn, increases consumer income and feeds back to the
product market by further increasing aggregate demand (since consump
tion rises). The chain reaction continues, producing Keynesian multiplierlike effects, until a new non-Walrasian equilibrium is reached with lower
unemployment and an increase in output that exceeds the increase in
government spending. This can be seen clearly in figure 3.4, where
the increase in government spending causes the aggregate demand
curve (which is equal to the effective demand for consumption plus
government spending) to shift upward and leads to a new equilibrium
with higher employment, output, and consumption.
What would be the effect of lowering the real wage? The classical
argument in favor of such a policy runs along the following lines. A
fall in the real wage should trigger an increase in the quantity of labor
demanded while reducing labor supply. If this occurs, then the level
of excess supply hi the labor market will be diminished and unemploy
ment will be lowered. Unfortunately, a reduction in the real wage has
virtually no effect when unemployment is of the Keynesian variety. To
see this, simply note that in the presence of Keynesian unemployment,
firms do not produce more output because they are constrained in the
product market, i.e., they would not be able to sell the extra output.
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Lowering the real wage will not relax this constraint and therefore it
will not lead to an increase in labor demand. The fact that workers are
constrained in the labor market implies that labor supply will not be
affected either. Before the reduction in the real wage, workers are willing
to work as many hours as the market allows and small changes in com
pensation will not change that. Therefore, policies aimed at lowering
the real wage will not affect the unemployment rate.

Classical Unemployment
This case differs from Keynesian unemployment in only one respect:
the situation in the product market. Under classical unemployment, firms
are unconstrained and therefore able to operate on their notional sup
ply and demand curves. Workers are constrained in both the product
and labor markets; they work as much as the market allows and con
sume whatever firms choose to produce. Equilibrium employment (L*)
is therefore determined by evaluating the firm's notional demand for
labor at the current real wage, i.e., L* = L^ffi. Equilibrium output
corresponds to a point on the firm's notional supply of output, i.e.,
Since firms are unconstrained in the product market, a reduction in
the real wage will be an effective way to combat unemployment. Profit
maximization dictates that unconstrained firms should hire workers until
the marginal product of the last worker hired equals the real wage. As
the real wage falls, firms will respond by increasing employment.
In contrast, the Keynesian remedy for unemployment, an increase
in aggregate demand, will have no effect on employment. Firms are
already producing and selling all they desire. The increase in govern
ment spending will not alter the profit-maximizing level of output (with
price fixed, marginal product still equals the real wage at the original
level of employment), it will simply crowd out private consumption.
A comparison of Keynesian and classical unemployment reveals that
it is the type of disequilibrium encountered in the product market that
determines the effectiveness of various government policies. If there
is excess demand (in the notionals) so that workers are constrained in
consumption, then the only effective way to reduce unemployment is
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by somehow lowering the real wage. When firms face sales constraints,
then the Keynesian solution of aggregate demand management is most
effective and policies aimed at lowering real wages have no employ
ment effect. This difference follows from the fact that non-Walrasian
prices create links across markets that are not present otherwise. For
example, when price is high enough to produce excess supply in the
product market, the tightness of the sales constraint directly determines
the level of employment (since firms hire only enough workers to pro
duce whatever is demanded). An increase in the demand for output
loosens this constraint, causing firms to expand their labor forces. A
qualitatively different link exists when the product market is characterized
by excess demand. In that case, firms can sell their profit-maximizing
level of output; thus, employment is determined by the equation equating
marginal product and the real wage. Only a reduction in the real wage
can reduce unemployment. This contrast should make it clear how im
portant the links between markets can be in the presence of nonmarketclearing prices.

Repressed Inflation
Repressed inflation occurs when there is excess demand in both
markets. The label refers to the fact that increases in price and the real
wage are required to equate notional supply and demand in each market.
As in the other cases, however, if prices are not flexible, quantity ad
justments will result in a non-Walrasian equilibrium.
Consumers/workers are constrained only in the product market, unable
to reach their desired level of consumption. In response to this con
straint, they simply consume as much as the market allows (c) and then
choose leisure to maximize utility. Formally, the worker's problem is
to maximize:
(4)

U(c, 24 - L, j)

subject to: pc + m = (24 - L)w + m.

Problem (4) is equivalent to the (1) with the product market constraint
added and the solution yields an effective supply of labor that is a func
tion of the tightness of the consumption constraint. As this constraint
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is relaxed, thereby allowing the worker to purchase more output, the
consumer responds by working more hours. This positive relationship
is depicted in figure 3.5 as the effective labor supply curve. 9

Figure 3.5

q,c

q(Lf)

L*f

Under repressed inflation the firm is unable to reach its optimal
employment level. Constrained profits are therefore maximized by hiring
as much labor as possible and using it to produce as much output as
the technology allows. Any increase in labor supply will be welcome,
resulting in an increase in economic activity. This positive relationship
is represented in figure 3.5 by the upward sloping effective supply of
output (as a function of L the firm's labor market constraint).
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The non-Walrasian equilibrium is characterized by a balance between
effective supply and demand in each market. An analysis similar to that
used in the case of Keynesian unemployment reveals that this occurs
at the intersection of the two curves in figure 3.5. Since there is no
unemployment in this regime, no detailed analysis of the equilibrium
or policy effectiveness is offered in this monograph. Interested readers
are referred to Benassy (1982) or Malinvaud (1977) for a discussion
of these issues.
X
The final possibility listed in table 3.1, labeled X, occurs when the
firm is constrained in both markets. Under our assumption that the con
sumption good is nonstorable, no non-Walrasian equilibrium with this
characteristic exists. The reason for this is simple. If the firm is con
strained in the product market, unable to sell what it desires to pro
duce, and if inventories cannot be carried into the next period, why
would the firm ever want to increase employment? An increase in
employment would only result in greater production. If the firm is unable
to sell or store additional output, then the increase in employment would
obviously lower profits (by increasing costs without changing revenue).
If the model is extended to allow for a durable consumption good, then
this regime emerges as a possibility. However, since this case would
not entail unemployment, I will simply refer interested readers to Benassy
(1982) for a discussion of the extended model.
If we place fairly mild restrictions on the utility and production func
tions in the model above, then it can be shown that for any price/wage
pair there is a unique equilibrium. Whether the equilibrium is characteriz
ed by Keynesian unemployment, classical unemployment, repressed in
flation, or a Walrasian equilibrium depends on the structure of wages
and prices. With specific functional forms for U( ) and./() we could
derive the conditions under which each regime applies. Figure 3.6 gives
us some idea as to what those conditions will look like, with (p*,w*)
representing the unique Walrasian equilibrium price vector. This is the
only price vector that equates notional supply and demand in all markets.
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A lower price level generates excess supply in the product market and,
if it is accompanied by a lower real wage, repressed inflation results.
All remaining price/wage combinations generate some level of
equilibrium unemployment. When the price level is high, there will be
excess supply in the product market and unemployment will be of the
Keynesian variety. Low prices generate excess demand in the product
market, thereby producing classical unemployment. The boundaries be
tween the regions depend on the nature of the utility and production
functions, but the qualitative properties of figure 3.6 are fairly robust.

Figure 3.6

w

Classical
Unemployment

Keynesian
Unemployment
Repressed
Inflation

At this point it is useful to step back and summarize the basic in
sights provided this fixed price model. First, we have seen that quanti
ty adjustments in the presence of fixed, non-Walrasian prices can pro
duce an equilibrium in which constrained supply and demand schedules
are equated. Once this equilibrium is reached, all market forces that
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might be expected to cause prices and/or wages to change disappear.
Therefore, if, for some reason, non-Walrasian prices prevail and quan
tities adjust to clear markets, it is conceivable that the economy will
remain at an equilibrium characterized by less than full employment.
In other words, the economy might not (and probably would not)
gravitate naturally towards the full employment Walrasian equilibrium.
Second, non-Walrasian prices create links across markets that influence
the types of policies that will be effective. Furthermore, the links can
produce Keynesian features such as multiplier effects and a traditional
Keynesian consumption function. This follows from the fact that con
straints faced by agents in one market directly influence their behavior
in other markets. For example, as the sales constraint faced by firms
in the product market is relaxed, they respond by increasing their de
mand for labor. These links have been referred to as "spillover effects"
in the literature and their importance is evident if one simply compares
the cases titled Keynesian and classical unemployment. In each case,
the labor market is characterized by excess supply but the policies that
will be effective in reducing unemployment differ across regimes. Keyne
sian unemployment occurs when firms are constrained in the product
market and policies that loosen this constraint lower unemployment (such
as an increase in government spending or lower taxes). Classical
unemployment occurs when the firm is totally unconstrained. This im
plies that unemployment can only be reduced by moving the firm down
its labor demand schedule (by lowering the real wage). Thus, the type
of notional disequilibrium encountered in the product market determines
the appropriate policy.

(iv) Other Insights
The simple model presented above is representative of the first models
used to illustrate the importance of non-Walrasian equilibria. A great
deal of subsequent work retained many of the features of this model
but extended it in a manner that would allow investigation of much
broader issues. For example, Barro and Grossman (1976) added a much
more elaborate monetary sector (including financial assets and capital)
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and grafted on a dynamic process to explain changes in prices and wages
in order to examine the relationship between inflation and unemploy
ment in a disequilibrium model. Their set-up also allowed them to in
vestigate the importance of inflationary expectations and the efficacy
of monetary policy. Obst (1978) also focused on the role of monetary
policy in the disequilibrium framework by investigating the impact of
a policy rule that keeps the money supply growing at a constant rate.
He demonstrated that due to monetary factors, such a rule would create
a trade cycle and keep the economy from converging to a steady-state
equilibrium. Dixit and Norman (1980), among others, used a simple
disequilibrium model to investigate the implications of sticky prices for
trade issues such as the effect of devaluation on the balance of payments.
Additional theoretical insights have been obtained by examining more
explicitly dynamic versions of the simple model. In a multi-period model,
Neary and Stiglitz (1983) demonstrated that even when current prices
are correct (in the sense that they are at the Walrasian values) nonWalrasian equilibria may arise instead due to changes in behavior caused
by expectations about future prices (and, therefore, future market con
straints). In other words, a Walrasian outcome requires that present prices
equal their market-clearing values and that all agents expect all future
prices to be at their Walrasian levels as well.
There has been a great deal of empirical work using the simple fixedprice framework as well. Methods for estimating disequilibrium models
have been developed and Quandt (1978), among others, has found ways
of testing whether the data conform better to an equilibrium or a dise
quilibrium model. (For an excellent survey of some of the issues in
volved, see Quandt and Rosen 1988.) In addition, surveys have been
conducted in which firms were asked about their perceived market con
straints. The answers to the survey questions allow one to obtain
estimates of how much of current unemployment is of the Keynesian
variety (as opposed to classical unemployment). It is also possible to
use the data to infer the impact of government policy on the type of
unemployment experienced over time. For a survey of the work in this
area, interested readers are referred to Laffont (1985).
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C. Endogenous Pricing
Although the early fixed-price literature clearly provided many
valuable insights, it cannot be considered a complete theory since it
provided no explanation of how prices are determined. There have been
a number of recent attempts to rectify this shortcoming. The purpose
of this section is to provide a cursory historical review of some of the
more notable attempts and the insights they have yielded.

(i) First Attempts
Benassy's 1976 article appears to have been the first to address the
issue of endogenous pricing in a disequilibrium framework. In Benassy's
model, firms announce their prices at the beginning of each period and
then quantities adjust to clear markets. Consumers are allowed to send
signals to producers in order to provide them with some feeling as to
the level of excess demand inherent in the market (these signals are
in the form of desired, as opposed to actual, transactions). Firms then
use these signals to adjust their prices. An equilibrium occurs when
firms arrive at a price vector that remains stable across periods. The
main goal of the article was to determine whether equilibrium could
occur at non-Walrasian prices and, in fact, Benassy was able to prove
the existence of a non-Walrasian equilibrium price vector. There are,
however, several problems with this approach. First, it is not clear that
the signals sent by consumers are adequate measures of disequilibrium
and it is unclear why firms should rely on such a measure in setting
prices. Second, by assuming that prices must remain fixed in the short
run, Benassy rules out the interesting (and plausible) possibility that
firms may attempt to alter their market-imposed constraints by chang
ing their prices. Finally, this model simply assumes that prices adjust
more slowly than quantities without providing an explanation as to why
this should be so.
The Benassy paper was significant since it represented the first at
tempt to endogenize the price decision while, at the same time, allow
ing firms to take into account market-imposed constraints. I also believe
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that it was significant because it marked the end of the line for strict
fixed-price models. Benassy retained the assumption that in the very
short run prices could not adjust and therefore ruled out the possibility
that agents might attempt to loosen market constraints by altering the
terms of trade. However, in reality, firms unable to sell all their output
often attempt to increase sales by lowering their price. Likewise, by
reducing their wage demands, jobless workers might increase their
likelihood of employment. It therefore seems more reasonable to assume
that market constraints are in the form of schedules that tell agents what
transactions can be made at various prices. For sales-constrained firms,
the schedule would tell the firm how much it could expect to sell as
a function of its price. By extending fixed-price models to allow for
constraint schedules, it becomes possible to investigate models in which
price and quantity decisions are made jointly. In doing so, the strict
adherence to price or quantity adjustments to clear markets is abandoned.
The first papers to adopt this alternative approach were written in
the late 1970s by Frank Hahn (see Harm 1977a, 1977b, 1978). Hahn
assumed that each rationed agent would form some sort of conjecture
as to how the market-imposed constraints were related to his/her price:
offers. Agents would then choose price and quantity offers to maximize
utility with these constraints in mind. The main goal of this research
project was to investigate whether non-Walrasian equilibria would ex
ist in such a setting. The answer to this question depends on the type
of conjectures allowed. It seems obvious that one would want to apply
some sort of notion of rationality when restricting conjectures, and that
is exactly what Hahn attempted to do. The first rationality condition
used requires the conjectured and actual constraints to coincide at
equilibrium. This simply implies that given the set of equilibrium tran
sactions, conjectured and actual prices are equal. The second condi
tion imposed is a type of' 'local rationality" requirement in that it states
that in the neighborhood of equilibrium, the conjectured relationship
between prices and trades must mimic the actual relationship. This is
equivalent to requiring the slopes of the conjectured and actual con
straint schedules to be equal when evaluated at equilibrium. With these
two restrictions, Hahn proved that there exists at least one equilibrium
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characterized by non-Walrasian prices. The problem with this approach
rests with the definition of a rational conjecture. As Hahn points out,
his definition of rationality simply requires agents' guesses to be cor
rect up to the level of first derivatives. Conjectures about higher order
derivatives are still allowed to be arbitrary. Forcing agents to be globally
correct in their conjectures seemed too strict to Hahn and too closely
related to theories of imperfect competition (since such a requirement
rules out the possibility of a Walrasian equilibrium). He refused to allow
his theory of unemployment to rest on an inherent assumption of im
perfect competition and was therefore unable to carry his work much
further.
(ii) Imperfect Competition and Coordination Failures
When agents face constraints resulting from non-Walrasian prices,
they must immediately abandon the perfectly competitive assumption
that they can trade all they want to at the current price level. This leads
one to think that theories of imperfect competition might provide the
appropriate framework for the study of non-Walrasian economies. Oliver
Hart, in his influential 1982 paper, "A Model of Imperfect Competi
tion with Keynesian Features," was the first to apply this concept in
a rigorous fashion. The major substantive difference between Hart's
approach and Hahn's lies in Hart's assumption that agents correctly
perceive the constraint schedules they face. This provides a general
equilibrium model very much in the spirit of Chamberlain's theory of
monopolistic competition. Firms, knowing the demand schedules they
face, choose prices to maximize profits, and unionized labor, knowing
the demand for labor schedule, chooses the wage rate to maximize utility.
Equilibrium occurs when prices and wages are chosen to maximize the
appropriate objective functions and all markets clear.
This abstract general equilibrium model is too complex to handle
without placing restrictions on the utility and production functions.
Therefore, Hart chose to work out an example in order to gain some
insight into the nature of equilibrium. This was accomplished by plac
ing enough restrictions on demand to guarantee the existence of
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equilibrium. 10 This equilibrium is characterized by non-Walrasian prices,
suggesting that an unaided market economy will not tend to gravitate
towards Walrasian, market-clearing prices. In other words, the selfish
pursuit of private gain will not produce an efficient outcome.
A comparison between Hart's equilibrium and the Walrasian outcome
reveals some interesting features. To begin with, in Hart's model,
equilibrium employment is below and output prices are above the values
that would be achieved in a perfectly competitive Walrasian economy.
This implies that the non-Walrasian equilibrium generates unemploy
ment of the Keynesian variety and that prices associated with classical
unemployment or repressed inflation cannot emerge in equilibrium when
prices are set optimally. 11 Furthermore, the Keynesian nature of
equilibrium means that aggressive aggregate demand management is
required to increase employment and aggregate income. 12 Finally, Hart
also demonstrates that, as in the Keynesian unemployment case above,
changes in government spending produce Keynesian multiplier-like ef
fects in his model.
The Hart article proves that when rational, fully informed agents set
prices to maximize utility (or profit), the economy may not end up in
the Walrasian equilibrium. In fact, the resulting equilibrium will likely
be troubled by underemployment that can only be reduced by Keyne
sian methods. One issue not addressed by Hart is whether or not this
equilibrium is unique. This issue was avoided by choosing restrictions
on the utility and production functions that guaranteed uniqueness. Subse
quent work by a number of authors, most notably Heller (1986), in
dicates that, in general, imperfectly competitive behavior may produce
several equilibria, all of which can be Pareto-ranked. 13
The Heller model consists of two monopolistically competitive pro
duct markets and a perfectly competitive labor market. Therefore, ex
cept for the modeling of the labor market, the setting is equivalent to
Hart's. To capture the notion that individuals tend to specialize in pro
duction but diversify in consumption, Heller assumes that income earned
by workers in one sector is spent entirely on the output produced in
the remaining sector. This assumption creates a vital link across sectors,
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since it implies that an increase in employment in one sector stimulates
activity in the other sector by increasing demand.
The point of the Heller article is to demonstrate that such a model
may possess multiple inefficient equilibria and that these equilibria can
be Pareto-ranked. The intuition for these results is as follows. Con
sider the position of a typical sector-one firm in equilibrium. If this
firm were to increase employment (in order to produce more output)
there would be a spillover effect on sector two in that the increase in
sector-one income would cause the demand for sector-two output to
rise. In response to this increase in demand, sector-two firms would
increase employment and (perhaps) raise prices. The increased activi
ty in sector two then feeds back to sector one as sector-two income rises,
and so on. In the end, income and demand will increase in both sec
tors, but, since the original situation was an equilibrium, the total in
crease in sector-one demand cannot be large enough to justify the in
itial increase in employment. Even though everyone except the original
firm would benefit, the increase in employment would not occur. The
problem is that each firm alone has such a small impact on aggregate
income that it cannot cause a chain reaction of sufficient magnitude to
justify increasing production. If, on the other hand, all firms were to
simultaneously increase employment, the resulting increase in income
could be large enough to make the increases in output profitable.
Therefore, another equilibrium characterized by greater output, employ
ment, and income might exist. Reaching this equilibrium, however, re
quires all firms to coordinate their production plans. The failure of the
economy to reach the best equilibrium has therefore been labeled a
' 'coordination failure.''
The conclusion that coordination failures may generate multiple in
efficient equilibria is reminiscent of Peter Diamond's result that when
search is required to find employment, feedback mechanisms are created
that can produce more than one equilibrium (see chapter 2 for details).
In addition, in both cases the equilibria can be Pareto-ranked so that
there is a role for government policy aimed at guiding the economy
toward the best equilibrium. The fact that these seemingly unrelated
models produce qualitatively similar results has not gone unnoticed.
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In a recent paper, Cooper and John (1988) developed a simple abstract
game theoretic model in an attempt to isolate the common forces at work.
In their model, agents choose strategies in order to maximize their own
payoff. These strategies may also affect the payoffs of other agents in
the economy. For example, in the Hart/Heller framework, each firm's
strategy consists of an output price and a level of employment. By chang
ing employment, a firm in sector one can alter worker income, and hence
demand in sector two. Consequently, strategy choices by sector-one
firms affect the profits earned by sector-two firms and vice versa. In
a search model, the worker's strategy would either be a level of search
intensity or a reservation wage. In either case, changes in the strategy
affect the likelihood that other workers find employment and the prob
ability that firms fill vacancies.
Cooper and John's goal is to identify conditions under which (1) their
model can support more than one equilibrium, (2) the equilibria are
inefficient, and (3) the equilibria can be Pareto-ranked. They refer to
these properties as "Keynesian features" since they are consistent with
the Keynesian notion that an unaided economy can get stuck in an inef
ficient equilibrium at less than full employment. In order to describe
their findings, I will make use of the following definitions.
Definition: An economy exhibits positive spillovers if an increase in
one agent's strategy increases the payoff to all other agents. An economy
exhibits strategic complementarity if an increase in one agent's strategy
results in an increase in each remaining agent's optimal strategy.
Cooper and John prove that strategic complementarity is necessary for
multiple equilibria and that positive spillovers lead to inefficiency. In
addition, if positive spillovers are present, the equilibria can be Paretoranked with those characterized by more activity preferred. Consider
the latter results first. Intuitively, positive spillovers are nothing more
than positive externalities. Their existence implies that equilibrium will
be inefficient, with agents choosing strategies below their optimal values.
A small increase in each agent's strategy would increase economic ac
tivity and enhance social welfare. Positive spillovers are present in
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Heller's model of imperfect competition, since an increase in sectorone employment leads to increased demand (and hence profits) in sec
tor two. Note also that strategic complementarity is present since it is
optimal for sector-two firms to respond to the increased demand by hiring
extra labor and producing more output. The existence of positive ex
ternalities in Diamond's search model has already been established in
chapter 2.
Now consider Cooper and John's first result. Equilibrium occurs when
each agent, taking the strategies of all other agents as given, chooses
an optimal strategy and the plans of all agents are mutually consistent.
According to Cooper and John, if the economy is in an equilibrium and
strategic complementarities are present, then a simultaneous increase
in the strategies of all agents may lead to a new equilibrium. Further
more, if strategic complementarities are not present, then there is at
most one equilibrium.
The reason for this can be made clear by examining an example in
detail. As noted above, Heller's imperfectly competitive economy ex
hibits strategic complementarity. Suppose that the economy is current
ly at rest in an equilibrium. Suppose further that all firms but one sud
denly decide to increase output. As we have already seen, the increas
ed activity by other firms results in an increase in the demand for the
remaining firm's output. Thus, the optimal response is for the last firm
to increase output as well (this is nothing more than strategic complemen
tarity at work). In fact, by a similar argument, the increases in output
by all other firms may also be optimal. A new equilibrium in which
each firm produces more output may therefore exist.
What would have happened had strategic complementarities not been
present? In such a case, an increase in every other firm's strategy (i.e.,
output) would actually discourage increased activity by the remaining
firm. Thus, if all firms but one were to increase output, the optimal
response by the last firm would be to decrease output a simultaneous
increase in output by all firms could not produce a new equilibrium.
Intuitively, when the economy exhibits strategic complementarity, the
increases in strategy choices reinforce each other, justifying the increased
economic activity.
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In summary, by building upon the insights provided by the early fixedprice literature, the literature on endogenous pricing has led to several
important results. First, when price-setting agents take market-imposed
constraints into account in calculating their optimal strategies, equilibrium
will occur at non-Walrasian prices. In addition, equilibrium will be in
efficient, with less employment and output than what would be predicted
by a traditional Walrasian model. Furthermore, unemployment is of
the Keynesian variety, implying that an increase in government spend
ing or a decrease in taxes is required to stimulate the economy. Final
ly, more than one equilibrium may exist so that active government policy
may be required to guide the economy to the best equilibrium.
A theme common to both the search literature and the literature on
non-Walrasian equilibria is that small changes in the assumptions of
the traditional Walrasian general equilibrium model may produce models
that possess "Keynesian features" multiple inefficient equilibria that
can be Pareto-ranked. The work of Cooper and John clearly identifies
the characteristics necessary for such a result: positive externalities must
be present and an increase in economic activity by one agent must en
courage other agents to increase their activity as well. Search and im
perfectly competitive models are just two examples of economies
possessing these properties.

D. Policy Implications
Policy analysis in a fixed-price framework is considerably more
straightforward than it is in the presence of frictional, i.e., searchgenerated unemployment. This follows from the fact that the efficient
level of unemployment in a fixed-price model is zero, since a social
planner can always adjust prices so that markets clear. This would result
in the competitive outcome and an efficient allocation of resources. Con
sequently, employment and welfare are perfectly correlated.
The goal of full employment can be achieved by allowing prices to
adjust to their market-clearing levels or by removing, if possible, the
factors that lead to price rigidities in the first place. However, assum-
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ing that such prescriptions are not feasible (as is likely to be the case),
the appropriate corrective policy depends on the constraints faced by
economic agents. In general, policies that relax these constraints are
welfare-improving.
Essentially, all that can be said concerning policy follows from the
insights discussed in sections B and C above. For example, we have
already seen that in the case of Keynesian unemployment, fiscal policy
aimed at increasing aggregate demand will stimulate the economy, in
crease the demand for labor, and reduce unemployment. It follows that:
increased government spending; a reduction in income taxes; unemploy
ment benefits, which increase the income of the jobless; wage subsidies,
which increase the income of the employed; redistribution programs
that transfer income from the wealthy to the poor (assuming that the
poor save less than the rich); or other government programs that result
in an increase in the aggregate demand for consumption goods will be
effective ways to increase employment and welfare. Although superior
policies always exist, minimum wages might even be welfare-improving
if it could be demonstrated that the increase in the income of the
employed (due to the increased wage) would more than compensate for
the reduction in demand brought about by the unemployment created.
On the other hand, these policies will have no impact on employment
whatsoever if unemployment is of the classical variety. In such a situa
tion, only policies that reduce the real wage will relax the constraints
faced by the workers and expand output and employment.
As far as policy is concerned, the endogenous pricing models surveyed
in section C provide two valuable insights. First, they imply that when
profit- and utility-maximizing agents set prices and wages in an optimal
manner taking market-imposed constraints into account, the result will
be Keynesian unemployment. Therefore, unemployment due to mo
nopoly power should be handled with old-fashioned Keynesian remedies.
Second, as demonstrated by Heller (1986) and Cooper and John (1988),
imperfectly competitive behavior can lead to coordination failures
the economy can get stuck in an equilibrium that is Pareto-dominated
by another feasible equilibrium. This result, which is qualitatively iden
tical to results obtained in the search literature, indicates that the govern-
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ment should play an active role in guiding the economy towards the
best equilibrium. This provides further support for "pump-priming"
and propaganda aimed at raising expectations about future economic
prospects.
NOTES
1. By "true microeconomic principles" I mean utility and profit-maximizing behavior on the
part of economic agents. Therefore, the "neoclassical synthesis" that produced IS-LM analysis
would not qualify.
2. Patmkin (1956) was actually the first to address these issues. However, his interpretation of
Keynes was, for the most part, ignored until Glower's work appeared.
3. Examples of recent attempts include Fisher (1972) and Eden (1981).
4. The analysis that follows draws heavily from the work of Barro and Grossman (1971), Malinvaud (1977), and Benassy (1982).
5. Of course, all of these constraints cannot be binding simultaneously. The case in which agents
are not rationed in a particular market is handled by setting the appropriate constraint equal to infinity.
6. This nomenclature is attributed to Malinvaud (1977).
7. There are two well-known methods for calculating effective demand and supply schedules.
In one method, due to Dreze (1975), agents take all market-imposed constraints into account
simultaneously in formulating their plans. Alternatively, Benassy (1975, 1976) assumes that in
determining the effective demand for a particular product, each agent takes into account all con
straints faced in other markets but ignores the constraint faced in the market for the good in ques
tion. This distinction is not important for my purposes and thus, for simplicity, I will adopt the
Dreze approach. For a detailed discussion of this point see Drazen (1980).
8. Since the excess supply is not actually observable in equilibrium (only effective demand is
revealed in the market) some authors refer to this situation as ' 'underemployment'' as opposed
to unemployment. I believe that they are probably correct, but I will choose not to push this distinc
tion in this chapter. This point is discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.
9. The graphical representations of Keynesian unemployment and repressed inflation are due to
Barro and Grossman (1971).
10. Existence of equilibrium in models of monopolistic competition can often be a serious prob
lem. See Roberts and Sonnenschein (1976, 1977) for details.
11. The imperfectly competitive framework provides firms with market power that they exploit,
resulting in excessively high output prices. These high prices generate excess supply in product
market notionals, and hence, Keynesian unemployment.
12. Interestingly, some empirical support can be found for the result that most unemployment
is of the Keynesian variety. In recent papers Bouissou, Laffont, and Vuong (1983) and Artus,
Laroque, and Michel (1982) report on survey data collected in an attempt to determine whether
the unemployment experienced in Europe during the 1970s was of the Keynesian or classical variety.
The authors concluded that over 60 percent of the unemployment was Keynesian (in that firms
viewed themselves as constrained in a manner consistent with Keynesian unemployment) while
less than one-quarter could be classified as classical unemployment (see the conclusion for details).
13. See also Kiyotaki (1985), Roberts (1987), and Weitzman (1982).

Implicit Contracts
One of the lessons of the recent articles on trade frictions and the
emerging literature on coordination failures is that economies can ex
hibit Keynesian features (e.g., multiple underemployment equilibria,
multipliers) even if wages and prices are perfectly flexible. Nevertheless,
wage rigidity remains an important element in much current
macroeconomic analysis. Perhaps this is because many believe that to
truly understand unemployment we must first determine why wages do
not fall when unemployment persists; or perhaps it is because many
are convinced that wage rigidity is a real phenomenon that needs to
be explained. 1 In any event, much recent work has been focused on
providing an explanation of wage rigidity in an environment in which
rational utility-maximizing agents operate. Implicit in much of this work
is the assumption that if we can explain wage rigidity, a theory of
unemployment will follow naturally.
The theory of implicit contracts (e.g., Bailey 1974 and Azariadis 1975)
represents one of the first successful attempts to provide a microeconomic
model in which wage rigidity arises as an optimal equilibrium
phenomenon. This literature differs from standard neoclassical
microeconomics in that it does not assume that the primary role of the
wage rate is to clear the labor market. Instead, wages are viewed as
the outcome of a complex process (that may or may not involve negotia
tions) in which the firm and its employees manage to decide how to
split the rents that are generated by employment. Jobs are viewed as
long-term attachments so that if, at the time of initial contact between
the firm and its employee, the future state of the economy is uncertain,
the wage pattern will reflect the relative attitudes towards risk of the
contracting parties. Assuming that workers are risk averse and that firms
are risk neutral, it can be shown that, in some cases, the optimal con
tract is characterized by future wages that are independent of the state
95
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of the economic environment. That is, wage rigidity is efficient. Un
fortunately, efficient contracts generally do not involve layoffs during
economic slumps and therefore, even though wage rigidity can be ex
plained, the link between wage rigidity and unemployment is lost.
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature on labor con
tracts while paying particular attention to its ability to explain unemploy
ment. 2 We begin in section A by briefly outlining the basic assump
tions underlying the early work in this area. Included are the supposi
tions that the terms of the contract are (at least in part) isolated from
market forces, and that workers are more risk averse than firms. We
then demonstrate how these assumptions can create an environment in
which wage rigidity can be expected to emerge in equilibrium.
The weaknesses of this approach are highlighted in the third portion
of section A. There are at least two major shortcomings. First, as noted
above, the theory cannot account for layoff unemployment. Intuitive
ly, in an efficient contract, the risk-neutral firm provides insurance to
its risk-averse employees by paying the same wage rate regardless of
whether it is facing good or bad times. The firm is willing to bear all
the risk since by doing so it can reduce its expected wage bill. However,
a similar argument implies that workers should also desire to insure
against perverse economic states in other dimensions as well. For ex
ample, workers should request (and firms should be willing to grant)
work-sharing arrangements that reduce the variability in leisure hours
across future states; layoffs are rarely optimal. Moreover, even when
layoffs are optimal it can be shown that contracts actually reduce the
number of layoffs below what would occur in an economy in which
labor is traded on a spot market.
The second deficiency concerns the implementation of these implicit
contracts. Although it is argued that no formal contract is necessary,
these implicit agreements are treated as if they are binding. This may
be problematic. After all, for the wage to be fixed at a level that allows
the firm to at least break even (in expected value terms), workers must
earn more than their marginal product in bad times and less than their
marginal product in good times. However, if this is the case, what would
prevent a worker from quitting during good times and seeking a higher
wage on the spot market?
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Subsequent work aimed at circumventing these problems is review
ed in section B. To deal with the implementation problem, efficient con
tracts are required to satisfy additional constraints designed to guarantee
that it is in the interest of both parties to continue the employment rela
tionship in all economic states. This alters the properties of the effi
cient contracts. Most notably, it results in contracts in which wages
are rigid downward but not upward, i.e., wages rise as the firm's
economic condition improves, but they do not fall during economic
downturns.
The first problem, explaining unemployment, is somewhat more dif
ficult to handle. Most of the work aimed at solving this problem modifies
the basic model by assuming that the firm and its workers possess dif
ferent amounts of information about the economic environment. For
example, the actual marginal product of labor might be known only
by the firm. In such situations, the terms of the contract must be altered
in one of two ways. First, since the uninformed party might not trust
the informed party to accurately reveal what they know, the contract
could be written so that wage payments and employment do not de
pend on the private information. Alternatively, the contract could be
structured so that it is in the interest of the informed party to correctly
reveal the relevant information. This would allow the terms of the con
tract to be conditioned on the state of the economy and allow more flex
ibility than the first approach. Of course, in order to elicit the appropriate
information, the proper incentives must be built into the contract. This
naturally changes the character of the optimal contract and, under cer
tain conditions, can lead to underemployment. Unfortunately, the con
ditions required to produce underemployment are either contradicted
by empirical findings or inconsistent with the conditions necessary to
generate wage rigidity. The conclusion is that contract theory has not
yet been able to develop a theory of unemployment based on a
microeconomic rationale for wage rigidity.
Some brief concluding remarks concerning the future role of this
literature are offered in section C.

98

Implicit Contracts

A. The Basic Model
(i) Setting the Stage
In a frictionless, perfectly competitive economy there is no reason
for a worker to feel any particular attachment to a firm. If the firm's
current wage offer were to fall below the market wage, all workers would
quit and seek employment elsewhere. This is, of course, one of the
reasons that all firms choose to offer the market-determined wage rate.
In a more realistic model, with labor market frictions and/or firm-specific
human capital, this knife-edge result disappears and the market's ability
to dictate the terms at which labor services are exchanged is considerably
weakened. In the former case, quitting is costly to both the worker and
the firm since it takes time and effort to find a new job or fill the newly
created vacancy. In the latter case, the current employer values the
worker's services more than any other firm, since the worker has already
been trained and has acquired the necessary productivity-enhancing
human capital. To replace the worker would be costly to the firm (since
it would have to train a new employee), and by quitting the worker
would be moving to a new job in which he or she is, at least at first,
less productive. In either setting, the worker-firm relationship is in
sulated from market forces and some other method must be used to deter
mine how to split the rents produced by employment. In addition, once
the split has been determined, both the worker and the firm will have
an interest in maintaining the relationship on a long-term basis. This
follows from the fact that frictions produce an environment in which
the value of a current job exceeds the sum of what the two parties could
earn in their next best alternatives.
The assumption that there is a long-term relationship between the firm
and its employees that is at least somewhat immune to market forces
is supported by recent empirical findings. As Sherwin Rosen (1985)
notes (the references have been updated as necessary):
Many features of labor markets bear little resemblance to
impersonal Walrasian auction markets. Chief among them
is the remarkable degree of observed worker-firm attachment.
Martin Feldstein's (1975) surprising finding that over 70
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percent of layoffs are temporary with most laid-off workers
ultimately returning to their original employers, was con
firmed on similar aggregate data by David Lilien (1980) and
by much different methods on micro-panel data in a recent
study by Lawrence Katz (1986c). The typical adult male
worker spends twenty years or more on a single job (Hall
1982) and the probability of job turnover is a sharply declining
function of job tenure (e.g., Mincer and Jovanovic 1981; Ran
dolph 1983). Most job changes in a worker's life occur at
younger ages, and a person who has persisted in the same
job for a few years is likely to continue employment in it
for a long time to come. If tenure is de jure in academia,
it is de facto in much of the labor market at large (p. 1147).
Taking as given this long-term attachment, the contract literature assumes
that workers and firms bargain over wages and employment at the time
of initial contact. 3 The outside market serves as a check on the market
power of both sides, since, if either side attempts to secure a contract
that is too unfavorable to the other side, the other side will sever the
relationship. However, as we have argued above, in the presence of
trading frictions the market will provide only a small check and much
will be left to negotiate over. Throughout this literature, the actual
bargaining process is not modeled and no attempt is made to predict
the exact outcome of the negotiations. Instead, it is assumed that the
outcome will be efficient (in the sense that to make one party better
off, the remaining party must be harmed) and the properties shared by
all efficient contracts are derived.
At the time that the terms of the contract are determined, there are
likely to be many aspects about the future that are uncertain. For ex
ample, technology and consumer tastes cannot be predicted with perfect
accuracy. Since the firm's demand for labor fluctuates with these fac
tors, there may be a desire to write contracts that make future employ
ment and compensation a function of the future economic environment.
This is feasible only if the variables in question are observable, e.g.,
changes in price may reflect changes in tastes. Whether or not it is
desirable depends on the contracting parties' attitudes towards risk. Of
course, if workers had easy access to capital markets, they could pur-
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chase insurance against fluctuations in income and employment elsewhere
and labor contracts would be redundant. However, such insurance is
generally not available and, since the terms of the contract determine
the amount of uncertainty faced by each party, the assumptions made
concerning attitudes towards risk are vital to the analysis.
The early work in this area made what seems to be the most natural
assumption workers are assumed to be risk averse while firms are risk
neutral. The idea underlying this assumption is that all agents are basical
ly risk averse (at least to some degree), but since firms are generally
owned by shareholders who hold diversified portfolios, the firm's owners
need not worry much about firm-specific risk. On the other hand, wages
are the primary source of income for most workers and, as noted above,
it is virtually impossible to purchase private insurance against changes
in employment status. Therefore, firms and workers differ in their ability
to shift firm-specific risk. This results in an environment in which firms
act as if they are risk neutral while workers are risk averse.
To summarize, the contract literature assumes that, for some reason,
a risk-neutral firm operating in an uncertain environment is momen
tarily tied to its risk-averse employees. These parties attempt to write
a contract that specifies future employment and wages, perhaps as a
function of the future environment. The market determines the relative
bargaining positions of the agents but, other than that, plays little or
no role in allocating labor services. The primary goals of the literature
are to derive the properties shared by all efficient contracts and to in
vestigate the employment implications of allocating labor in this man
ner. Finally, at least in the early studies, the terms of the contracts are
treated as if they are binding.
(ii) Wage Rigidity
The framework of a typical contracting model can be described as
follows. Each firm is tied to a number of workers, say TV, for at least
one period. This firm faces uncertainty about the economic environ
ment in which it operates and must negotiate over working conditions
with its employees before the uncertainty is resolved. The uncertainty is
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introduced by assuming that the firm's revenue (K), which depends on
output and price, is given by the relationship R(s) = sJ(IJi) where ft )
represents an increasing, concave production function, s is a random
variable, L denotes employment (so that L<N) and h represents hours
worked. 4 The random variable s can be thought of as the price of the
product or as a random element in labor productivity. In either case,
s represents the state of nature with higher values corresponding to better
economic conditions.
For now, we will assume that the distribution from which s is drawn
is known by all parties at the time that the contract is drafted and thait
once the uncertainty is resolved, s is observable. In addition, we will
assume that the terms of the contract are enforceable (these assump
tions will be dropped later on). Since s is observable, it is possible to
write contracts in which employment conditions are a function of s.
For example, if the firm and its workers bargain over the hourly wage
(w*), employment (L), hours (h), and severance pay for laid-off
workers (w"), then the contract may specify different values for each
of the variables for each possible realization of s.
To characterize the set of efficient contracts, consider the situation
of a typical firm contemplating a contract consisting of the functions
(w%s), w"(s), L(s), h(s)}. If the firm accepts this contract and then state
s occurs, it will employ L(s) workers for h(s) hours per day, pay its
employed workers an hourly wage rate of H>*(.S) and pay its [N - L(s)]
laid-off workers w"(s) each. Its revenue will be R(s) = sfms)h(s)), and
therefore it will earn a profit of
(1)

7r(.s) = sflUsW) - ^(sWsMs) - W(j)[# - !(*)].

Expected profit, which is the value of the contract to the firm, is
calculated by taking the expectation of (1) over s. Of course, the firm
never accepts a contract that leads to negative expected profit.
Now consider the situation faced by the workers contemplating a con
tract offer by the firm. Each worker is assumed to have a utility func
tion, U(c,k), that is increasing in consumption and decreasing in hours
worked (since an increase in hours worked necessitates a reduction in
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leisure). It is usually assumed that all income earned is spent on con
sumption. In other words, workers are not allowed to save. This assump
tion is not crucial to the analysis, but is made in order to capture the
notion that savings are generally not adequate to smooth consumption
optimally across economic states. Income and consumption expenditures
are therefore equal to v^h when employed and w" when laid off. Final
ly, if we assume that each worker is equally likely to be employed in
any given state, then/?(j) = -^ represents the probability that any given
N
worker will be employed in state s. Expected utility if state s occurs
is therefore given by
(2)

The value of the contract to the worker is calculated by taking the ex
pectation of (2) with respect to s. If we let (/denote the level of ex
pected utility that the worker could obtain by leaving the firm and seeking
a job in the labor market, then the contract must provide at least this
much utility to the worker, i.e., we must have EsV(s) > U where Es
denotes the expectation over s. s
In general, a labor contract specifies values for w*, L, h and w" for
each possible realization of s. However, in the initial implicit contract
articles the firm was allowed to vary output only by hiring or firing
workers. That is, hours worked were not allowed to vary. We refer to
such contracts as "restricted" and begin by examining their features.
This is accomplished by setting h equal to 1 if the worker is employed
and 0 otherwise. The importance of restricting attention to such con
tracts is discussed in detail below. Finally, since the contract must be
negotiated before the uncertainty is resolved, the form of the optimal
contract will depend on attitudes towards risk. We begin by assuming
that the worker is risk averse (U is concave) and that the firm is risk
neutral (i.e., the firm is simply interested in maximizing expected profit).
An efficient restricted contract maximizes expected profit subject to
a constraint on expected utility. We may state this formally using (1)
and (2).
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Definition: A restricted contract consists of three functions w%s), w"(j).,
and L(s) which describe wages, unemployment compensation, and
employment as a function of s, the state of nature. The contract is effi
cient if it solves
Max £>( *) subject to EsV(s) > U* and EsTr(s)>0
for some 17* > U, so that the workers achieve a level of expected utility
at least as great as what they could obtain in the next best market
alternative.
The major contribution of the early work by Bailey (1974) and
Azariadis (1975) was the observation that in any efficient restricted con
tract, the hourly wage paid to employed workers is independent of the
state of nature. In other words, the income earned by employed workers
does not fluctuate with the economic conditions; wage rigidity is efficient.,
To understand the intuition behind this result, suppose that there are
only two states of nature, Si and s2, with s2 >sl (the argument easily
generalizes). Suppose further that the firm and its employees are con
sidering a contract in which w%Sj) =£ w%s2). Then it can be shown that
there exists another contract in which the wage paid to employed workers
is constant across sl and s2 , which Pareto dominates this contract.
To construct this superior contract, let X denote the probability that
Si will occur. Then consider an alternative contract that is identical to
the original except that instead of paying vv^Sj) if Si occurs and
if s2 occurs, it pays
(3)

w* =

^i)
w%y,) -I(1 - X)L(52)
- X)L(s2)
XL(j,)+(l - X)L(.s2)

in both states. This wage is constructed so that the firm's expected wage
bill is the same in both contracts. In the initial, variable wage contract,
the firm hires L(SI) workers and pays a wage of ^(sj with probabili
ty X. With probability (1 - X) the firm hires L(s2) workers and pays
v^(j2). This leads to an expected wage bill of \L(s l)\ve(sl )+(l- X)
L(s2)we(s2). In the alternative, fixed-wage contract, the firm's hiring
practices are the same, however, it pays w* in each state. Thus, its expected
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wage bill is [XLCsj) +(1 - X)L(s2)]w*. Simple algebra reveals (using
(3)) that the two wage bills are identical.
We are now in position to compare the relative welfare of the parties
under the two contracts. Since employment, unemployment compen
sation and the expected wage bill are the same for both contracts, the
firm's expected profit would not change if the second contract were
substituted for the first. Therefore, the firm is indifferent between the
variable and fixed- wage contracts.
This is not the case for the workers. A typical worker is employed
in state i with probability p(Sj) = L(sj)/N. Expected utility under the
variable-wage contract (EUV) is therefore
(4)

EUV =

Under the fixed-wage contract, expected utility is equal to (4) with w*
replacing ^(Si) and we(52). If we let EUf denote this value and make
the appropriate substitution, we obtain
EUf =

In order to compare these two values we begin by noting that severance
pay and the employment probabilities do not differ across the contracts.
Therefore, EUf>EUv if
+ (1 -

If we define z = _____*P(s i)_____ men mis equation is
+ (1 - X)/>(s2)
equivalent to
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Finally, if we substitute the value of w* into the left-hand side we obtain

which holds due to the concavity of the utility function. Therefore, due
to the risk aversion of the workers, EUf>EUv. That is, the workers
benefit from switching to the fixed-wage contract.
The reason for this is rather simple and is illustrated in figure 4.1.
The variable-wage contract represents a gamble to the workers since
the hourly wage varies with the random variable s. As is well known,
any risk-averse agent would prefer to receive the expected value of a
gamble with certainty rather than face the gamble itself. But this is ex
actly what the fixed- wage contract offers. Thus, the employees prefer
the contract with a rigid wage and, since the firm earns the same ex
pected profit under the two contracts, the fixed- wage contract Pareto
dominates the variable-wage contract.
Figure 4.1

Utility

U(w*)

M),I)+
(1-z)U(we(s2),l)

w
we(s,)

we(s2)
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In this model, the primary role of the wage rate is to allocate risk
optimally across the firm and its workers; it does not adjust to clear
the labor market. Since firms are risk neutral, they are willing to pro
vide insurance to their risk-averse workers by offering a wage rate that
is independent of economic conditions. The firm benefits by doing so
since by offering a fixed-wage contract it can lower its expected wage
bill while at the same time providing its workers with the same level
of expected utility that they would receive in a comparable variablewage contract.
Can this model explain layoff unemployment? This is equivalent to
asking whether efficient restricted contracts are ever characterized by
L(s) < Nfor any s. That is, does the firm lay off workers during some
states of nature? At first blush it would seem like we should be able
to construct an argument similar to the one we used above (to prove
that wage rigidity is efficient) to show that the firm would always fully
employ its workforce. After all, if workers want to avoid risk with respect
to the hourly wage, why would they be willing to accept risk with respect
to employment? In spite of the intuitive appeal of this argument, there
are cases in which it is incorrect. The reason is that, if hours cannot
be varied, the firm is less willing to provide full insurance in employ
ment than wages. When compensation is at issue, the firm can be per
suaded to pay a wage above labor's marginal revenue product during
bad states by allowing it to pay less than labor's value during good states.
No such trade-off exists with respect to employment. Suppose, for ex
ample, that the contract on the table includes layoffs in a particularly
bad state of nature and full employment in all other states. If the firm
were to agree to increase employment in the layoff state, it could not
be compensated by lowering employment in other states without pro
ducing unemployment in those alternative states. Instead, the firm must
be compensated by allowing it to lower the hourly wage. However,
workers may not be willing to trade a pay cut for less risk in employ
ment. Whether or not the trade actually takes place will depend on the
workers' level of risk aversion and how much of a pay cut the firm
demands in order to fully employ labor in all states. It can be shown
that layoffs are efficient only if the workers are not too risk averse and
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if the firm has a strong desire to reduce its workforce during adverse
conditions (see, for example, Azariadis 1975 or Cooper 1987). Unfor
tunately (at least as far as this theory of unemployment is concerned),
even when layoffs are efficient, the act of distributing risk optimally
across firms and workers results in fewer layoffs than would occur in
pure market economy; allocating labor via contracts leads to
overemployment. 6
In summary, the major contribution of the early articles on labor con
tracts was to draw attention to the fact that wage rigidity could be ex
pected to arise as an equilibrium phenomenon in some situations. Un
fortunately, in the framework chosen, wage rigidity is not always com
patible with layoff unemployment and, even when the two are com
patible, contracts actually reduce the number of layoffs one would ex
pect to observe.

(iii) Other Difficulties
There are two other troubling aspects of the basic model. First, it
is not clear that the agents can be trusted to abide by the implicit agree
ment once the uncertainty has been resolved. An efficient contract requires that workers sacrifice income in good states in order to keep their
income from falling during poor states. The reduction in pay during
good states is equivalent to an insurance premium that must be paid
in order to guarantee that the firm will pay the worker more than the
marginal revenue product of labor when poor economic conditions arise..
However, suppose that a good state occurs. What incentive does the
worker have to carry out his or her part of the implicit agreement? Why
not quit and seek employment at a wage commensurate with his or her
true market value? If such a job is available on the spot market, then
there is no reason for the worker to continue the relationship with the
firm. One way around this problem is to add an additional constraint
to the contracting problem that requires the firm to pay the worker no
less than what could be earned by quitting and seeking a job on the
spot market in each state of nature. We will discuss how this alters the
nature of the contract in the next section.
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The second problem concerns the ad hoc restriction on hours work
ed. It is not at all clear why the firm and its employees would not wish
to bargain over hours. This is especially true if by doing so they could
achieve a settlement that dominates the optimal restricted contract. On
the other hand, if it can be shown that efficient restricted and unrestricted
contracts share many important features, e.g., wage rigidity and the
possibility of layoff unemployment, then this simplifying assumption
may not be so troublesome. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Effi
cient unrestricted contracts never include layoffs and may not be con
sistent with wage rigidity.
To see how allowing hours to be an object of negotiation affects the
contracting process, we begin by defining precisely what we mean by
an "efficient unrestricted contract."
Definition: An efficient unrestricted contract consists of four functions
w^s1), w"(5), L(s) and h(s) which describe the hourly wage, severance
pay, employment and hours as a function of s, the state of nature. In
addition, these functions solve
Max £>(s) subject to EsV(s) > U* and £>( *) for some U* > U.
Solving this maximization problem requires the use of optimal con
trol theory, and therefore, we will not describe the actual procedure
used to characterize these contracts. Instead, we will list some of the
more interesting properties and discuss the implications for wages and
employment.
First, in any efficient unrestricted contract, employed labor's marginal
utility of consumption must be equal across all states. With risk-averse
workers, this can only be accomplished by providing these workers with
the same level of compensation (and hence consumption) under all
economic conditions. 7 It is also worth noting that, as in the case of
restricted contracts, this is equivalent to the firm providing complete
insurance along one dimension consumption. However, complete in
surance in consumption need not imply wage rigidity when hours can
vary. To see this, simply note that compensation in state s to employed
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workers is equal to w£?(.s)/i(,s). If hours cannot vary, the only way to
keep this value constant across states is to make we(s) independent of
s (thereby generating wage rigidity). If h can vary, the firm can render
consumption state independent by paying higher wages in periods in
which it wants labor to work fewer hours. Consequently, contract theory
cannot explain wage rigidity without applying the restrictive assump
tion that hours worked are not negotiable.
Turn next to employment. It can be shown that efficient unrestricted
contracts never involve layoffs (see, for example, Cooper 1987). In
other words, the firm always fully utilizes its labor force so that workers
are completely insured against risk in the other major dimensionemployment status. The reason for this is actually rather straightfor
ward. Since workers are risk averse, they would (ex ante) be willing
to reduce their hours worked during poor states in return for guaranteed
employment. Increasing employment and reducing hours in a manner
that keeps total labor services constant assures that the firm will be willing
to allow the work-sharing arrangement. Therefore, by agreeing to allow
hours worked to vary directly with economic conditions, labor can avoid
the risk of being laid off. In addition, once hours are fixed, wages can
then be adjusted to keep income and consumption constant as well. In
essence, by setting up work-sharing arrangements, management can pro
vide labor with almost complete insurance (leisure still varies with s).
Another way to view this second result is as follows. We argued above
that workers will want to avoid employment risk for the same reason
that they want to avoid risk in consumption. However, if hours cannot
vary, the firm is not always willing to provide insurance along this dimen
sion. Allowing hours worked to vary provides the firm with increased
flexibility in the negotiating process and results in a superior contract.
In periods in which labor's value to the firm is low, full employment
can be maintained while at the same time allowing the firm to cut back
on its wage bill by reducing hours.
These two results represent a major setback for those who had hoped
that the theory of implicit contracts would provide an explanation of
wage rigidity and unemployment. In the most general setting (with hours
flexible), optimal risk-sharing is not consistent with layoff unemploy-
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ment and may not lead to wage rigidity. This problem can be avoided
by noting that in most contract talks, hours worked are not considered
negotiable. Therefore, it may seem reasonable to simply assume that
hours cannot vary. This, however, is not a satisfactory solution. After
all, even if we do not observe contracts that provide for flexible hours,
a theory of optimal contracts should be able to explain why, in spite
of the fact that unrestricted contracts are superior to restricted contracts,
such agreements do not emerge from the negotiating process.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing once again that even when hours are
fixed exogenously, efficient risk-sharing may still be incompatible with
layoff unemployment. If workers are sufficiently risk averse, then the
optimal contract is characterized by full employment regardless of
economic conditions. In addition, even in the cases in which layoffs
are optimal, risk-sharing through long-term contracts actually reduces
the number of layoffs we would expect to observe. We can conclude
that to use contract theory to explain both wage rigidity and unemploy
ment, the basic model would have to be altered in some nontrivial
manner.

B. Extensions of the Basic Model
(i) Asymmetric Information
One of the more unrealistic assumptions of the basic model is the
supposition that the uncertain parameter s (the state of nature) is obser
vable by both parties. In reality, since s determines the value of labor
to the firm, it is likely to be the case that the firm is better informed
about the true value of s than its employees. This observation has led
a number of authors to consider the implications of informational asym
metries for the contracting procedure (see, for example, Hall and Lilien
1979 and the papers in the supplement of the Quarterly Journal of
Economics 1983). When informational asymmetries are present, it
becomes difficult to implement contracts in which wages, hours, and
employment are state-contingent since the uninformed party (usually
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labor) may have good reason not to trust the informed party (usually
management) to truthfully reveal the state of nature. For example, sup
pose that in the optimal contract hours are increasing in s and compen
sation is independent of s. Then, if labor cannot observe s, the firm
would have an incentive to announce that the best state has occurred
regardless of the truth (this leads to the largest value for h and the lowest
value for w, thereby yielding the largest profit for the firm). To keep
the firm from misrepresenting the true state, the contract must be struc
tured so that it is always in the interest of the firm to tell the truth. Con
straints added to the contracting problem to induce truth telling are refer
red to as "incentive compatibility constraints." As we will see below,
by extending the basic model in this manner, underemployment may
arise as a feature of an efficient contract.
To make this precise, consider a simplified version of the basic model
in which the firm bargains with a single worker over compensation (c)
X
and hours (h). In this case, profit for the firm in state s if it announces
that state s has occurred is given by TT(S|S ) = sj(h(s)) - c(s). Then the
firm will always tell the truth if ir(s \s) > ic(s\s) for all s. This equation
states that the firm always earns more profit from telling the truth than
from misrepresenting the true state. If this condition is met, then con
tracts can be written and enforced in which the terms of the contract
are state-dependent. This is formalized in the following definition.
Definition: An efficient incentive compatible contract consists of a com
pensation schedule c(s) and a schedule of hours h(s) that solve
Max £>( *)
subject to EsU[c(s),h(s)] ^ C/*, ESTT(S) > 0
and TT(S \s) >TT(S\S) for all s
for some U* > U.
The major insights provided by this line of work can be illustrated
in a model with two possible states of nature, sv and s2 with Si < s2 .
For the worker, utility is increasing in c and decreasing in h. Assum
ing that the utility function is quasiconcave, the indifference curves take
the form depicted in figure 4.2a. Holding h fixed, utility increases with
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c so that higher indifference curves are associated with greater levels
of utility.
Iso-profit curves for the firm are depicted in figure 4.2b. Combina
tions of c and h yielding the same level of profit satisfy sf(h) - c = z
where z is an arbitrary constant. Since J(h) is concave, the iso-profit
curves increase at a decreasing rate with a slope that is increasing in
s (solving the equation above for c gives us the iso-profit equation: c
= sf(h) - z so that the slope of the curve is sf'(Kj). Each value of s
generates a whole family of iso-profit curves with steeper curves
representing better economic conditions (in figure 4.2b, the dashed
curves denote the iso-profit curves in the good state and the solid lines
represent the curves in the bad state). With h fixed, profit is decreasing
in c so that lower iso-profit curves are associated with greater profit
for the firm.
If s could be observed by both the firm and its employees, an effi
cient contract would result in a tangency between the iso-profit and in
difference curves in each state of nature. Three examples of what an
efficient unrestricted contract might look like are provided in figures
4.3a-4.3c. In each case x(si) denotes the terms of the contract if state
Si occurs. Consider figure 4.3a first. In this case, compensation and
hours worked are both higher in the good state. Moreover, if the bad
state (sj occurs (implying that the correct iso-profit curves are the flatter
set), then the firm is better off at point x(s^ than it would be at point
x(s2). To see this, note that the flat iso-profit curve intersecting x(s2)
is higher and therefore represents lower profit than the flat curve in
tersecting x(Si). By a similar argument, if the good state occurs (im
plying that the true iso-profit curves are the steeper set), then the firm
would rather be at x(s2) than at x($i).
Why is this important? Suppose now that s is observable only by the
firm. Then this efficient contract can be implemented only if the worker
can trust the firm to reveal the truth once the uncertainty has been resolv
ed. In figure 4.3a the firm never has an incentive to lie and thus there
is no reason for the worker to distrust the firm. This is so because
regardless of the economic conditions, the firm earns a larger profit
from telling the truth than it would from lying. In this case the incen-
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tive compatibility constraints are satisfied by the efficient contract and
the existence of asymmetric information does not affect the outcome
of the negotiations.
This is not the case in figure 4.3b. Here the firm has an incentive
to lie if the good state occurs. To see this, note that in the good state
x(si) lies on a better iso-profit curve than x(s2). Consequently, if the
firm can convince its workers that Sj has occurred when in fact s2 has
occurred, it can operate at x(s^ rather than at x(s2) and earn greater
profit (as drawn, at x(sl) the firm gets its employees to work approx
imately the same number of hours as at x(s2) but at less pay). This means
that it is in the firm's interest to claim that state Si has occurred regardless
of the true economic conditions. Since the efficient unrestricted con
tract does not satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints (in particular
ir(si\s2) ^ n(s2 \s2y), it cannot be enforced when s is known only by
the firm. A similar situation exists in figure 4.3c where the firm has
an incentive to lie in the bad state, i.e., Trfoki) ^ ?T(JI|*I) so that the
firm makes more profit in state s l if it claims that s2 has occurred.
Figure 4.3c

w
Good state

x*(s2)

x(s,)

//

/

Bad state
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When asymmetric information is present and the optimal unrestricted
contract does not satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints, the con
tract must be altered in order to remove the firm's incentive to misrepre
sent the state of nature. In figure 4.3b, the firm always wants to an
nounce that the poor state has occurred so that it can compensate the
worker less for approximately the same number of hours worked. One
way to remove the incentive to lie when s2 occurs is to restrict the hours
worked in state sl . For example, the firm and worker could agree to
replace x(si) with the (c,h) package represented by x*(si). Since x*(s^
lies on the same steep iso-profit curve as x(s2), the firm will then be
willing to tell the truth when the good state occurs. Note that in order
to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints, hours worked must
be reduced. 8 Thus, in this case asymmetric information results in less
hours worked or underemployment. It is important to note that this is
not an explanation of unemployment, since the workers are never laid
off completely. Instead, work hours are reduced in poor states below
the values that would emerge in a contract without informational
problems.
Since the optimal unrestricted contract leads the firm to lie when the
bad state occurs in figure 4.3c, the terms of the contract in the good
state must be altered in order to satisfy the incentive compatibility con
straints. This can be accomplished by replacing x(s2) with x*(s2), thereby
requiring employees to work additional hours in the good state. Since
labor is more valuable in the good state, the firm can afford to com
pensate the workers for the extra hours if s2 occurs but not if state Si
occurs. Consequently, the firm will accurately reveal the value of s once
the uncertainty has been resolved. In this case, asymmetric informa
tion results in a contract calling for more hours worked. We refer to
this as overemployment.
Figure 4.3c also differs from 4.3a and 4.3b in one other manner.
In the first two examples the worker prefers for the good state to occur
since x(s2) lies on a higher indifference curve than x(si). Unfortunate
ly, in figure 4.3c the worker is better off in the bad state. This perverse
result must leave one with an uncomfortable feeling about the over
employment case.

Implicit Contracts

117

Figure 4.3 indicates that asymmetric information may have no im
pact on the optimal contract or it may result in overemployment or
underemployment. If it results in underemployment, then contract theory
combined with informational problems can explain why economies may
get struck in less than full employment equilibria. Unfortunately, the
following theorem from Green and Kahn (1983) indicates that
underemployment is an unlikely result.
Theorem: The optimal unrestricted contract satisfies the incentive com
patibility constraints if the demand for leisure is independent of income.
If leisure is a normal good, then the optimal incentive compatible con
tract results in overemployment. If leisure is inferior, then the optimal
incentive compatible contract is characterized by underemployment.
Since empirical studies consistently report that leisure is a normal
good, this theorem is rather disappointing. It indicates that private in
formation held by the firm is likely to result in greater utilization of
labor not less. Therefore, we cannot rely on this model (as is) for an
explanation of unemployment or underemployment. In addition, as we
saw above, when overemployment occurs workers actually prefer poor
economic conditions over good ones. This runs counter to observation
and severely weakens the value of the model.
There have been several recent attempts to modify the asymmetric
model in order to circumvent these problems. Grossman and Hart (1981)
accomplish this by ruling out work-sharing and by changing the assump
tions concerning attitudes towards risk; they assume that workers are
risk neutral and firms are risk averse. In this setting, workers bear the
risk and the optimal restricted contract tends to equalize expected pro
fit across states of nature rather than wages. However, to equalize pro
fit, wages must be higher in good states than in bad ones and, therefore,
since hours are fixed, the firm has a strong incentive to lie whenever
good states occur (so that it may pay a lower wage). The only way to
remove this incentive is to make wages state-independent as well. But,
the firm will only be willing to stabilize the wage if it can reduce
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employment in poor states. Thus, the optimal restricted incentivecompatible contract results in layoffs in bad states. Unfortunately, this
result depends on the rather unusual assumption concerning the relative
attitudes towards risk of the workers and the firm. It also relies on the
ad hoc assumption that work-sharing arrangements cannot be instituted.
An alternative, more appealing approach to dealing with these prob
lems has recently been offered by Cooper (1985) and Moore (1985).
They demonstrate that when workers are better informed about the true
state of nature than are firms, efficient incentive-compatible contracts
may, under reasonable conditions, be characterized by underemploy
ment. The basic idea is as follows. Suppose that s is nonstochastic but
that the employees' disutility from work varies with economic condi
tions and is known only by the workers. This makes utility a random
variable as far as the firm is concerned. In order to get the workers
to accurately reveal their tastes once the uncertainty has been resolved,
incentive compatibility constraints must be added to the basic contract
ing framework. If we assume that work-sharing is not feasible, then,
as in the Grossman-Hart model above, the incentive compatibility con
straints imply that the wage must be independent of the state of nature
(otherwise the worker would announce that the state with the highest
wage has occurred regardless of the truth). But, if the wage is fixed
and the disutility from work varies with economic conditions, employ
ment states are risky for workers. Efficiency therefore results in less
employment than we would observe if tastes were publicly observed.
Models in which workers possess superior information about the
economic environment are still in their early stages of development.
The initial studies, e.g., Cooper (1985) and Moore (1985), indicate that
the structure of preferences and the manner in which uncertainty af
fects worker preferences play important roles in determining the nature
of the optimal contract. For example, restrictions must be placed on
how worker indifference curves shift as economic conditions change
in order to solve even the simplest contracting problem. Therefore,
although the early results seem promising, we will have to wait and
see how productive this line of research will be in the future. For a
more detailed discussion of the issues involved, readers are referred
to Cooper (1987).
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(ii) Implementation Problems
As we noted above, although the literature has focused on implicit
contracts (contracts which are not binding), most papers simply assume
that the two parties involved will honor the contract once the uncer
tainty has been resolved. However, since efficiency usually dictates that
the worker be paid less than the marginal revenue product in some states,
i.e., the worker pays an insurance premium, and more than the marginal
revenue product in other states, i.e., the worker collects insurance, each
party faces an incentive to break the contract in at least one instance.
Therefore, unless we assume that these contracts can be enforced through
legal action, the basic model must be extended in some manner to make
sure that the contract can be implemented.
One method for accomplishing this is to add reputation considera
tions to the model. For example, a worker who quits often will earn
a reputation as a quitter and will have difficulty finding a job. Or a firm
that fails to honor its part of the implicit agreement will find it difficult
to find workers willing to accept employment. In both cases, the party
choosing to sever the relationship runs the risk of developing a reputa
tion as "untrustworthy." These reputation effects can be strong enough
to ensure that the contract will be honored (see Carmichael (1984) or
Bull (1987) for an example of this type of argument).
An alternative way to solve the enforcement problem is to build in
centives into the contract that will ensure that it will be in the interest
of both parties to honor the terms under all conditions. Suppose, for
example, that when the worker is hired, a contract is negotiated which
sets the wage to be paid during training (w,) and a wage to be paid once
training is completed (w^Cs)). The post-training wage is a function of
the unknown parameter s, the state of nature. Suppose further that dur
ing the training period the worker acquires firm-specific human capital
and that work-sharing is not feasible. In such a setting and in the absence
of enforcement problems, any efficient contract would specify the same
w6 for all s. Now, let wm(s) denote the market wage (what the worker
could earn by quitting and seeking employment on the spot market) so
that if the firm wants to retain the worker's services, it must offer a
contract satisfying \ve(s)>wm(s) for all s. Not surprisingly, it can be
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shown that for sufficiently high s, the optimal unrestricted contract dic
tates a wage below */"($). To satisfy the added constraint, the firm must
pay the market wage in a good state and find some other way to collect
the insurance premium. This can be accomplished by lowering the train
ing wage, thereby collecting part of the premium before the uncertain
ty is resolved. This produces a contract with a wage that is flexible up
wards (since vt^(5) is increasing in s if s is sufficiently high) but rigid
downward. Interested readers are referred to Holmstrom (1983) or loannides and ftssarides (1983) for more details.

C. What Next?
Contract theory began as an attempt to provide a microeconomic foun
dation for wage rigidity. In this regard, it has succeeded (at least to
some extent) in that it has demonstrated that when wages are isolated
from market forces and used as an instrument to allocate risk across
a risk-neutral firm and its risk-averse workers, wage rigidity is an effi
cient outcome. By stabilizing the wage, workers are able to insure
themselves against perverse economic conditions. The firm is willing
to provide this insurance since by doing so it can reduce its wage bill
below what it would have to pay in a variable-wage contract. Unfor
tunately, the same type of arguments that lead to this conclusion imply
that efficient contracts should also reduce the riskiness faced by workers
in other dimensions; in particular, in employment status. Therefore,
contract theory has been unable to explain the coexistence of wage rigidi
ty and layoff unemployment.
As we have seen above, the basic model can be altered in a number
of ways to generate some of the desired results. For example, by add
ing asymmetric information, the possibility of an underemployment
equilibrium emerges. In most cases, however, the extensions seem forc
ed. Some times the new models are able to explain one phenomenon
Gay off unemployment) but lose the ability to explain others (wage rigidi
ty). In other instances, the new models succeed only by making assump
tions directly opposed to empirical findings. And finally, in some cases,
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success is achieved at a much lower level than originally desired (asym
metric information models provide an explanation for underemployment
not unemployment) .
This is not to say that this literature is not valuable. There can be
no doubt that recent empirical findings do suggest that there are strong
attachments between firms and their workers that are likely to render
wage rates somewhat immune to market forces. Consequently, it is im
portant for us to understand how wages and employment will be deter
mined in these long-term relationships. What we can conclude from
all of this is that contract theory on its own will probably never pro
duce a satisfactory theory of unemployment. By embedding the basic
contracting model in a framework consistent with equilibrium unemploy
ment, we may be able to obtain some valuable insights into matters such
as the role of risk-sharing in cyclical variations in unemployment. Ex
amples of recent attempts to do just this are Hosios (1986) and Arnott,
Hosios, and Stiglitz (1988).

D. Policy Implications
In spite of its failure to provide an explanation for both wage rigidity
and unemployment, there have been a number of attempts to draw policy
conclusions from contracting models. Two distinct approaches have been
employed. First, there have been studies in which it is assumed that
labor is allocated using simple fixed-length, fixed nominal wage con
tracts with employment set ex post by the firm (see, for example, Gray
1976, Fisher 1977, Taylor 1980, and Gertler 1982). These models have
been used to study the effectiveness of monetary policy, the optimality
of certain monetary policy regimes and the time-series properties of
employment, output and prices in a contracting framework. One im
portant result was to show that in the presence of long-term contracts,
i.e., more than one period, anticipated changes in the money supply
could have real effects. This result remains true even when the wage
level is indexed to the price level. These models differ from those review
ed above in that the assumed structure of the contract is not optimal.
Due to this lack of microfoundations, Cooper (1987) refers to this line
of research as "macro-contracting models."
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The second approach builds upon the micro-contracting models of
sections A-C to investigate the policy implications of efficient contracts.
To begin, consider the question of whether or not money is neutral.
Azariadis (1978) and Cooper (1988) have both investigated this issue
by analyzing models in which the economy is subject to both perma
nent and temporary and real and nominal shocks. Agents attempt to
use prices to infer the types of shocks that have occurred, but price
signals are incomplete (note that a crucial assumption is that the underly
ing shocks are not observable). The contracts allowed are fairly flexi
ble. For example, although wages are negotiated in nominal terms, they
can be indexed to prices, if desired. Nevertheless, as long as price signals
are incomplete, money is not neutral. Changes in the money supply
cause prices to change, but since these price changes may be the result
of temporary shocks, it is not optimal to fully index wages to prices.
Turning to labor market policies, there have been several studies of
the impact of unemployment insurance programs in a contracting
framework. Polemarchakis and Weiss (1978) consider a simple twosector general equilibrium contracting model in which it is costly for
workers to switch sectors. Since, in general, optimal contracts result
in compensation that differs from marginal productivity, labor will not
be allocated efficiently across sectors. They demonstrate that when ran
dom shifts in demand dictate that workers should switch sectors, the
market will result in too little mobility. This is essentially due to monopo
ly power an increase in demand leads a firm to want to increase its
labor force; but, since this would require increasing the wage it pays
its current employees as well, the firm does not expand as much as is
optimal. The government can reduce the inefficiency by subsidizing
job movements. One effective way to do so is to have the government
fund part of the unemployment insurance program.
Kahn (1985) takes a different tack. He considers a model in which
the worker's outside wage is random and cannot be observed by the
firm. In addition, the firm is subject to random productivity shocks.
As one would expect, an optimal contract results in a larger differen
tial between the wage and severance pay when labor productivity is high.
The reason is simple: the worker is more valuable to the firm when
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productivity is high. Therefore, to keep the worker from quitting, the
firm must increase the spread between the wage and unemployment
insurance.
The final policy issue concerns the uniqueness of equilibrium. As we
have already seen in the two previous chapters, search and market power
can lead to a situation in which multiple, Pareto-rankable equilibria may
exist. This opens up the possibility that the economy may get stuck in
a low-employment equilibrium. Government action might then be re
quired to push the economy towards full employment. Not surprising
ly, this possibility emerges in the contracts literature as well. Hosios
(1986) demonstrates this possibility by considering a contract model
in which laid-off workers can search for employment and might be hired
ex post by firms. He demonstrates that multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria
may exist. As in the search literature, this is due to an externality and
a feedback mechanism. When a firm lays off a worker, it reduces the
cost of other firms hiring labor in the ex post market (by increasing
the supply of labor in the ex post market). However, this also increases
the amount of activity in the ex post market a factor that bolsters the
outside opportunities of labor. This leads to greater market power for
workers in the negotiation process, and therefore makes layoffs more
profitable. The policy implications are then similar to those outlined
at the end of chapter 2.
NOTES
1. See, for example, the discussion in Stightz (1986).
2. There are several excellent, more detailed surveys of the implicit contracts literature available
including Azariadis (1981), Hart (1983), Rosen (1985), Stiglitz (1986), and Cooper (1987). Much
of this chapter is based on the discussions in Stiglitz (1986) and Cooper (1987).
3. We do not have to assume that bargaining actually takes place. Instead we could assume that
firms offer contracts that workers accept or reject. Profit-maximizing firms will always offer ef
ficient contracts.
4. Labor is assumed to be the only productive input. Note also that since f( ) depends on total
labor hours, we are assuming that labor services (in terms of employment) and hours worked
are perfect substitutes. These assumptions are not crucial to the analysis.
5. Almost all of the initial articles take U as given and focus on the interaction between a specific
firm and its employees. Since the remainder of the labor market is ignored, these papers do not
provide an equilibrium analysis. Azariadis (1975) demonstrated that the model could be closed
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by varying U and solving the optimal contract problem to trace out supply and demand for labor
schedules. The intersection of supply and demand determines the market-clearing U and the distribu
tion of workers across firms. The wages that correspond to U can then be considered, in a sense,
market-clearing wages. For an alternative, search-theoretic approach to closing the model, see
Hosios (1986).
6. In a market economy with labor traded on a spot market, each firm hires workers such that
the marginal revenue product of the last worker hired equals the wage. Let rf denote the spot
market wage. Then Ls, spot market employment, satisfies sf (If) = w*. Layoffs occur as s falls
but the wage always adjusts to produce full employment. For a proof that Ls < L(s) see, for ex
ample, Cooper (1987).
7. This statement is true provided that utility is separable in compensation and hours. If the utility
function is not separable, then compensation (and hence wages) will not be constant across states.
8. In figure 4.3b it may appear that the incentive to lie could also be removed by replacing x(s t)
with the (c,h) package at the intersection of the good state iso-profit curve and the indifference
curve that intersects x(s t). This would represent an increase in compensation and hours worked
in the bad state. However, the firm earns greater profit at x*(st) than at this alternative point
and since both points lie on the same worker indifference curve, **($,) Pareto dominates this
alternative.

5
More on Wage Rigidity
Efficiency Wages and Insider/Outsider Workers

A. Introduction
Due to the failure of contract theory to provide a consistent explana
tion of wage rigidity and unemployment, a number of new theories have
recently been developed to fill this important gap in the literature. Most
of these theories adopt the same microeconomic approach taken in the
contract literature in that they seek to explain wage rigidity and
unemployment as a natural outcome in a setting in which rational, utility,
and profit-maximizing agents operate. While it is far too early to assess
the overall success of this work, the initial insights that have been pro
vided seem promising.
In this chapter I briefly outline the basic tenets of (what I consider
to be) the two most promising lines of research in this area: efficiency
wage theory and the insider/outsider theory of unemployment. In each
case, I will focus on the assumptions used to explain wage rigidity and
the link between wage rigidity and unemployment. I will also attempt
to point out the weaknesses and any logical inconsistencies that remain.
This will provide some guidance as to the directions these literatures
are likely to take in the future. Since both literatures are in their early
stages of development, the treatments offered in this chapter will be
somewhat more succinct than those offered in the previous chapters.
This is not meant to indicate that this work is less important, merely
that the profession has had less time to develop these ideas fully. A
brief discussion of some of the policy implications that can be gleaned
from the early models concludes the chapter.
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B. Efficiency Wages
The fundamental assumption of efficiency wage theory is that the labor
productivity is positively related to the wage rate. A number of possi
ble reasons have been suggested to support this claim, the most promi
nent of which are discussed in detail below. Regardless of the reason,
once this claim is accepted, it is not difficult to produce a model with
wage rigidity and unemployment. The argument is as follows. Suppose
that at the current wage rate there is an excess supply of labor. Then,
although there are workers available who are willing to work for less
than the going wage, firms may not want to cut the wage rate since
by doing so they would trigger a reduction in productivity and (possibly)
lower profit. It is therefore possible for equilibrium to be characteriz
ed by an excess supply of labor even though the wage rate is positive.
This argument can be illustrated using a simple model from Solow
(1979, 1980). ! Let n denote employment; e, worker efficiency (a measure
of productivity); w, the nominal wage; and/?, the price level. Then the
basic tenet of efficiency wage theory is that e depends on the real wage.
Profit for the firm is given by
(1)

TT = pF(efflri) - wn

where F( ) denotes the production function. That is, total output depends
on total efficiency units supplied by labor. In this setting, the firm's
optimization problem is to choose n and w to maximize profits. Dif
ferentiating TT with respect to n yields the familiar condition that deter
mines the demand for labor: the firm hires labor until the real wage
( ) equals the marginal product of the last worker hired (eF'). Dif
ferentiating with respect to w yields what has been referred to as the
"Solow condition"

This equation defines the optimal wage. It states that the firm should
set the wage rate such that the elasticity of the efficiency function with
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respect to the wage is equal to 1. The solution to (2) is known as the
"efficiency wage" since it is the wage rate that minimizes labor costs
per efficiency unit of labor. For simplicity, assume that all firms are
identical so that they all offer the same efficiency wage, w*. 2 Then,
if at w* the supply of labor exceeds demand, the wage will not fall and
unemployment will emerge. This follows even though there are workers
available who are willing to work for a wage below w*. Firms are un
willing to hire these workers because they realize that lowering the wage
will result in a more than proportional reduction in e, which will lower
profit. The basic problem is that the workers who could be hired for
less would not be as productive as those currently employed (not due
to inherent difference in the workers but simply because they would
not work as hard) and therefore replacing the current labor force with
cheaper labor would not be profitable.
This simple model highlights the importance of the hypothesis that
productivity is tied to the wage rate. Without this assumption, firms
would attempt to pay the lowest wage that workers would accept and
equilibrium would occur only when the wage had been driven down
to its market-clearing level; there would be no unemployment. It is
therefore crucial for the proponents of efficiency wage theory to pro
vide a reasonable justification for this assumed functional relationship.
The idea that such a link exists and has important implications for
unemployment actually has ancient roots. For example, Bowles (1985)
traces the notion as far back as Marx's theory of the reserved army
of the unemployed. However, most of the literature cites Leibenstein
(1957), who was interested in explaining wage rigidity and unemploy
ment in underdeveloped countries, as the first individual to suggest that
such a link exists. Leibenstein argued that workers earning higher wages
would be able to achieve a higher level of nutrition and would therefore
be ill less often. While this argument seems reasonable for
underdeveloped areas, it is probably not a very important factor in
developed countries. Nevertheless, several other reasons have been sug
gested that would account for this link in modern economies. In the
remainder of this chapter, I focus on one particular explanation due
to Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) that better paid workers work harder
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to avoid being fired. 3 1 have chosen this model for a number of reasons,
including its simplicity, intuitive appeal, and popularity in the profes
sion. A number of other theories (some quite similar in structure to
the Shapiro/Stiglitz approach) are discussed in Akerlof and Yellin (1986,
pp. 4-9) and Katz (1986a, pp. 240-251).

(i) Endogenous Effort and Unemployment
Suppose that at each instant the wage rate adjusts to clear the labor
market so that every willing worker is guaranteed employment. Why
would a worker expend any effort on the job? After all, effort generates
disutility and even if the worker is fired for lack of work, a new job
could be obtained at the same (market-clearing) wage without delay.
Such behavior, loafing on the job, has been commonly referred to in
this literature as "shirking." Without unemployment, there would be
no cost to shirking, and firms would be unable to induce then* employees
to put out any effort at all. Therefore, zero unemployment is not con
sistent with equilibrium.
This insight, that when effort is endogenous unemployment must be
present to motivate workers, is at the heart of modern efficiency wage
theory. It provides the rationale for the link between productivity and
the wage rate and it generates a model with simultaneous wage rigidity
and unemployment. This basic idea has been suggested by a number
of authors as a possible explanation for unemployment (see, for exam
ple, Calvo 1979; Foster and Wan 1984; Miyazaki 1984; and Shapiro
and Stiglitz 1984). All of the models are similar in structure and in
clude the assumption that effort can only be imperfectly monitored by
the firm so that it is possible to shirk and not get caught. The wage
rate must then rise to a level that generates unemployment high enough
to persuade workers that working hard is in their own best interest. In
this section I focus on the Shapiro/Stiglitz model, the simplest of those
adopting this approach, to demonstrate exactly how these models work.
To keep matters simple, Shapiro and Stiglitz use a one-good model
in which infinitely lived employees can either work hard (put out an
effort level of e) or shirk (put out no effort). The price of the con-
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sumption good is normalized at 1 and agents are not allowed to save.
The utility of a typical worker is equal to the difference between the
wage earned (since all income is spent on the consumption good) and
the effort expended on the job. That is

(3)

U = w - e.

If the agent is employed and chooses to work hard, then there is an
exogenous probability (b) that he will lose his or her job. Such separa
tions are assumed to be caused by firm closings due to relocation and/or
shifts in tastes and preferences. If the worker shirks, there is an addi
tional probability (q) of being fired. This represents the probability of
being caught shirking. While employed, the worker earns the marketdetermined wage (w) and while unemployed he or she collects unemploy
ment insurance of vv. Finally, the probability of finding a job (a) is assum
ed to be a decreasing function of the unemployment rate (/i).
It is optimal for an employed worker to expend effort if the expected
lifetime income from doing so exceeds the expected lifetime income
from shirking. To determine when this is the case, let Ves denote the
expected lifetime utility for a worker who is currently employed and
shirking and let Ven represent the expected lifetime utility for a hard
working employee. Then, if we let r denote the interest rate, it follows
that

(4)

ye = w + V> + qWu + (1 - b - q)Ves
1 + r

and

- b)Ven
1 + r
where Vu denotes the expected lifetime utility for an unemployed
worker. Intuitively, (4) states that an employed, shirking worker earns
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a wage of w and expends no effort so that current utility is given by
w (applying eq. (3)). Moreover, these workers face a probability of
b + q that they will lose their job either because of being caught shirk
ing (which occurs with probability q) or due to an exogenous shock
(which occurs with probability b), in which case their expected future
income is equal to Vu . If they keep their job (which occurs with prob
ability 1 - b - q), their expected lifetime income remains equal to K|.
The denominator represents the rate at which future income is dis
counted. Equation (5) can be explained in a similar manner. The only
difference is that hard-working employees expend effort so that cur
rent utility is lower (w - e), but they are rewarded for their effort by
a smaller probability of unemployment (b).
The expected lifetime income for an unemployed worker is calculated
in an analogous fashion. We have
Vu =

w +

1 + r

The worker collects unemployment insurance of w while facing an
employment probability of a (which is a decreasing function of /A, the
unemployment rate). If a job is found, expected lifetime income rises
to Ven \ otherwise, it remains at Vu .
Employed workers shirk if V* > Ven and expend effort if the inequality
is reversed. Solving (4) - (6) for Ves , Ven and Vu allows us to generate
the no shirk condition (NSC). This condition tells us for any given level
of unemployment how high the market wage must be to guarantee that
employed workers will not loaf on the job. We find that Ven >Ves if
/s

(7)

w > w +4
*i (a + b + r + q).

This condition can be simplified a bit further by noting that in equilibrium
the flows into and out of unemployment must be equal. The flow out
of unemployment is proportional to a/t, the product of the employment
probability and the unemployment rate, while the flow into unemploy
ment is proportional to £(1 - /A), the product of the separation rate and
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the employment rate (assuming no employed workers shirk). 4 Equating
these two rates, solving for a and substituting into (7) yields a somewhat
simplified version of the no shirk condition:
A

(8)

w > w + e +—
q l&n + r].

Equation (8) reveals that the wage firms must pay to induce workers
to expend effort on the job increases with unemployment insurance and
the separation rate. Intuitively, as unemployment compensation rises
there is less of a reason to fear unemployment and workers are more
likely to risk losing their jobs by shirking. In addition, if the separation
rate is relatively high, workers may as well shirk since they are likely
to lose their jobs in the near future anyway.
Equation (8) also indicates that the "no shirk wage" is decreasing
in the probability that shirking will be detected (q) and the unemploy
ment rate. If q is relatively high so that monitoring of effort is fairly
efficient and effective, the firm can pay a low wage without fearing
that its workers will shirk. After all, shirking would be detected easily
and the worker would lose his job. The unemployment rate is a factor,
since it influences the rate at which jobs can be obtained. An increase
in the unemployment rate makes it harder for an unemployed worker
to find a job. Therefore, an employed worker values his job more and
is much less likely to risk losing it by shirking during periods of high
unemployment. This allows the firm to pay a lower wage when /* is high.
The NSC is depicted in figure 5.1 with employment (L) measured
on the horizontal axis and the wage on the vertical axis. For any given
level of employment, wages above the NSC are sufficient to induce ef
fort while wages below the NSC lead workers to shirk. The efficiency
wage, w(|t), is an increasing function of employment since reductions
in unemployment make it easier to find new jobs and must therefore
be accompanied by higher wages to make working hard optimal. At
full employment (Ly), shirking is optimal regardless of the wage since
workers can find new jobs at the old wage as soon as they are fired.
Therefore, the efficiency wage curve approaches but never intersects
the dashed vertical line. This implies that full employment can never be
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an equilibrium. Equilibrium unemployment serves as a discipline device
by making workers fear the prospect of losing their jobs.
Figure 5.1

w

No shirk condition (NSC)

Ld

Worker behavior is completely described by the NSC. To complete
the model we must also take into account firm behavior. The firm must
choose w, the wage it pays to its employed workers; w, unemployment
compensation; and L, employment, taking as given the economy's overall
unemployment rate. The optimal wage is given by (8) (with the ine
quality replaced by an equality), since this is the lowest wage that will
elicit effort. Increasing w is costly for two reasons: it increases layoff
costs and raises the efficiency wage. Thus, it is optimal to set w as low
as the law allows. Finally, given w and w, the firm chooses L to max
imize profit. This leads to a labor demand schedule which is, as is usually
the case, downward sloping. The aggregate demand for labor is
represented by the Ld curve in figure 5.1.
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Equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the labor demand curve and
efficiency wage locus. As emphasized above, equilibrium unemploy
ment must be positive. Changes in effort requirements, the laws govern
ing unemployment compensation, the process by which workers find
jobs, the ability of firms to monitor effort, and other such variables
influence unemployment and wages by affecting the labor demand
schedule and the no shirk condition. For example, an increase in the
separation rate (implying greater job turnover) makes it harder for firms
to keep workers from shirking. This leads to an increase in w and, as
the no shirk condition shifts up, an increase in unemployment as well.
The nature of the relationships between some of the remaining factors
and unemployment are discussed in some detail in the policy section
below.
In chapter 2 we found that in the presence of trading frictions
equilibrium unemployment is generally suboptimal. The reason for this
is that external effects are generated by individual search decisions and
this distorts incentives. It is therefore natural to ask whether the
unemployment produced by efficiency wage considerations is efficient.
The answer is generally no, for reasons similar to those encountered
in the search literature. There are two externalities that arise in the firm's
hiring decision that can be explained as follows. An increase in employ
ment by one firm lowers the unemployment rate and makes it easier
for an unemployed worker to find a job. This increases the expected
lifetime income of the unemployed and raises the efficiency wage thait
all other firms must pay. This externality remains important even when
the number of firms becomes large since, although the effect on
unemployment is small, the number of firms affected is large. This
negative externality leads to overemployment.
The second externality concerns the difference between the private
and social costs of employment. When a firm considers hiring another
worker it considers only the private cost, w. However, the social cost
of employment is e, the effort expended by the worker. The no shirk
condition (eq. (8)) indicates that in equilibrium w>e so that the private
cost exceeds the social cost. This leads to underemployment. By com-
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bining the two external effects, we can conclude that equilibrium
unemployment may be either too high or too low for efficiency pur
poses. Shapiro and Stiglitz show that in their model the two effects ex
actly offset each other if, in equilibrium, the marginal and average pro
ducts of labor are equal. In general, however, this need not be the case.
Further complications arise when the model is extended to allow for
an endogenously determined amount of monitoring. This is accomplished
by making q a function of the firm's monitoring effort (ra) and by sub
tracting the cost of monitoring from profit (as given in eq. (1)). Since
Changes in q affect the efficiency wage (see eq. (8)), changes in monitor
ing effort will generate externalities similar to those associated with the
hiring decision. The implication is that the level of monitoring will,
in general, be suboptimal and this will have spillover effects on unem
ployment. In the Shapiro/Stiglitz framework with a constant returns to
scale production function, equilibrium entails too much monitoring and
overemployment. Intuitively, firms can reduce shirking by increasing
the amount of monitoring that they undertake. However, since monitor
ing uses resources, it is cheaper for society to reduce shirking through
layoffs. With constant returns to scale, the savings in resources more
than compensate for the loss in employment, so that it is optimal to
tax monitoring. However, this is not true in general.
(ii) Criticisms and Evidence
Efficiency wage theory has been both severely criticized and staunch
ly defended in recent years. Most of the criticisms have been aimed
at demonstrating that there are superior ways of handling the shirking
problem that are more likely to emerge in a market setting. 5 For exam
ple, it has been argued that each worker should be willing to post a
bond that would be forfeited if he or she was detected shirking. All
that would be needed to guarantee that the worker would not shirk would
be a sufficiently high bond; unemployment would no longer be needed
as a discipline device. Alternatively, the worker could pay an "entrance
fee" when initially hired. Competition among workers for the jobs would
then increase the fee until all involuntary unemployment disappeared.
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The fear of losing your job and having to pay another entrance fee would
then be sufficient to keep workers from shirking.
The initial response to this criticism was to point out that this type
of bonding creates a moral hazard problem for the firm when it monitors
its workforce. After all, what prevents the firm from simply claiming
that the worker has shirked (regardless of the truth) in order to collect
the bond? Or, in the case of entrance fees, why not simply fire the worker
in order to collect additional fees from the replacement? There is no
cost to doing so, since the worker could be replaced immediately by
anyone from the pool of unemployed. Unfortunately, at least for the
proponents of efficiency wage theory, there are bonding arrangements
that both elicit effort and avoid this moral hazard problem. For exam
ple, upon accepting a job, each worker could deposit the value of the
bond into a pension fund. In the event that the worker leaves (for
whatever reason), the money would then be used to increase the pen
sion benefits of those who stayed on the job. Since the firm would no
longer benefit from firing the worker, this would circumvent the moral
hazard problem. 6 Supporters tend to argue that such arrangements are
rarely observed due to imperfections in capital markets which make
it impossible for the newly employed to raise the value of the bond. 7
Further work merging contract and efficiency wage theories is needed
to determine if there is a more satisfactory answer to the question of
why such contracting arrangements do not emerge to handle the shirk
ing problem.
Support for efficiency wage theory has come from a variety of sources.
On the theoretical front, a number of authors, most notably Akerlof
and Yellin (1986), argue that efficiency wage theory is able to explain
a number of important stylized facts concerning cyclical unemployment
better than competing micro theories of unemployment, e.g., search
and contract theories. Akerlof and Yellin single out the five following
features of business cycles that they feel any reasonable model of
unemployment should be able to explain:
(1) equilibrium unemployment should be involuntary;
(2) shifts in aggregate demand should affect output and employment;
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(3) quits should fall when unemployment rises;
(4) higher-skilled workers should be unemployed less often than lowerskilled workers; and,
(5) labor productivity should vary procyclically.
The first three features can be explained using the simple models discuss
ed above. Unemployment is involuntary since there are jobless workers
willing to work at wages slightly below the equilibrium level who are
unable to find employment. Moreover, shifts in aggregate demand alter
the demand for labor and trigger changes in output and employment.
Finally, as unemployment grows it becomes harder to find a new job
so that the value of quitting falls. This leads workers to quit less often.
The fourth feature is somewhat more difficult to explain. At first,
one might think that it would be more difficult to monitor high-skilled,
highly educated workers since their output is more difficult to observe.
Therefore, if unemployment acts as a discipline device and if all workers
possess the same utility function, then there should be more unemploy
ment among high-skilled workers. However, Akerlof and Yellin argue
that, in reality, high-skilled jobs are more pleasant and cause less disutili
ty when effort is expended. If high-skilled workers gain no utility from
shirking, then, in equilibrium there will be no highly skilled workers
unemployed. Unemployment will still be necessary to motivate lowskilled workers and the desired result will be obtained.
To explain the remaining feature, a model combining elements of the
efficiency wage and contract theories is needed. These considerations
enter by assuming that effort can vary and that the wage is negotiated
in an uncertain environment before the state of the world is known.
In a model without informational asymmetries and work-sharing it can
be shown (using techniques outlined in the previous chapter) that an
optimal contract is characterized by a wage that is independent of the
economic environment and an effort function that varies procyclically.
That is, workers work harder during good periods. However, this does
not immediately imply that productivity varies procyclically since ef
fort is subject to diminishing returns. Nevertheless, the desired result
can be obtained under certain conditions. For more details on this argu
ment, see Akerlof and Yellin (1986, pp. 11-14).
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Additional support for the theory is provided by Bulow and Sum
mers (1986), who argue that efficiency wage considerations provide
a theoretical basis for the dual labor market hypothesis. This hypothesis
maintains that there are two distinct labor markets: one providing highpaying primary sector jobs and another providing low-paying secon
dary sector jobs. 8 This theory has long been criticized for its lack of
theoretical underpinnings. Why don't secondary workers migrate to the
primary sector and bid wages down to their market-clearing level? Bulow
and Summers argue that shirking and imperfect monitoring provide the
explanation. In their model, shirking is difficult to detect in the primary
sector and perfect monitoring is costless in the secondary sector. The
secondary sector acts as a competitive labor market with wages adjusting
to clear the market. Without unemployment, the only way to keep
primary sector workers from shirking is to pay them wages above this
level. This makes primary sector jobs more attractive than secondary
sector jobs and supplies the motivation for primary sector employees
to work hard in order to avoid losing their jobs.
On the empirical front, several approaches have been adopted to either
test the theory or provide support for it. First, there is some compel
ling anecdotal evidence that paying higher wages leads to greater pro
ductivity, either due to higher morale or less shirking (see, for exam
ple, the discussion concerning Ford's 1914 wage increase in Bulow and
Summers 1986). In addition, there is evidence that high wages tend to
reduce turnover costs (by lowering quit rates), increase job satisfac
tion (Hamermesh 1977), and reduce absenteeism (Alien 1984).
There have also been a few attempts to determine whether or not inter
industry wage data are consistent with the predictions of the efficiency
wage models (e.g., Dickens and Katz 1986; Katz 1986b; Krueger and
Summers 1988; and Katz and Summers 1989). As I emphasized in the
chapter on search theory, we often observe workers with similar skills
and jobs earning substantially different wages. Competitive models of
the labor market cannot explain why such differentials persist. Accord
ing to search theory this phenomenon could arise as the result of search
costs that vary across workers. Efficiency wage models provide another
possible explanation: these differentials could be due to different
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wage/productivity relationships across industries. If, for example,
monitoring is more difficult in one industry than another, efficiency
wage theory would predict higher wages in the difficult to monitor in
dustry. It has been argued that the fact that there are important wage
differentials that cannot be explained by standard competitive factors,
e.g., compensating differentials, differences in union coverage, labor
quality differences, is evidence in favor of this theory (see, for exam
ple, Krueger and Summers 1988). Given the wealth of other possible
explanations for this phenomenon (including search theory), this must
be considered, at best, weak evidence. For a detailed survey of the em
pirical work along these lines see Katz (1986a). For an appropriately
skeptical view of this approach see Topel (1989).
To date, direct attempts to test the theory have proven to be largely
unsuccessful (see Leonard 1987; Groshen and Krueger 1990; and Holzer
1990).

(iii) Policy Implications
The policy implications of efficiency wage theory are similar in many
respects to those generated by search theory. This is especially true with
respect to transfer payments from the government. Unemployment in
surance (and other transfers to the unemployed) increase unemployment
for two reasons. First, it makes workers less fearful of unemployment
by reducing the relative value of a job. In response, firms must pay
higher wages in order to keep workers from shirking. This can be seen
most clearly in (8), the NSC, where the efficiency wage is an increas
ing function of w, unemployment compensation. The second effect works
through labor demand. Since firms must finance at least part of the pro
gram, any increase in UI raises the cost of employment and lowers labor
demand. Therefore, both the NSC and the labor demand curve in figure
5.1 shift in a manner that lowers employment. In an economy with multi
ple sectors, an increase in UI will shift resources toward the high
unemployment/high-wage sectors. The reason for this is that workers
become more willing to risk long spells of unemployment in order to
have the chance to capture a high-wage job. This result also parallels
the effect of UI in a search model.
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Transfer payments to employed workers or firms filling vacancies
(such as wage or employment subsidies and job bonus programs) in
crease employment. If the payment is made to labor, it makes employ
ment a more valuable state and shifts the NSC in figure 5.1 down. If
the payment goes to the firm, it reduces the relative value of an unfill
ed vacancy (with respect to a filled vacancy) and shifts labor demand
in figure 5.1 out to the right. As with unemployment insurance, the
qualitative effect is identical to what is predicted by a search model.
Figure 5.1 can also be used to determine the impact of an increase
in the minimum wage. To do so, draw a horizontal line at the level
of the minimum wage over to the NSC. This gives the NSC when the
law is instituted. In sectors in which the minimum wage falls below
the level of the original equilibrium wage, the law has no impact. Other
wise, the new NSC intersects labor demand at a lower level of
employment as we would expect, unemployment rises. Assuming that
these low-wage sectors are also the low unemployment sectors (as should
be the case according to the theory), the program results in resources
shifting towards high unemployment sectors of the economy.
Turn next to the impact of state-run employment agencies which are
aimed at reducing the time it takes to find a job. In the Shapiro/Stiglitz
model, such a program can be modeled by examining the impact of
a reduction in a, the job-finding rate. The immediate impact is a reduc
tion in the time it takes to find reemployment. While this lowers
unemployment, it also makes workers fear unemployment less and
therefore shifts the NSC up. Although this indirect effect works in the
opposite direction of the primary effect, causing unemployment to rise,
it can never dominate.
There are two other similarities between the policy implications of
the search and efficiency wage literatures worth mentioning. The first
concerns trade policy and is due to Bulow and Summers (1986). In their
two-sector model they demonstrate that free trade can actually lower
welfare if it results in a contraction of the primary (i.e., efficiency wage)
sector. The reasoning is as follows. Primary sector jobs carry with them
higher wages to keep workers from shirking. If this sector shrinks due
to free trade, high wage (i.e., "good jobs") are replaced by low wage
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('bad jobs') and income falls. This can result in a fall in welfare. In
fact, welfare is likely to fall if the primary sector is highly competitive,
since then the standard gains from trade would be relatively small and
would probably be dominated by the fall in income. The implication
is that governments should subsidize or protect high-wage, highly com
petitive sectors. This result is similar to Davidson, Martin, and Matusz's
finding that some jobs are more valuable than others in an economy
with search-generated unemployment and finitely lived agents.
Finally, turn to the question of efficiency. As we noted above, exter
nalities are present in efficiency wage models that render equilibrium
suboptimal. There are some cases in which it is necessary to increase
unemployment in order to raise welfare. However, as with the search
literature, there is no evidence that these externalities are nontrivial nor
is there any indication of which external effects are most important.
It is therefore impossible to determine the overall welfare effect of any
given policy; the results will not be robust to small changes in the
assumptions of the model.

C. The Insider/Outsider Theory of Unemployment
The fundamental supposition of the insider/outsider theory of
unemployment is that the workforce can be divided into two subgroups
that possess different degrees of power in the wage-setting process. The
first subgroup consists of employed workers (the "insiders") while the
second consists of the unemployed (the "outsiders"). 9 It is also assumed
that turnover costs or frictions exist that insulate the wages earned by
the insiders from market forces. This results in non-Walrasian wages
and involuntary unemployment.
The basic idea is simple. A firm has a certain amount of time and
effort already invested in its current workforce. It took time to find and
train the right workers for each available job. Replacing these workers
with outsiders would be costly for a number of reasons. For example,
the firm would have to search for and then train the new workers, and
it might be costly to lay off or fire the old incumbents. These transac-
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tion costs provide the insiders with a certain amount of market power
that they can use to their advantage. Insiders can demand wages above
the market-clearing level and, as long as their demands do not become
too outrageous (so that it becomes cheaper to fire the worker and seek
an outsider as a substitute), the firm will find it optimal to meet the
demand. In equilibrium, even though outsiders would strictly prefer
to be employed, insiders are able to exploit their market power to keep
outsiders from underbidding them and taking their jobs. This results
in involuntary unemployment.
In the remainder of this chapter I briefly outline how insider market
power results in unemployment, and how such market power can be
obtained and sustained. Recent empirical tests of the theory's predic
tions are also discussed.
(i) Bargaining, Non-Walrasian Wages
and Involuntary Unemployment
One of the first papers to formally analyze the impact of insider market
power is due to Shaked and Sutton (1984). The purpose of their article
is to show how trading frictions and turnover costs can lead to nonWalrasian outcomes. They do so by assuming that such costs exist and
then demonstrating how insiders can exploit the situation and secure
wages above the market-clearing level.
In Shaked and Sutton's model, a firm and its employees bargain over
wages by trading offers until one side makes an offer that the other side
finds acceptable. However, the firm has the option of terminating
negotiations with its current workforce and replacing it with unemployed
workers if agreement cannot be reached in T periods. If the firm chooses
this option, the newly hired workers become the new insiders and
negotiations begin anew. The option of replacing workers captures the
notion that market forces should influence the outcome of the negotia
tions. If, for example, unemployment is high, one might expect that
there would be a great deal of competition for the employment oppor
tunities offered by the firm and that this would drive the wage rate down
to its market-clearing level. The assumption that this option can be
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exercised only after T periods have passed captures the notion that there
are frictions or turnover costs that keep the firm from costlessly replacing
its workforce. Increases in T indicate that it takes more time and effort
(that is, it is costlier) to replace insiders with outsiders. Large values
for Tare therefore associated with a high degree of insider market power.
The solution to this complex bargaining problem can be explained
in a fairly straightforward, intuitive manner. Following Snaked and Sutton, consider the case in which the firm collects $1 in revenue and must
negotiate with its single employee over the wage. Assume further that
the firm, its worker and the outsider discount the future at a common
rate denoted by 6 e (0,1). Finally, assume that this is the only job available
so that the competitive solution results in the workers underbidding each
other until the wage is driven to zero.
The bargaining problem can be thought of as a two-stage process.
In the first stage, which lasts T periods, the firm is bound to negotiate
with its current employee. Then, if after T periods no agreement has
been reached, we enter stage two in which the firm is free to switch
workers or keep bargaining with the incumbent worker. Let M denote
the most that the firm can reasonably expect to earn at the beginning
of stage one and let M° represent the most that the firm can reasonably
expect to earn if it reaches the beginning of stage two. Then the following
two equations must hold
(9)
(10)

M° = max{5(l - 6 + 6M );M}
M = * ~ &T+l
1 -6

+ 5TM°.

Equation (9) can be explained as follows. Consider the position of the
firm if it reaches stage two. At this point, it will either switch workers
or continue bargaining with its current employee based on which ac
tion leads to the larger payoff. If it switches, it finds itself in a setting
identical to that faced at the beginning of stage one; the only difference
is that the old insider has been replaced by another worker. Therefore,
switching leads to a payoff of M. Now, suppose instead that the firm
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chooses to continue bargaining with the incumbent worker. If the next
two offers (one made by the firm and then the counteroffer made by
the insider) are refused, then the firm finds itself in exactly the same
position it was in at the start of the negotiations (since it is now locked
into bargaining with this worker for at least Tmore periods). Therefore,
in this case, the firm's payoff will be at most 52Af) . Go back one period.
The worker, realizing that the firm will give up at least 62 - 52M° in
the next period, demands at least this value now. This leaves the firm
with 6 - [62 - 62M ] or 6[1 - 6 + 6A/ ], a value that it can demand
at the beginning of the negotiations.
Turn next to (10). This equation can be explained by working
backwards in a similar manner. If no agreement is reached after T
periods, the firm will earn no more than 5TM°. Therefore, in period
T the firm can expect a profit of no more than dT- 5TM°. Repeating
this argument T times leads to a profit of no more than
1 _ g _ 52 _ _ _ $r
1 -6
at the beginning of the negotiations.
Solving (9) and (10) for the two unknowns, M and M , yields the
firm's equilibrium profits
(11)

M=
(1 + 6) (1 - S7)

Examining (11) in detail reveals that the market-clearing wage, i.e.,
zero, is obtained only if T = 1 and that the wage is increasing in T
(since profits are decreasing in 7). That is, only when the firm can im
mediately switch workers (so that there are no turnover costs or fric
tions) will the wage be bid down to its competitive level. For all other
values of T, a non-Walrasian wage rate is obtained. We conclude that
frictions or turnover costs produce an environment in which incum
bent workers are able to secure wages above the market-clearing level
for themselves. They are able to do so because the frictions bestow upon
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them market power that places them at a relative advantage when com
pared with the unemployed outsiders. In a more complex model with
multiple sectors and firms, this market power would lead to an
equilibrium level of involuntary unemployment.
The one shortcoming of the Shaked and Sutton analysis is that it does
not attempt to explain why outsiders cannot (or do not) seek out the
firms and underbid the insiders. This is because they simply assume
that the firm and the outsiders cannot make contact for T periods. We
now turn to the model that addresses this issue.
(ii) Turnover Costs and On-the-job Harassment
In a series of articles, Lindbeck and Snower (1986, 1987, 1988a,
1988b) argue that insiders are able to prevent outsiders from underbid
ding them by using their market power to alter the transaction costs
faced by their employers. For example, suppose that there are signifi
cant search and training costs involved in hiring new workers and that
firing costs are nontrivial. Then, even if outsiders are willing to work
for less than the prevailing wage, they may not be willing to accept
work at the prevailing wage less the turnover costs the firm must incur
when hiring them. Therefore, insiders will be able to retain their jobs,
underbidding will be unsuccessful and unemployment will persist. The
higher the turnover costs, the larger the wage rate insiders will be able
to earn before underbidding becomes successful. It is therefore in the
insiders' interest to increase these costs as much as possible. One way
to do so is through unionization, since unions can push for increased
severance pay and institute elaborate hiring and firing procedures that
make substituting outsiders for insiders extremely costly. In addition,
strike threats are more powerful when coming from a group of workers
(rather than individuals) and can further enhance the market power of
insiders.
Another way that insiders can increase transaction costs is by threaten
ing not to cooperate with and/or to harass newly hired employees. As
Lindbeck and Snower demonstrate in their 1988 AER article, such threats
can keep outsiders from "stealing" jobs held by insiders. In their model,
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worker productivities depend upon the level of cooperation between
workers and the amount of cooperation that takes place is under the
control of the workers. In equilibrium, insiders cooperate with other
insiders but harass any outsider who takes a job from a fellow insider.
This lowers outsider productivity and hence the value of outsiders to
the firm. Underbidding would not take place either because outsiders
would realize that it would be unsuccessful or because firms would
realize that replacing high-productivity insiders with low-productivity
outsiders would not be profitable. Since outsiders prefer to trade places
with insiders, the unemployment is involuntary. This unemployment
arises as the result of insiders exploiting their market power to keep
outsiders from obtaining jobs.

(iii) Criticism and Evidence
The insider/outsider theory of unemployment generates several in
teresting testable hypotheses. One particular result which has received
a great deal of attention has to do with the multiplicity of equilibria
and the persistence of unemployment. Since insiders possess and use
market power to their own advantage, the number of insiders is an im
portant determinant of the equilibrium unemployment rate. Different
initial employment levels produce different equilibria; there is no
"natural rate of unemployment." Moreover, the effect of different labor
market policies will depend, to a large extent, on the initial level of
employment. Recent empirical work by Blanchard and Summers (1987)
indicates that in fact the equilibrium unemployment rate does depend
on the history of the actual employment level. This result has been refer
red to as "hysteresis in unemployment," since it implies that equilibrium
is path-dependent. Insider/outsider theory provides one possible explana
tion for this empirical finding.
Additional support for this theory can be found in recent work by
Carruth and Oswald (1987) and Blanchflower, Oswald and Garrett
(1987). These papers attempt to explain how wages are determined in
British labor markets. In addition, they focus on the importance of in
ternal and external pressures in the wage-setting process. External
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pressures are beyond the firm's control and include standard competitive
factors such as the level of unemployment. Internal pressures include
factors such as the profitability of the firm. According to competitive
theories of the labor market it is the outside pressures that should drive
wages. However, in both instances inside factors are found to also be
of great importance. This is consistent with the insider/outsider theory
since internal pressures affect the degree of market power held by
insiders.
Due to the relative newness of this theory, it has not yet generated
a great deal of attention from those who are apt to criticize it. There
are, however, two obvious weaknesses of the models in their present
form. First, although the models explain why existing firms will not
want to hire outsiders, it seems as if it would be profitable for new firms
to enter, hire outsiders at low wages, and compete with the incumbents.
As long as the prevailing wage was above the market-clearing level and
as long as set-up costs are not too large, it appears that entry would
be successful at reducing or eliminating unemployment. Therefore, the
insider/outsider theory may not be consistent with long-run equilibrium.
The second weakness concerns the payment scheme for insiders. It
is assumed throughout that all workers are paid using simple time-rate
wages. Under this assumption, there is no way for the firm to convince
insiders to cooperate with newly hired workers. However, if the firm
used a more elaborate payment scheme in which insider compensation
was tied to firm profitability (or output), it might be in the insiders'
interest to allow the firm to expand by hiring outsiders at low pay. By
doing so, the firm could increase its profit and insiders would benefit
as well. For this reason, "share contracts" would improve the perfor
mance of the economy and reduce unemployment (for more on share
contracts see Weitzman 1984 and 1987). Although Lindbeck and Snower
(1988a) suggest some reasons why such contracts are rarely observed,
it is clear that more research along these lines is warranted.

(iv) Policy Implications
The insider/outsider theory of unemployment is still in its infancy,
and at this point, therefore, little work has been undertaken to investigate
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its policy implications. What follows relies heavily on one of the only
systematic treatments of policy issues in this framework, chapter 10
of Lindbeck and Snower (1988b).
With respect to labor market policies, Lindbeck and Snower consider
two avenues to increase employment: policies that diminish insider power
and those that increase the participation of outsiders in the wage-setting
process. To reduce insider power it is necessary to find ways to lower
the cost of replacing incumbent workers. One way to do this is to lower
severance pay or decrease the proportion of the unemployment insurance
program funded by firms. Another way is to alter legislation so as to
make firing workers easier. According to the theory, such policy changes
should result in lower wages for insiders, an increase in employment
and greater production. There is a cost, however, in that the real wages
of insiders must fall for these policies to be effective.
One method for increasing outsiders' influence in the process of
negotiation has already been mentioned: the institution of profit-sharing
schemes. By tying worker compensation to firm performance, the cost
of hiring new workers falls and incumbent workers become less resis
tant to expanding employment (this follows from the fact that by ex
panding employment firms can increase profits; this benefits insiders
if they receive part of the firm's profit). The government can encourage
the use of such labor contracts via tax incentives.
Another way to make outsiders more attractive to firms is for the
government to subsidize training programs. This lowers the cost of hiring
outsiders and increases labor productivity at a cost of reducing insider
wages. Finally, any government policies aimed at encouraging entry
by new firms should increase employment. After all, new firms do not
have incumbent workers and are therefore free to hire outsiders at
relatively low wages. This can be accomplished by encouraging lend
ing institutions to finance new ventures or by altering the tax incen
tives faced by firms.
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NOTES
1. See also Stiglitz (1976) or Yellin (1984).
2. If the relationship between productivity and the wage varies across firms the model predicts
that the firms will offer different wages. Thus, this is perhaps another explanation of equilibrium
wage dispersion.
3. Shapiro and Stiglitz were not the first to argue that by paying higher wages firms could elicit
greater effort. Examples of earlier work which also exploits this notion include Eaton and White
(1982), Foster and Wan (1984) and Miyazaki (1984).
4. The actual flows out of and into unemployment are found by multiplying these values by the
size of the labor force. It is also worth noting that in equilibrium firms will pay efficiency wages
so that no worker will shirk.
5. For a more basic criticism aimed at the credibility of the theory see Barro (1989).
6. See, for example, Malcolmson (1984).
7. For a way around imperfections in the capital market see Carmichael (1985).
8. For a discussion of the dual labor market hypothesis see Doeringer and Piore (1971).
9. Workers holding jobs in sectors with no turnover costs are also sometimes included in the
outsider group. These workers are subject to market forces and earn less than insiders.

6
Conclusion
It is highly likely that the theories discussed in this monograph each
provide an accurate explanation of some component of unemployment.
For example, unemployment generated by search or efficiency wage
considerations seems most consistent with our notion of frictional
unemployment (or the "natural rate"). However, deviations from the
equilibrium unemployment rate are probably better explained by models
of non-Walrasian equilibria. To further our understanding of unemploy
ment, serious empirical work needs to be undertaken. Unfortunately,
in spite of the fact that a great deal of empirical work has been devoted
to unemployment, to date very little has been done to test these theories
or distinguish between them. Such work is important, since it would
allow us to determine which theories account for a significant amount
of unemployment.
While a detailed investigation of the ways to empirically distinguish
between the theories would certainly be valuable, it is beyond the scope
of this monograph. In addition, given my firm belief in the theory of
comparative advantage, it seems appropriate to leave this task to those
more qualified. There are, however, two other issues that are worth
considering. First, it is important to sort out the critical features of the
various models that need to be verified empirically. This entails reexamining the crucial results and the assumptions that generate them. Sec
ond, it is possible that much can be learned by looking for similarities
across models as well as differences. In particular, if there are policies
that would be effective in all of the frameworks discussed, then the
likelihood that such a policy would be effective in reality is greatly
enhanced. Therefore, I will conclude the monograph by trying to
distinguish between predictions and conclusions that are "model bound"
and those that seem to emerge in all of the recent theories of involun
tary unemployment.
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A. Empirical Verification
The first two issues I discuss concern the type of unemployment the
theories attempt to explain. Of particular interest is whether the bulk
of unemployment is structural or frictional, and whether or not changes
in unemployment are primarily due to business cycles or sectoral shocks.
Although these questions have been addressed by a variety of authors,
I will focus on the most recent findings.
Search theory explains unemployment due to the market's failure to
match unemployed workers and firms with vacancies. The models of
non-Walrasian equilibria explain unemployment as the result of incom
patible desires on the part of firms and workers with respect to economic
transactions. This incompatibility leads to job rationing. If virtually all
of unemployment is of the former variety, it would be wise to devote
a good deal of resources to employment agencies and other programs
designed to improve the matching process. In a recent article, Abraham
(1983) argues that this is not the case. In her article, Abraham shows
that the number of workers seeking employment typically exceeds the
number of vacant jobs by a significant margin (according to her
estimates, the ratio averaged 5.0 during the late 1970s). Since search
ers greatly outnumber the number of jobs available, there must be many
sectors in which jobs are rationed. We can conclude that unemploy
ment is more than just a simple matching problem that is, not all
unemployment is frictional. It follows that programs aimed at matching
workers may not have a significant impact on aggregate unemployment.
Abraham's results also lend support to the non-Walrasian models of
unemployment discussed in chapter 3. Further support for the view that
job rationing is important is provided by Laffont (1985) in his survey
of empirical work on fixed-price models. Laffont summarizes the results
obtained by Bouissou, Laffont and Vuong (1983) and Artus, Laroque
and Michel (1982), who used survey data to investigate whether the
European unemployment experienced during the 1970s was dominated
by classical or Keynesian unemployment. The survey data included
responses by firms to questions concerning the constraints they perceived
as binding. For example, firms were asked: "If you received more
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orders, could you produce more with your actual capacities?" An af
firmative answer was viewed as an indication of excess supply in the
product market. A negative response was viewed as an indication of
excess demand in the product market. Following this procedure, the
authors concluded that over 60 percent of the firms surveyed viewed
themselves as constrained in a manner consistent with Keynesian
unemployment. Less than one-quarter responded in a manner consis
tent with classical unemployment.
Another important issue concerns the ability of these theories to ex
plain changes in unemployment. So far, most of the work in these areas
has focused on providing a microeconomic rationale for the existence
of unemployment. Far less work has been devoted to the issue of how
unemployment varies over time. In particular, there have only been a
few attempts to demonstrate that the forces at work in these models
can generate cyclical behavior consistent with the stylized facts of
business cycles (for notable exceptions, see the search theoretic ap
proaches by Howitt and McAfee 1988 or Diamond and Fudenberg 1989).
The importance of this issue is underscored by the recent findings of
Blanchard and Diamond (1989). They begin their paper by noting that
the monthly flows into and out of employment in the United States are
commonly quite large (close to seven million workers change employ
ment status each month). They then go on to investigate whether such
transitions are caused primarily by: sectoral shocks, which require a
reallocation of labor across sectors; cyclical shocks, due to changes in
aggregate demand; or labor supply shocks. Using a simple matching
model, they demonstrate that each type of shock implies a different type
of co-movement of unemployment, vacancies, and labor force participa
tion. Applying this theory to the data, they find that changes in unemploy
ment over the past 30 years have been primarily influenced by cyclical,
not sectoral, shocks. This finding, although somewhat controversial (see
the comments by Hall and Yellin that follow in Brookings), strongly
suggests that more attention needs to be paid to the origin of business
cycles and the cyclical component of unemployment. Providing an ex
planation of the existence of unemployment is not enough.
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One feature that arose repeatedly throughout the monograph was the
possibility of multiple, Pareto-rankable, steady-state equilibria. In the
search literature, this result emerges due to externalities in the search
process and a feedback mechanism that makes a joint increase in pro
duction by all firms profitable. This type of coordination problem also
arose in the non-Walrasian models where it was generated by spillover
effects across sectors (an increase in one sector's employment increases
the demand for the other sector's product so that a joint increase in
employment may be welfare-improving). As discussed in the policy sec
tions, this result, if supported by empirical evidence, has important policy
implications. In particular, when the economy can get stuck in an
equilibrium that is Pareto-dominated by another (higher employment)
equilibrium, the government should play an active role in determining
both the overall level of economic activity and individual expectations
about the future economic environment. However, these policy prescrip
tions depend crucially upon the assumptions that the search externalities
and/or spillover effects are nontrivial and, in the search literature, that
the search technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. Yet, no one
has attempted to measure these external effects. Moreover, work on
the properties of the search technology is still in its infancy. While it
is interesting to note that the outcome is theoretically possible, it seems
sensible to require some evidence that these assumptions mimic reality
before instituting the implied policies.
One way to get some sort of handle on the size of the search exter
nalities is to build a simple theoretical model and then calibrate it, i.e.,
derive estimates of the unobservable parameters, using data from
previous labor market studies. This enables one to obtain estimates of
the actual size of the external effects. Recent work by Davidson and
Woodbury (1990), using data from the Illinois Unemployment Insurance
Bonus Experiment, suggests that the search externalities may be fairly
small. One of the problems with this approach is that, as Diamond and
Maskin (1979) point out, the results are extremely sensitive to the
assumptions made concerning the search technology (Davidson and
Woodbury assume that all job contacts are made by workers and that
the underlying search technology is quadratic).
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Recent findings with respect to the properties of the search technology
are no more encouraging. Estimating a model, using British data, in
which increasing returns to scale is a necessary condition for multiple
equilibria, Pissarides (1986) finds strong evidence in favor of constant
returns to scale. Blanchard and Diamond (1989) obtain similar results
using U.S. data, although it is possible to interpret their results as sup
port for mildly increasing returns to scale.

B. Similarities in Policy Implications
Although the five theories surveyed rely on dramatically different
arguments to support equilibrium unemployment, there is remarkable
consistency in terms of the policy implications. One reason for this is
that all of the work in these areas can be viewed as an attempt to establish
a solid microeconomic foundation for Keynesian unemployment. Not
surprisingly, the policy implications that follow possess a distinct Keyne
sian flavor.
With respect to transfer payments, except in a few minor instances,
unemployment compensation increases unemployment by making
joblessness relatively more attractive than it would be in the absence
of such a program. When search is required to find employment,
unemployment compensation reduces search activity and results in fewer
matches between firms and workers. When efficiency wage considera
tions are important, UI raises the wage that firms must pay to keep
workers from shirking and this results in a greater steady-state level
of unemployment. Unemployment insurance also increases the turnover
costs faced by firms, thereby increasing insider market power. This
leads to higher insider wages and lower employment according to the
insider/outsider theory of unemployment. Only the fixed-price literature
provides support for UI. When unemployment is of the Keynesian varie
ty, UI relaxes the product market constraint faced by firms and increases
employment. However, even in this case there are alternative programs
that can achieve the same objective.
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On the other hand, programs that reward workers for finding jobs
or firms for filling vacancies, e.g., wage or job subsidies and bonuses
to workers finding reemployment, almost always perform well. By mak
ing a job more valuable, these programs increase search effort, reduce
the expected reward from shirking and increase aggregate demand. All
three effects lead to an increase in steady-state employment. The only
cost associated with such schemes appears to be distributional.
Not surprisingly, minimum wage laws do not collect much support
from these new theories of unemployment. Although they may be
welfare-enhancing due to their impact on the externalities involved in
search and monitoring, they almost always lead to an increase in
unemployment (often by reallocating labor towards high-unemployment
sectors). The only exception is when the economy is troubled by the
type of Keynesian unemployment discussed in chapter 3. In that case,
minimum wages can increase aggregate demand (if they increase ag
gregate income) and can thereby reduce unemployment. However, as
stressed in chapter 3, there are always better ways to achieve the same
objective.
Traditional Keynesian remedies for unemployment such as aggregate
demand management (through changes in taxes and government spend
ing) also repeatedly emerged throughout the monograph as effective
ways to increase welfare. When prices are incorrect due to, say, monopo
ly power on the part of firms, the constraints faced by firms in the pro
duct market can be relaxed by increasing the demand for commodities.
This increases the demand for labor and lowers unemployment. Similar
effects are present when search and efficiency wage considerations are
important. Aggregate demand management can also play an important
role in guiding the economy toward the most preferred equilibrium when
multiple equilibria are present. As discussed above, this is one possibility
that arises in almost all of the frameworks reviewed here.
Finally, we have also seen that when multiple equilibria exist, agents'
expectations about the future trading environment are crucial. Govern
ment programs aimed at convincing the public that the future economic
outlook is positive should be effective ways of improving economic per
formance. In this sense, the government should act as an "economic
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cheerleader." In other words, the Reagan rhetoric, while not always
believable, may have had a hand in reducing unemployment. At least
such a belief is consistent with these new views of involuntary
unemployment.
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